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HQ 224162


May 5, 1992

LIQ-4/11-CO:R:C:E 224162 CB

CATEGORY: LIQUIDATION

District Director
U.S. Customs Service
150 North Royal
Mobile, AL 36602

RE: Protest and Application for Further Review No. 1901-92- 100042; 19 U.S.C. 1504(a); Deemed liquidation by operation of law; 19 U.S.C. 1504(d)

Dear Sir:

The above-referenced protest and application for further review was forwarded to this office for further review. We have considered the points raised and our decision follows.

FACTS:

According to Protestant, it entered certain steel products in 1977. The merchandise was apparently subject to an antidumping finding on carbon steel plate from Japan. Liquidation of these entries was suspended pending advice on assessment of antidumping duties. Although the merchandise was subject to an antidumping finding, under the law in effect at the time of entry, no deposit of estimated dumping duties was posted with these entries.

On September 30, 1981, the Department of Commerce published the results of its administrative review for the period covered by the entries subject to this protest. Pursuant to that notice on October 2, 1981, liquidation instructions were issued directing Customs to liquidate entries for the time periods reviewed for several companies. On April 17, 1986, the Department of Commerce published its revocation of the antidumping finding effective October 1, 1984. On April 24, 1992, Customs liquidated the subject entries and issued a bill to Protestant for the antidumping duties.

ISSUE:

Whether there was a deemed liquidation by operation of law of the subject entries?

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

Liquidation of an entry of merchandise constitutes the final computation by Customs of all duties (including any dumping or countervailing) accruing on that entry. See generally, Ambassador Division of Florsheim Shoes v. United States, 748 F.2d 160, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978 (the 1978 Act) provides in section 209(a), 19 U.S.C. 1504, that an entry is deemed liquidated as entered if Customs has not liquidated the entry within one year from the date of entry or withdrawal from warehouse. The 1978 Act was effective as to entries or withdrawals for consumption on or after 180 days after the enactment of the Act (Oct. 3, 1978). Thus, only entries or withdrawals made on or after April 1, 1979, were covered by the 1978 Act.

Previous to the 1978 Act, there was no time limit for the liquidation of an entry. Dart Export Corp. et al. v. United States, 43 CCPA 64, C.A.D. 610 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824, 77 S. Ct. 33, 1 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1956). The Court in Dart Export stated that the law prescribed no time limit within which the collector shall make the original liquidation. This conclusion is supported by the legislative history of the 1978 Act. In the statement of Reason for Change contained in S. Rep. No. 95-788 at 832, it is stated:

Reason for change.--The provisions adopted by the commit- tee [section 209] would increase certainty in the customs process for importers, surety companies, and other third parties with a potential liability relating to a customs transaction. Under the present law, an importer may learn years after goods have been imported and sold that additional duties are due, or may have deposited more money for estimated duties than are actually due but be unable to recover the excess for years as he awaits liquidation. . . .

The entries at issue were made on November 17, 1977. As stated above, the time constraints provided for under 19 U.S.C. 1504 only apply to entries made on or after April 1, 1979. Therefore, contrary to protestant's argument, the subject entries were not deemed liquidated by operation of law.

In an additional submission protestant contends that the doctrine of laches prevents the assessment of antidumping duties on the subject entries because Customs waited too long to take action on the entries. "As a general rule, laches or neglect of duty on the part of officers of the Government is no defense to a suit by it to enforce a public right or protect a public interest." Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 37 S. Ct. 387, 61 L. Ed. 791 (1917). In the instant case, the public interest required to be protected consisted of the revenue of the United States. Additionally, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that equitable estoppel is not available against the Government in cases involving collection or refund of duties on imports. See Air-Sea Brokers, Inc. V. United States, 596 F.2d 1008, 66 CCPA 64 (1979).

HOLDING:

The subject entries did not liquidate by operation of law because the entries were made prior to the effective date of 19 U.S.C. 1504. The doctrine of laches is not a defense to the payment of duties owed. Therefore, the subject protest should be DENIED.

A copy of this decision should be attached to the Customs Form 19 and provided to the protestant as part of the notice of action on the protest.

Sincerely,

John Durant, Director

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