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HQ 965751




November 18, 2002

CLA-2:RR:CR:TE 965751 JFS

CATEGORY: CLASSIFICATION

TARIFF NO.: 6405.20.90

Jason M. Waite, Esq.
Alston & Bird, LLP
601 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
North Building, 10th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20004-2601

RE: Petition by Domestic Interested Party; Outer Soles of Textile; Tariff Engineering; Not Fraud or Artifice.

Dear Mr. Waite:

This letter is in response to your Petition by Domestic Interested Party (Petition), dated February 15, 2002, filed pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516, on behalf of your client, Mars Footwear, Inc. In accordance with Section 175.21(a), Customs Regulations (19 CFR 175.21(a)), Customs published a notice titled “Receipt of Domestic Interested Party Petition Concerning Tariff Classification of Textile Slippers” (Notice), in the Federal Register, issued May 23, 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 36301.

FACTS:

The imported footwear is a slipper that has an upper of textile material and an outer sole composed of unit-molded rubber/plastics with nubs measuring ¼ inch in diameter evenly spaced across its surface, over which is adhered a thin layer of textile fabric. In New York Ruling Letter (NY) G89205 and NY G89960, both dated April 19, 2001, Customs classified this footwear under subheading 6405.20.90, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated (HTSUSA), which provides for “Other footwear: With uppers of textile materials: Other,” which has a general column one rate of duty of 12.5 percent ad valorem.

You argue that the textile material adhered to the rubber/plastic is not plausible soling material, does not come into contact with the ground over the life span of the slipper and constitutes a disguise or artifice. Accordingly, you contend that the footwear should be classified in subheading 6404.19.35, HTSUSA, as “Footwear with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and uppers of textile materials: Footwear with outer soles of rubber or plastics: Other: Footwear with open toes or open heels; footwear of the slip-on type, that is held to the foot without the use of laces or buckles or other fasteners, the foregoing except footwear of subheading 6404.19.20 and except footwear having a foxing or foxing-like band wholly or almost wholly of rubber or plastics applied or molded at the sole and overlapping the upper: Other,” which has a general column one rate of duty of 37.5 percent ad valorem.

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS:

In the Notice, Customs informed the public of the filing of your Petition and invited interested parties to submit comments on or before July 22, 2002. A total of 32 comments were received in response to the Notice. Twenty-seven of the commenters support your position and five of the commenters are opposed to your position. Comments were received from footwear manufacturers and suppliers related to the domestic footwear industry, law firms, members of the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives, domestic trade associations and foreign trade associations. Many of the commenters raised economic or political issues. These particular comments will be summarized. However, because such comments involve issues that are outside Customs mandate, they will not be considered in this ruling letter. Some comments were received outside the comment period and cannot be considered in Customs decision.

Fifteen commenters argue that, because the textile material wears off after very limited use, the textile cannot be considered the material that comes into contact with the ground when the slipper is in use over the life-span of the slipper. Accordingly, the textile cannot be considered the constituent material of the outer sole.

Twenty-two commenters state that the thin layer of textile material is not a genuine or plausible soling material, because it serves no purpose and is not commercially recognized as textile soled slippers. Many of these commenters attest that they are in the footwear business or are suppliers to footwear manufacturers and have first hand knowledge of the implausibility of the textile material as soling material.

Nineteen commenters argue that if Customs maintains its current position, U.S. industry as well as industries in Mexico and the Caribbean will be harmed. They contend that the position is contrary to the intent of legislation and programs giving duty free preference to articles manufactured from U.S. components and assembled in Mexico or the Caribbean. Seventeen commenters argue that there has been a dramatic increase in imports of textile soled slippers from China, classified in subheading 6405.20.9015, HTSUSA. These commenters cite to statistics from an U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) trade data report as support for their argument. According to the trade report, there has been a 217% increase from 1996 to 2001 in the importation of textile soled house slippers. Concurrently, the growth in imports of rubber soled slippers from China, classified in subheading 6404.19.3515, HTSUSA, for the same period was very small. Most significantly, there was a 45% drop in rubber soled slippers, from 2000 to 2001, the time in which Customs issued its rulings on the subject slippers. The commenters argue that the large tariff shift to textile soled slippers is evidence that the textile layer is artifice, and that it is an attempt by Asian manufacturers to compete with programs benefiting Mexico and Caribbean nations. They further argue that U.S. trade laws are designed to encourage manufacturing in Mexico and the Caribbean, and thus, that Customs, when implementing the trade laws, must consider circumvention of the tariff by Asian producers.

Three commenters argue that the U.S. footwear industry has adapted to foreign competition and is able to remain modestly competitive within certain limited markets. They argue that Customs position on the instant footwear severely weakens the purpose of subheading 6404.19.3515, HTSUSA, and makes competing with foreign manufactures even more difficult.

Four commenters argue that Note 4 (b) to Chapter 64 (stating that the constituent material of the outer sole shall be taken to be the material having the greatest surface area in contact with the ground, no account being taken of accessories or reinforcements. . . .) must be interpreted to include the basic minimum requirement that the material on the outer surface of the sole, must be legitimate soling material. Moreover, the reference in the Note to excluding accessories and reinforcements is evidence that only genuine soling material is to be considered. They contend that the thin textile layer is a reinforcement that is meant to be disregarded. Finally, they argue in the alternative, that the textile cannot be reinforcement, because it serves no functional purpose.

One commenter quotes language in the Caribbean Basin Trade Promotion Act, which states that the “United States policy towards the region [Caribbean] should focus on expanding international trade with the Caribbean Basin region as an enduring solution for economic growth and recovery.” The commenter argues that it was the intent of the U.S. Congress to promote trade with the Caribbean nations and Customs actions thwart the intent of Congress.

Two commenters argue that Customs interpretation of the HTSUSA in this case reduces government revenues for the sole benefit of a handful of overseas suppliers.

Four commenters urge Customs to reasonably interpret the HTSUSA, and to not overlook the common and commercial meaning of “sole.”

Six commenters argue that Customs position is damaging U.S. industry.

One commenter cites to Headquarters Ruling Letter (HQ) 964978, dated April 18, 2002, HQ 965558, dated April 30, 2002, NY I82037 dated June 6, 2002, and NY I18211, dated June 6, 2002, as evidence that Customs has improperly applied the classification principle of the instant case to a women’s slip-on shoe, a girl’s textile upper boot, and to an athletic sneaker style shoe, all of which are intended for outdoor use. In each of these cases, a thin layer of textile had been applied over the portion of the rubber/plastic outer sole otherwise in contact with the ground. Customs is said to have failed to cite any commercial purpose connected to the manufacture or use of these shoes for the presence of the textile material. The commenter uses these rulings as examples of how Customs position is being improperly applied to a broad range of footwear. Except to the extent that issues addressed in this ruling are relevant therein, Customs will not address those rulings.

One commenter argues that Customs is overlooking the statement in U.S. v. Citroen, 223 U.S. 407 (1912), that “[t]his does not mean that a prescribed rate of duty can be escaped by resort to disguise or artifice. When it is found that the article imported is in fact the article described in a particular paragraph of the tariff act, an effort to make it appear otherwise is simply a fraud on the revenue and cannot be permitted to succeed.” The commenter then cites Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 264 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001), for the proposition that there must be a commercial purpose for the engineering of the product.

One commenter argues that the addition of the textile is a disguise or artifice, arguing that the textile material should not be allowed to disguise the commercial reality of the rubber/plastic outsole. The commenter argues that there is a “commercially real caveat” to the proposition that goods are classified as imported, as stated in Citroen and Heartland.

One commenter argues that Customs position has the potential to completely disrupt the history and significance of the Census Bureau’s reporting of footwear imports into the U.S. Approximately thirty-nine different subheadings under headings 6401, 6402 and 6404 could, by adding a textile covering to all or part of the outsole, be rendered classifiable under subheadings 6405.20.30, 6405.20.60 or 6405.20.90.

One commenter, citing many Customs rulings, argues that importers have a right to structure merchandise to obtain favorable tariff classifications. The commenter argues that Customs should not be in the business of having to determine whether there is a “commercial purpose” to every aspect of goods entered into the U.S. Arguing that if Customs were required to make such determinations, Customs would have to reconsider and revoke many rulings.

One commenter argues that the Heartland decision does not diminish the importer’s right to engineer finished articles to obtain favorable tariff classifications. This is because Heartland was decided on the issue of the definition of “foreign substances.” The majority of the court specifically declined to address Customs argument that the actions by Heartland constituted disguise or artifice.

Three commenters argue that the decision in Heartland upheld Customs determination that the actions of Heartland were disguise and artifice.

Three commenters argue that the textile material is not an accessory or reinforcement pursuant to Note 4(b) because it is not ejusdem generis with the exemplars. They cite several Customs rulings where Customs has ruled that similar attachments to the sole of a shoe are not accessories or reinforcements.

Four commenters argue that where the external surface of the outer sole is made of two or more materials, the component material with the greatest surface area in contact with the ground will prevail. The determination should not be based on which material is the best material for the outer sole. They argue that to make such a determination would be impossible for Customs.

Four commenters argue that the textile layer on the sole is not disguise or artifice but legitimate tariff engineering and there is no concealment as to the nature of the slippers. They distinguish this case from HQ 955720, wherein Customs ruled that felt, which was easily removed, was disguise or artifice. Another commenter notes other decisions by Customs wherein the manufacturer was allowed to engineer the footwear by adding weights, e.g., NY E81498, dated May 10, 1999. They point out that all of the rulings cited by petitioner as prohibiting tariff engineering have one factor in common, i.e., the feature designed to qualify the imported article for a lower rate of duty or to permit admission did not, or was not likely to, reach the ultimate purchaser in the United States. They contend that the subject situation is different because the textile material remains on the footwear until the time that it is purchased by the consumer and is subsequently worn off by actual use.

One commenter argues that retailers are finding footwear incorporating textile soles to be commercially viable and that if the Petition is approved, it is the U.S. consumer that will be harmed.

Four commenters argue that classification should be based on the condition of the goods as imported and that consideration of subsequent deterioration and changes in the goods are irrelevant.

One commenter argues that results from the wear tests are not only irrelevant but unreliable because there were no control samples and because sufficient information detailing the parameters of the tests or how they were conducted were not provided.

Three commenters argue that not only is the textile a legitimate soling material but that the Petition does not demonstrate that textile materials are inappropriate materials for the sole.

Two commenters point out that Customs has classified footwear with the opposite construction, i.e., a heavy textile sole with a thin layer of plastic, as having an outer sole of plastic.

ISSUE:

Whether slippers that have a thin layer of textile material applied to their rubber bottom in order to received a favorable duty rate are properly classified as footwear with outer soles of textile?

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

Classification under the HTSUSA is made in accordance with the General Rules of Interpretation (GRI’s). GRI 1 provides that the classification of goods shall be determined according to the terms of the headings of the tariff schedule and any relative Section or Chapter Notes. In the event that the goods cannot be classified solely on the basis of GRI 1, and if the headings and legal notes do not otherwise require, the remaining GRI may then be applied.

The Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System Explanatory Notes (EN’s) represent the official interpretation of the Harmonized System at the international level (for the 4 digit headings and the 6 digit subheadings) and facilitate classification under the HTSUSA by offering guidance in understanding the scope of the headings and GRI. The EN’s, although not dispositive or legally binding, provide a commentary on the scope of each heading of the HTSUSA, and are generally indicative of the proper interpretation of these headings.

Classification of footwear is essentially based upon the composition of the outer soles and uppers. In pertinent part, General EN (C) to Chapter 64 defines outer sole as follows: “The term "outer sole" as used in headings 64.01 to 64.05 means that part of the footwear (other than an attached heel) which, when in use, is in contact with the ground.” At the time of importation, it is the textile material of the instant slipper that is in contact with the ground when the slipper is being worn and used.

The Complete Footwear Dictionary, Rossi (2nd Ed. 2000), defines outer sole as follows:

Outsole (or outersole). The outermost sole of the shoe which is directly exposed to abrasion and wear. It can consist of any of a variety of materials: leather, rubber, plastic, cork, rope, crepe, wood, etc., plus differences in thickness or degrees of flexibility, and an infinite variety of surface designs.

Pursuant to this definition, the sole of the instant slipper is the textile material, because it is the material that is directly exposed to abrasion and wear.

The only limitation provided for in the EN is that an attached heel is not considered part of the outer sole. This recognizes that certain components of a shoe should be excluded from consideration. The fact that the heel is the only exclusion shows intent to define outer soles broadly. Moreover, neither definition limits the type of material which may comprise the outer sole. The definitions also do not describe the outer sole according to its durability.

In the case where a shoe has more than one material that is in contact with the ground, determinations regarding the constituent material of the outer sole are governed by Note 4(b), Chapter 64, HTSUS, which states that:

The constituent material of the outer sole shall be taken to be the material having the greatest surface area in contact with the ground, no account being taken of accessories or reinforcements such as spikes, bars, nails, protectors or similar attachments.

See also the EN to Chapter 64.

“The constituent material of the outer sole for purposes of classification shall be taken to be the material having the greatest surface area in contact with the ground. In determining the constituent material of the outer sole, no account should be taken of attached accessories or reinforcements such as spikes, bars, nails, protectors or similar attachments which partly cover the sole (see Note 4(b) to this Chapter).” Again, there is no limitation on the type of material, the thickness, or the overall quality of the material that comprises the outer sole. Moreover, the EN to heading 6405, HTSUSA, states, in pertinent part, that the heading includes footwear with outer soles of textile fabric. Accordingly, because it is the textile material that is in contact with the ground when the slipper is worn, the constituent material of the outer sole is the textile material and not the underlying rubber/plastic.

You maintain that the thin layer of textile material overlying the “rubber soles” of the slippers is akin to an accessory or reinforcement and, therefore, cannot be considered as the constituent material of the outer sole. However, Customs rulings have consistently interpreted the terms accessories and reinforcements narrowly. In HQ 958550, dated March 6, 1996, Customs, in considering the classification of an espadrille with a jute midsole, found that the rubber bottom covering the midsole was not an accessory or reinforcement. Customs stated that:

Although Note 4(b) does provide as an exception to the outer sole having the greatest contact with the ground, any "accessories or attachments", it similarly defines those terms. The words "accessories" and "reinforcements" are followed by a limited number of defining exemplars such as spikes, bars, nails, protectors or similar attachments. To conclude that by similitude an entire external surface layer of rubber soling is included within the meaning of "similar attachments" is not only unfounded but clearly contradicts the intended meaning of Note 4(b).

Having disposed of the argument that the rubber covering was an accessory or reinforcement, Customs concluded that the espadrille had an outer sole of rubber.

In HQ 089250, dated December 27, 1991, Customs found that rubber traction lines, less than 1mm in thickness, were not accessories or reinforcements, and were to be included in the determination of the constituent material of the outer sole. Similarly, “Customs does not consider plastic traction dots to be accessories or reinforcements.” See HQ 088533, dated March 25, 1991. See also HQ 085182, dated October 23, 1989 (finding that leather stitched over a textile outer sole is not an accessory or reinforcement under Note 4(b) but is the material of the sole in contact with the ground (modified on other grounds)).

Like the soling material in the rulings discussed above, the textile covering on the instant slippers is not similar to the exemplars listed in Note 4(b) to Chapter 64. These rulings also demonstrate that Customs consistently looks to the material that is in contact with the ground when determining the constituent material of the outer sole.

You conducted a “wear test” and an “abrasion test” to determine the durability of the textile material that comes into contact with the ground. The results of the wear test revealed that the textile material frayed and wore off of the nubs located at the ball and heel of the slipper after 30 days of normal use. The abrasion test revealed that the textile material first began to wear off after 10 cycles. After 100 cycles, approximately 60% of the textile material was worn off. After 200 cycles, approximately 90% of the textile material was worn off. In contrast, the rubber/plastic, that at the time of importation is covered by the textile material, showed minimal wear when subjected to 200 cycles.

You rely upon the EN to Chapter 64 which state that the outer sole “means that part of the footwear . . . which, when in use, is in contact with the ground.” You assert that because the textile material wears off in a relatively short period of time, the constituent material that is in contact with the ground over the life of the slippers is the rubber/plastic, not the textile material. In other words, you are asking Customs to classify the slippers according to how they wear over time.

In U.S. v. Citroen, 223 U.S. 407 (1912), the Court clearly stated that when classifying goods, “the inquiry must be – Does the article, as imported, fall within the description sought to be applied?” Id. at 415. When classifying footwear, Customs cannot base its decision on the durability of the materials of the shoes. As imported, the textile material covering the outer soles of the instant slippers, is the material that is in contact with the ground when in use. For classification purposes, it is not relevant whether or not the textile material will continue to be in contact with the ground thirty or forty or sixty days after importation.

You, and a large number of the commenters, advance the argument that the textile material is not plausible soling material and is not a commercial reality. Accordingly, you argue that Customs should find that the application of the textile material is a fraud or artifice. You cite HQ 952935, dated January 6, 1993, as support for this argument. In HQ 952935, Customs found that it was fraud or artifice to classify footwear with rubber soles covered with removable felt as footwear with textile soles. You quote the Customs statement that “[i]n its condition as imported we do not believe the shoe is a commercial reality . . . the felt layer is fugitive.” Customs then listed many factors as to why the material was unsuitable as soling material. Customs emphasized that, regarding “commercial reality,” there was a catalog showing that similar, if not identical, footwear was advertised and sold as wool clogs with rubber soles. There was no felt covering the outer soles of the advertised footwear. Thus, Customs found that the clogs were not sold in the condition as imported. In contrast, Customs classified rubber fishing boots (waders) with felt soles under heading 6405, HTSUSA, because the boots were sold and worn with the felt material adhered to the rubber bottom. See HQ 953404, dated April 19, 1993.

This case exemplifies the distinction between when manipulation of an article in order to receive a lower tariff is considered acceptable tariff engineering and when manipulation constitutes a fraud or an artifice. The concept of tariff engineering is based on the long-standing principles that merchandise is classifiable in its condition as imported and that an importer has the right to fashion merchandise to obtain the lowest rate of duty and the most favorable treatment. In Citroen, the Court stated that “although dutiable classification of articles imported must be ascertained by an examination of the imported article itself, in the condition in which it is imported [,] this, of course does not mean that a prescribed rate of duty can be escaped by resort to disguise or artifice.”

In Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U.S. 694 (1881), the Court concluded that its task was to interpret the tariff as drafted by Congress. If standards that were written into the tariff were no longer satisfactory, then it was up to the legislature to remedy the situation. In Merritt the Court considered, hypothetically, the situation in which a sugar manufacturer would alter the color of the sugar in order to obtain a lower duty. The Court stated:

Great stress is laid on the charge that sugars are manufactured in dark colors on purpose to evade our duties. Suppose this is true; has not a manufacturer a right to make his goods as he pleases? If they are less marketable, it is his loss; if they are not less marketable, who has a right to complain? If the duties are affected, there is a plain remedy. Congress can always adopt such laws and regulations as it may deem expedient for protecting the interests of the government.

Id. at 701.

In Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 264 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the court declined to resolve Customs claim that Heartland’s manipulation of its sugar imports were a fraud or artifice. The court found in favor of Customs on other grounds. However, in a concurring opinion, the honorable Judge Friedman, Senior Circuit Judge, agreed with Customs that Heartland’s actions were not legitimate tariff engineering. In that case, Heartland added molasses to its already refined sugar, imported the sugar and, after importation, removed the molasses. The sugar as imported was never entered into the stream of commerce. Instead it was processed to return it to the state that it was in prior to importation. Customs contended that the imported sugar was not a commercial reality and was fraud or artifice.

While there is little case law concerning finding tariff engineering to be a fraud or artifice, there are many Customs rulings on this issue. The general position taken by Customs in these rulings is that if Customs finds the article, at the time of importation, is a commercial reality, then the tariff engineering will not be considered a fraud or artifice. In the cases in which Customs has found that the tariff engineering was a fraud or artifice, Customs concluded that the article was not a commercial reality, in large part, because the article was not sold or otherwise entered into the stream of commerce in the condition as imported.

In HQ 653704, dated March 8, 1985, involving a petition for relief from penalties, Customs found that the petitioner had deliberately attempted to avoid quota/visa restrictions. In that case, the petitioner had taken cotton knitted shirts and sewn, with a single thread, a 10 ½ inch piece of fabric to the hem of the shirt. The piece of fabric could be easily removed by removing the single thread. At the time the garments were seized, the petitioner was in the process of removing the strips of fabric material. The purpose of adding the strip of fabric was to change the classification of the garments from shirts to dresses. Customs found that “the commercial reality of the merchandise is as a shirt disguised as a dress at the time of importation.” Customs further noted that the pieces of the garments did not remain together up until the time of the their sale to U.S. merchants.

In HQ 222146, dated June 6, 1990, microscopes made in the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) were admitted into a foreign trade zone (FTZ) in St. Louis, Missouri. The microscopes were equipped to handle the addition of a camera. In the FTZ, each microscope was packaged with a camera. This was accomplished by physically opening each crate containing a microscope and inserting into the crate a packaged camera. Following the initial entry for consumption the camera was removed from the microscope-camera combination and returned to the FTZ in domestic status where it was again packaged with another microscope and reentered for consumption from the FTZ. Customs concluded that this action was a fraud or artifice, and not legitimate tariff engineering.

In HQ 089090, dated July 10, 1991, Customs reclassified articles that had been entered as feather dusters under subheading 9603.90.4000, HTSUSA, as feathers under subheading 0505.90.0040, HTSUSA. In making this determination, Customs concluded that the feather dusters were not constructed in the manner that feather dusters are usually constructed. Significantly, Customs noted that after importation the feather dusters were disassembled and the feathers further processed. This involved cleaning, sorting, bleaching and sometimes dyeing. After processing the feathers were manufactured into articles such as headwear, boas and novelty items, or sold as feathers. The feather dusters were not entered into the stream of commerce in the condition as imported.

In HQ 073219, dated February 29, 1984, Customs classified what was referred to by the importer as a “body suit.” In that case, the submitted sample was a long sleeve knit sweater with a three-inch rib waist. On the inside of the waistband, a knit crotch brief with snap closure was attached to the sweater by means of a single yarn. The yarn was easily removed by cutting it and pulling it out, thus separating the two garments. Customs concluded that:

We do not believe that the submitted sample is known in the commerce of the United States as a body suit or that the two joined garments are used in this country as a single garment. Accordingly, the two garments are separately classifiable.

In HQ 076411, dated July 31, 1986, Customs classified a pair of overalls. In that case, Customs found that the “bib addition to [the] garment is an unusual element having no apparent actual utility nor commercial reality. The bib feature is obviously not intended to be used with the shorts. Rather, the purchaser of the garment would cut off the bib at its attachment at the inner bottom of the waistband and throw it away.”

All of these cases have a common thread running throughout them. That is, the good is altered prior to importation, typically by adding a component, in order to receive a lower duty rate. After importation the good is returned to its original condition and then entered into the stream of commerce. As a result, Customs found that the goods, in their condition as imported, were not a commercial reality. In each of these cases the importer was literally trying to deceive Customs regarding the nature of the imported goods. These cases are distinguishable from the instant case where there is no apparent deceit as to the nature of the slippers. They are imported and then sold with the textile soling material intact. Indeed, the textile material cannot be removed. Although the material may wear off in a relatively short period of time, the ultimate purchaser cannot remove the textile and will, in fact, wear the slipper with the textile material. The slipper is not only introduced into the stream of commerce as entered, but it is a commercial reality, in its condition as entered.

A finding that this is acceptable tariff engineering is consistent with prior rulings in which importers have altered a shoe’s composition in order to benefit from a lower duty rate. For example, Customs has allowed an importer to add metal weights to shoes to achieve a favorable rate of duty. See Port Ruling Letter D85216, dated December 1, 1998 (classifying a dance shoe under a 37-1/2% ad valorem duty rate provision) and NY E81498, dated May 10, 1999 (classifying a metal-weighted modified version of the same dance shoe under a 10% duty rate provision). Although it would appear that the addition of a metal weight to a dance shoe would have questionable commercial purpose, the weighted shoe was a commercial reality.

Accordingly, after consideration of the Petition and the comments, Customs finds that the constituent material of the outer sole of the subject slipper is the textile material. Moreover, Customs finds that the addition of the textile material in order to obtain a lower duty rate constitutes legitimate tariff engineering and is not a fraud or artifice. The slippers are classified in subheading 6405.20.90, HTSUSA, as “Other footwear: With uppers of textile materials: Other,” which has a general column one rate of duty of 12.5 percent ad valorem.

HOLDING:

The slippers are classified in subheading 6405.20.90, HTSUSA, which provides for “Other footwear: With uppers of textile materials: Other,” which has a general column one rate of duty of 12.5 percent ad valorem.

Pursuant to section 175.23, Customs Regulations (19 CFR 175.23), if you are dissatisfied with this decision, you may, in accordance with section 516, Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1516) file, not later than 30 days of the date of this ruling, a notice informing Customs that you wish to contest the classification of the merchandise. The notice must designate the port or ports at which the subject merchandise is being imported into the United States, and at which port you desire to protest Customs classification. Pursuant to 175.24, Customs Regulations (19 CFR 175.24), upon receipt of a properly filed notice contesting this decision, a notice of this decision shall be published in the Federal Register and the Customs Bulletin.

Sincerely,

Myles B. Harmon, Acting Director
Commercial Rulings Division

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