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HQ 227241





August 13, 1997

LIQ-9-01-PRO-2-07-RR:IT:EC IOR

CATEGORY: LIQUIDATION

Port Director
U.S. Customs Service
ATTN: Trade Compliance Section
200 Granby Street, Room 839
Norfolk VA 23510

RE: Application for further review of protest no. 1401-96-100124; notice of denial of 19 U.S.C. ?1520(c)(1) claim; timeliness of protest; mistake of fact; notice of liquidation; A.N. Deringer v. United States

Dear Sir:

The above-referenced protest was forwarded to this office for further review. We have considered the facts and issues raised, and our decision follows.

FACTS:

This protest concerns the entry of tomato product. On November 21, 1991 Customs HQ 089803 was issued, holding that the subject tomato product was classified under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) subheading 2002.10.00, and as a product of the European Community, under subheading 9903.23.17 HTSUS, with a 100% rate of duty. Following receipt of the ruling, the protestant determined to bring an action before the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) on the issue of tariff classification. According to the protestant:

In preparation for litigation, [protestant's in-house counsel] instructed personnel at [protestant's] Solon and Danville facilities to retain all documents pertaining to 1992 imports of tomato sauce from Spain and to send her copies of all customs liquidation notices so that entries could be protested under 19 U.S.C. ?1514.

Entry no. 100-xxxx025-1 was made on February 24, 1992, and according to the protestant, was the protestant's first shipment of the tomato product in 1992. The entry was made consistent with the decision in HQ 089803. The importer of record listed on the entry summary (CF 7501), in box no. 11 was the protestant with a Danville, Virginia address. The entry was liquidated on June 19, 1992, and the protestant alleges that the liquidation notice was sent to the Danville address. However, according to Customs practice, as stated by Arthur Versich of Customs Automated Commercial System (ACS), the address to which the liquidation notice is sent is the one associated with the importer number, contained in box no. 12 on the entry summary. The address associated with the importer number is the Glendale address. After receipt of the liquidation notice, the protestant allegedly filed a protest on the entry.

Entries no. 100-xxxx343-5, made February 28, 1992, and 100-xxxx186-7, made March 24, 1992, were the second and third consecutive shipments of the tomato product imported by the protestant in 1992, and are the subject of this protest. These two subject entries were also made consistent with the decision in HQ 089803. The importer of record listed in box no. 11 on the entry summaries of the two subject entries was the protestant, with a Glendale, California address. The importer number in box no. 12 is the same on both of these entries and the entry made on February 24, 1992. The February 28, 1992 entry was liquidated with no change on June 26, 1992, and the March 24, 1992 entry was liquidated with no change on July 24, 1992. The protestant alleges that the liquidation notices for the two subject entries were mailed to the Glendale address.

According to the protestant's in-house counsel's affidavit:

5. Glendale is the corporate headquarters of not only [the protestant], but also several other affiliated ...entities.... No one at the Glendale facility expected to receive Customs liquidation notices, because it was expected that the liquidation notices for the 1992 shipments of tomato sauce from Spain would first arrive at Danville and then be immediately sent to me by Danville personnel.

6. I have since learned that all subsequent liquidation notices for the 1992 shipments of tomato sauce from Spain were sent by Customs to the Glendale address. Only two of these notices were subsequently directed to knowledgeable [protestant's] employees at Danville who then forwarded them to me. As there are approximately 1,400 employees at the Glendale facility, without the name of a designated individual on a piece of mail, the likelihood of its reaching its intended recipient is low.

According to the protestant, because the liquidation notices for the subject entries were not forwarded to the in-house attorney, the entries were not protested within 90 days after the date of liquidation. On April 19, 1993, the protestant filed a Petition to correct a clerical error under 19 U.S.C. ?1520(c)(1). The protestant alleges:

The failure to file protests on the second and third tomato shipments in 1992 was directly caused by a mistaken belief that all customs liquidation notices for the 1992 shipments would be sent to [protestant's] Danville address, not to its Glendale address. This belief was clearly reasonably given the fact that the liquidation notice for the first shipment of tomato sauce was sent to [the protestant's] Danville plant where knowledgeable [protestant's] employees followed special procedures resulting in a valid protest filed on this shipment. [Protestant] expected that all subsequent liquidation notices would be received in Danville and handled and processed in the same manner. This mistake of fact, the basis of which is that [protestant] employees and in-house counsel understood the facts to be other than they were, is the type of situation that is correctable under section 520(c)(1). (Emphasis supplied).

The petition requested that Customs refrain from taking any action on the petition until the CIT had ruled upon the issue of tariff classification.

The 1520(c)(1) petition was denied by letter dated June 16, 1993. The letter was addressed to counsel for protestant, Katten Muchin & Zavis' (the law firm representing protestant, hereinafter referred to as the "law firm") Chicago office, and the salutation referred to "Ms. Murphy." The notice stated that the petition was denied on the grounds that "an error in the construction of a law is involved, and cannot be corrected under this provision (520 (c)(1)." According to conversation with Customs personnel, the date on the notice of denial, the date of denial and the date of mailing of the notice, are the same. Customs ACS indicates that the date of denial of the 1520(c)(1) petition was June 16, 1993. By letter dated April 1, 1996, counsel for protestant informed Customs that a settlement agreement had been reached in the tariff classification litigation, and requested that the 1520(c)(1) petition be expeditiously processed. The protestant has submitted a copy of the CIT decision, according to which tomato products imported by the protestant are not properly classified under HTSUS subheading 2002.10.00. A copy of the settlement agreement between the parties was submitted as well. The protestant's counsel claims that it was not notified that the 1520(c)(1) petition had been denied until Customs notified protestant's counsel by telephone on April 16, 1996 and by facsimile dated April 16, 1996.

In support of its claim of non receipt of notice of denial, prior to April 16, 1996, protestant provides the following:

--Affidavit of Mark S. Zolno, the head of Customs and International Trade Department at the law firm, stating that: 1) he conducted searches of all relevant client files for any indication that the notice had been received prior to April 16, 1996 2) that he had no recollection of ever receiving a notice of denial from Customs on the 1520(c)(1) petition, in his name or otherwise, and 3) believed that no such notice had been received by the law firm prior to April 16, 1996;

--affidavit of Kathleen M. Murphy, an attorney with the law firm in its Customs and International Trade Department, stating that: 1) she has no recollection of ever receiving a notice of denial of the 1520(c)(1) petition prior to April 16, 1996, 2) has searched the law firm's files pertaining to the protestant and has found no notice of denial of the 1520(c)(1) petition sent to the law firm prior to April 16, 1996, and 3) believes that the law firm never received such notice prior to April 16, 1996;

--affidavit of Richard F. Kozlowski, Director of Operations for the law firm's Chicago office stating: 1) from February, 1985 until October, 1995 he was the Office and Facilities manager at the law firm's Chicago office and his duties included management and supervision of mailroom operations, 2) in his current position his duties include management and supervision of mailroom operations, 3) a description of the law firm's regular business practice with respect to mail which is received but not identified in order to identify and deliver mail to the proper individuals or departments within the law firm, 4) all mailroom personnel are required to follow the described mandatory procedures for identifying and distributing mail, and 5) he has no recollection of any instances in which the law firm's policies and procedures for delivery of mail were not followed;

--affidavit of DeLargo Lee, Supervisor of the mailroom for the law firm's Chicago office stating: 1) from February, 1986 until December, 1995 he was a mail clerk at the Chicago office of the law firm and his duties included the sorting and delivery of incoming U.S. mail, messenger packages, and express mail packages to attorneys and other employees of the law firm, in accordance with the policies and procedures which the law firm had implemented for incoming mail; 2) in his current position his duties include oversight of incoming mail, messenger packages, and express mail packages, and ensuring that the law firm's policies and procedures for the processing of incoming mail are implemented properly, 3) a description of the law firm's regular business practice with respect to mail which is received but not identified in order to identify and deliver mail to the proper individuals or departments within the law firm, and 4) he has no recollection of any instances in which the law firm's policies and procedures for delivery of mail were not followed;

--affidavit of Linda M. Murphy, Training and Development Coordinator at the law firm's Chicago office stating that she has read and is familiar with the Notice of Denial dated June 16, 1993 and has no recollection of ever receiving such notice of denial from U.S. Customs at any time;

--affidavit of Bernadette Murphy, attorney in the Healthcare department at the law firm's Chicago office until October 25, 1993, stating that she has read and is familiar with the Notice of Denial dated June 16, 1993 and has no recollection of ever receiving such notice of denial from U.S. Customs at any time;

--affidavit of James Berge, Benefits Analyst in the law firm's Chicago office stating: 1) his duties include the maintenance, updating, and retrieval of information contained in the law firm's employee records, and 2) as of the date of the affidavit, since June 1, 1993 three individuals with the last name "Murphy" have been employed at the law firm's Chicago office, and they are Kathleen M. Murphy, Linda M. Murphy and Bernadette Murphy;

--a copy of a December 18, 1995 U.P.I. news story describing various incidents from 1987 to the time of the news story of how dozens to many thousands of pieces of mail and hundreds and thousands of pounds of mail are discovered as undelivered and detained by mail carriers;

--a copy of a July, 1994 Washington Monthly article describing the problems of Chicago mail, including 800 foot long mounds of undelivered mail, loss of mail by carriers, the discovery of tens of thousands of pieces of undelivered mail, and a determination that the Chicago mail system was in disrepair;

--a copy of a May 30, 1994 St. Louis Post-Dispatch article describing the discovery of tens of thousands of pieces and thousands of pounds of undelivered mail in Chicago, and how in a test mailing in Chicago, only 72 of 119 pieces of mail got delivered.

The subject protest was filed on July 15, 1996, protesting the June 16, 1993 denial of the 1520(c)(1) petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the subject protest was timely filed pursuant to 19 U.S.C. ?1514?

2. Whether the petition under 19 U.S.C. ?1520(c)(1) should be granted?

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

The refusal to reliquidate an entry under 19 U.S.C. was timely filed pursuant to 19 U.S.C. ?1514(c)(3). The date of decision was June 16, 1993 and the protest was filed on July 15, 1996. The time in which a protest must be filed is provided for in 19 U.S.C. ?1514(c)(3):

(3) A protest of a decision, order, or finding described in subsection (a) shall be filed with the Customs Service within ninety days after but not before--

(A) notice of liquidation or reliquidation, or

(B) in circumstances where subparagraph (A) is inapplicable, the date of the decision as to which protest is made.

In this case, the date of the decision as to which protest is made, is the date of the decision denying the 1520(c)(1) petition. The date of denial is June 16, 1993. However, the protestant claims that notice of the denial was not received until April 16, 1996. A protest must be timely filed in order to give the Customs Service jurisdiction to consider the protest's merits. We must determine whether the ninety day period in which to file a protest was met in this case.

Under the facts of some cases where the timeliness of the protest is at issue, it is claimed that notice of liquidation had not been received, resulting in an untimely protest. See e.g. Tropicana Products, Inc. v. United States, 13 CIT 390, 713 F. Supp. 415 (1989), and Penrod Drilling Co. v. United States, 13 CIT 1005, 727 F. Supp. 1463 (1989). In such cases, the protesting party must meet its burden of proof that the subject bulletin notice was not posted, because "proper notice of liquidation refers to the bulletin notice of liquidation." Penrod Drilling Co., 13 CIT at 1009 (the bulletin notice serving as proper notice is discussed in further detail infra).

Under ?1514 (c)(3)(A), the 90 days in which a protest must be filed is determined specifically by the "notice" of liquidation or reliquidation. Whereas, under ?1514(c)(3)(B), the 90 days in which a protest must be filed is determined by the "date of the decision" as to which protest is made. The statute and regulations specifically provide for notice of liquidation (19 U.S.C. ?1500(e); Customs Regulations 159.9 and 159.10 (19 CFR 159.9 and 159.10). The statute and regulations do not provide for notice of a denial of a ?1520(c)(1) petition. However, it is clear that in order for there to be a decision against which a person must protest under ?1514(c)(3)(B), the decision has to be conveyed to that person.

Protestant asserts that Customs has applied the notice provision in ?1515(a) to denials of ?1520(c)(1) petitions. In support of the position that Customs has applied the provisions of ?1515(a) and 19 CFR 174.30 to the denial of ?1520(c) petitions, the protestant cites Headquarters Rulings (HQ) 224440, dated November 17, 1993, and 225027, dated June 14, 1994. In HQ 224440, the timeliness of the protest was raised in the facts section, however it was not addressed in the law and analysis section of the decision. The protest was allowed on the protestant had established that it did not receive notice of the decision protested. We found that the protestant had not rebutted the presumption that notice of the decision protested was issued to the protestant, and concluded that the protest was not timely filed, as it was filed 91 days after the date of the decision protested.

It is clear that ?1515(a) and 19 CFR 174.30 are inapplicable to denials of ?1520(c)(1) petitions. The issue in this case is whether the mailing to the law firm triggers the presumption of regularity which, unless rebutted, would result in a deemed notice of denial to the protestant. This is distinguishable from the situation in HQ 224440, in which case the letter from Customs showed on its face that it was mis-addressed. In HQ 224440, the first requirement for applying the presumption of regularity did not exist, as the letter was not properly addressed. The address on the letter of denial was different from that on the entry documents and the broker's letterhead on the 1520(c)(1) petition. In HQ 225027, the address on the letter of denial matched the address on the entry documents, and there was no indication that the letter of denial was not addressed properly. In the instant case, the address on the denial matches the firm's address in the petition. In HQ 225027, the protestant provided evidence that it had searched the relevant files and did not find the decision protested. Customs found that its computer records and administrative procedure support the presumption that notice of the decision was given. The evidence on behalf of Customs was as follows:

A search of Customs computer records indicates that this decision was issued on May 20, 1983. In addition, a conversation with Customs personnel indicates that decisions are mailed on the date they are stamped.

In this case also, Customs ACS records indicate that the date of denial was June 16, 1993, and the date on the notice of denial is June 16, 1993, and the date of mailing is the same as well, according to Customs practice.

A presumption of regularity attaches to the acts of government officials. See, e.g., International Cargo & Surety Ins. Co., v. United States, 15 CIT, 544, 779 F. Supp. 174, 177 (1991). In addition, proof of mailing raises a presumption of delivery. See, Intra-Mar Shipping Corp. v. United States, C.D. 4160, 66 Cust Ct. 3,5 (1971). The presumption of delivery is rebuttable by proof of nonreceipt. Id.

The issue of "nonreceipt" of notice was addressed in A.N. Deringer v. United States, No. 96-131 (CIT August 13, 1996) (reprinted in Customs Bulletin and Decisions, September 4, 1996 p. 59). In Deringer, the customs broker acting as the importer of record, challenged Customs decision denying the plaintiff's protest against Customs liquidation of the subject merchandise. The plaintiff alleged that it did not receive any notices of extension or suspension of liquidation from Customs after the date of entry. The court found that Customs introduced sufficient evidence to invoke the presumption of regularity that attaches to acts of government officials. Secondly, proof of mailing gave rise to the presumption of delivery, which the plaintiff failed to rebut by proof of nonreceipt. Id. at 72. Accordingly, the court found that Customs was presumed to have generated and mailed the notices that were at issue.

In Deringer, the plaintiff presented numerous affidavits of the employees of the customs broker and of the broker's surety. The affidavits spoke of the routine of processing extension or suspension of liquidation notices, lack of recollection of the receipt of extension or suspension of liquidation notices for the subject merchandise, and lack of any evidence of extension or suspension of liquidation notices in the relevant files. Upon considering such evidence as the foregoing, the court found that the plaintiff's failure to present testimony from the primary recipients of mail both at the plaintiff's office and that of its surety, undermined the plaintiff's claim of nonreceipt. The court stated:

In order to establish nonreceipt, plaintiff should have introduced testimony from each available person who would have had contact with the incoming mail in the ordinary course of business. This would have allowed the court to formulate a comprehensive assessment of the reliability of both the personnel and procedures employed to process the mail once it was received.

Deringer, Customs Bulletin, at 65.

In particular, the court noted the absence of testimony from the plaintiff's mail clerk, who was available to testify on whether she processed notices of extension or suspension herself. Further, the court found that the processing system was not as foolproof as depicted by the post-entry clerk, in that internal mail delivery was sometimes used as opposed to hand delivery, and that others in the office either assisted or assumed the responsibility of processing the notices of extension or suspension.

In the instant case, the affidavits of the attorneys establish no more than the affidavits of the case handlers in Deringer. They state that they never saw the notice of denial until April 16, 1996, and that it was not in the relevant file until April 16, 1996. The affidavit of Richard Kozlowski, the former manager and supervisor of the mailroom at the law firm, states that "all mailroom personnel are required to follow these mandatory procedures for identifying and distributing mail." The only other affidavit from Mailroom personnel is that of DeLargo Lee, a former Mail Clerk at the law firm, and current Mailroom Supervisor. His duties as Mail Clerk were said to include the sorting and delivery of incoming mail. There is no indication from the affidavits that there are no other Mailroom personnel other than Mr. Lee, and there is no reference to them or why there are no other affidavits. Based on Mr. Kozlowski's reference to "all mailroom personnel," it appears that there were others in addition to Mr. Lee. There is no explanation of why no other affidavits were provided. Further, if Mr. Lee was the only Mail Clerk, there is no evidence that he was responsible for receipt and distribution of mail at all times from June 16, 1993 to April 16, 1996, or whether his duties were ever performed by other personnel in the event of his absence. It does not appear that protestant has provided evidence of every person who would have had contact with incoming mail in the ordinary course of business.

With regard to the problems with the Chicago postal service, without evidence directly linking the service problems with the subject notice of denial, we cannot find that the information submitted supports a rebuttal of the presumption of delivery.

With respect to evidence of the performance of Customs duties, the Customs officer responsible for the notice of denial of the subject 1520(c)(1) petition, has stated that the date on the notice of denial is the same date as the date of denial and the date of mailing of the notice. Further, according to Customs ACS records, the date of denial is June 16, 1993, consistent with the date on the notice of denial.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the evidence presented by the protestant fails to rebut the presumption of delivery, because the protestant has not proved nonreceipt of the notice of denial. Therefore, we conclude that notice of the June 16, 1993 decision was issued to the protestant, and the subject protest was not timely filed. Therefore, Customs refusal to reliquidate the entries at issue under ?1520(c)(1) is final and conclusive on all persons pursuant to ?1514(a)(1).

Although our decision on the timeliness of the protest makes the ?1520(c)(1) issue moot, we are addressing the protestant's arguments in this regard for your information.

19 U.S.C. ?1514 sets forth the proper procedure for an importer to protest the classification and appraisal of merchandise when it believes the Customs Service has misinterpreted the applicable law. A protest must be filed within ninety days after notice of liquidation or reliquidation, or the date of the decision as to which protest is made. Otherwise, the tariff treatment of merchandise is final and conclusive.

19 U.S.C. ?1520(c)(1) is an exception to the finality of correct a clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence, not amounting to an error in the construction of a law. The error must be adverse to the importer and manifest from the record or established by documentary evidence and brought to the attention of the Customs Service within one year after the date of liquidation. The relief provided for in 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) is not an alternative to the relief provided for in the form of protests under 19 U.S.C. 1514; section 1520(c)(1) only affords "limited relief in the situations defined therein" (Phillips Petroleum Company v. United States, 54 CCPA 7, 11, C.A.D. 893 (1966), quoted in Godchaux-Henderson Sugar Co., Inc., v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 68, 69, C.D. 4874, 496 F. Supp. 1326 (1980); see also, Computime, Inc. v. United States, 9 CIT 553, 555, 622 F. Supp. 1083 (1985), and Concentric Pumps, Ltd. v. United States, 10 CIT 505, 508, 643 F. Supp. 623 (1986)).

The protestant's allegation of a mistake of fact is that "the failure to file protests on the second and third tomato sauce shipments in 1992 was directly caused by a mistaken belief that all customs liquidation notices for the 1992 shipments would be sent to [protestant's] Danville address, not to its Glendale address." (Emphasis supplied). The protestant claims that the basis of the mistake of fact is that the protestant's employees and in-house counsel understood the facts to be other than they were. The protestant asserts that such understanding of the facts was reasonable as the liquidation notice for the first shipment of 1992 was sent to the Danville address.

In order to qualify for relief under ?1520(c)(1), it must be established that there was an error or mistake (i.e., in this case it must be established that the liquidation was incorrect). In the instant case, for purposes of this decision, based on the CIT case included in the file, we assume that the liquidation of the merchandise was incorrect with respect to the classification of the merchandise. However, the protestant must also establish that the alleged error was due to clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence, not amounting to an error in the construction of a law, adverse to the importer and manifest from the record or established by documentary evidence.

The notices sent to the protestant are courtesy notices, and are not the official notices of liquidation. Customs Regulations 159.9(d) (19 CFR 159.9(d)). As the notices are not the official notices of liquidation, the notices, or records of the mailing of the notices, are not saved in Customs records. The address associated with the importer number, is the address to which the courtesy notices are sent. In this case, the address for the protestant's importer number, contained in ACS, is the Glendale address. Therefore, according to Customs records, it does not appear that a courtesy notice would have been sent to the Danville address at all, but that all of the notices would have been sent to Glendale. Other than the statement of protestant's in-house counsel, there is no evidence that the first courtesy notice was sent to Danville instead of Glendale.

However, even if Customs had sent the courtesy notices to the "wrong" address, or the protestant had believed the courtesy notices would be sent to a different address than to which they were actually sent, such a mistake did not directly cause the error or mistake in the liquidation of the subject entries.

It is well settled that the only notice of liquidation that is statutorily mandated is bulletin notice. See Goldhofer Fahrzeugwerk GmbH & Co. v. United States, 13 CIT 54, 706 F. Supp. 892 (1989), aff'd, 885 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Tropicana Products, Inc. v. United States, 13 CIT 390, 395, 713 F.Supp. 415 (1989). The bulletin notice is the only effective notice of liquidation and the courtesy notice is predictive only. SSR v. Robles, 18 C.I.T. 475, 476, 853 F. Supp. 451 (1994). The Court of International Trade has held that the importer has the burden to check for posted notices of liquidation and to protest in a timely manner. See, Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 18 CIT 1037, 1040 (1994) (stating that although Customs erroneously liquidated entries, protestant had no relief to protest after the running of 90 day periods after the posting of the bulletin notices of liquidation); Penrod Drilling Co., v. United States, 13 CIT 1005, 1009, 727 F.Supp. 1463 (1989), reh'g denied, 14 C.I.T. 281, 740 F.Supp. 858 (1990), aff'd. 925 F.2d 406 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

As the bulletin notice is the only effective notice of liquidation, protestant's mistaken belief as to where the courtesy notice would be sent, and resultant failure to file a protest of the liquidation, cannot be the direct cause of the incorrect liquidation. The protestant has not established how such a mistaken belief could have been the direct cause of the incorrect liquidation. Instead it appears that the protestant's failure to check for the posted notices of liquidation caused the failure to file a protest of the liquidation, resulting in an incorrect liquidation. The protestant has presented no evidence on why it did not check for posted notices of liquidation.

Upon an assertion that merchandise has been wrongly classified due to a mistake of fact, "it is incumbent on the plaintiff to show by sufficient evidence the nature of the mistake of fact." PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States, supra, 4 CIT at 147-148 (citing Hambro Automotive Corp. v. United States, 81 Cust. Ct. 29, 31, 458 F. Supp. 1220,1222(1978) aff'd 66 CCPA 113, C.A.D. 1231, 603 F.2d 850 (1979)). In ITT Corp. v. United States, 24 F.3d 1384, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1994), the court found that reliquidation under 19 U.S.C. ?1520(c) requires both notice and substantiation. Notice of a clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence includes asserting the existence of a clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence "with sufficient particularity to allow remedial action."

In this case, the protestant has failed to meet the notice requirement, as no mistake of fact which directly caused the incorrect liquidation has been asserted. Consequently, there has been no basis presented for reliquidating the subject entries pursuant to 19 U.S.C. ?1520(c)(1). The protestant's claim was therefore correctly denied.

HOLDING:

1. The protestant has failed to rebut the presumption that notice of the denial of the 19 U.S.C. ?1520(c)(1) petition was not delivered and therefore the protest was not timely filed under 19 U.S.C. ?1514, when it was filed more than 90 days after the date of notice of denial.

2. The protestant has not established a mistake of fact in the liquidation of the subject entries, and reliquidation of the entries is not permissible pursuant to 19 U.S.C. ?1520(c)(1).

Consistent with the decision set forth above, you are hereby directed to deny the subject protest. In accordance with Section 3A(11)(b) of Customs Directive 099 3550-065, dated August 4, 1993, Subject: Revised Protest Directive, this decision should be mailed by your office to the protestant no later than 60 days from the date of this letter. Any reliquidation of the entry in accordance with the decision must be accomplished prior to mailing of the decision. Sixty days from the date of the decision the Office of Regulations and Rulings will take steps to make the decision available to customs personnel via the Customs Rulings Module in ACS and the public via the Diskette Subscription Service, Freedom of Information Act and other public access channels.

Sincerely,

Director,
International Trade
Compliance Division

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