United States International Trade Commision Rulings And Harmonized Tariff Schedule
faqs.org  Rulings By Number  Rulings By Category  Tariff Numbers
faqs.org > Rulings and Tariffs Home > Rulings By Number > 1993 HQ Rulings > HQ 0224025 - HQ 0450288 > HQ 0224047

Previous Ruling Next Ruling


HQ 224047


February 5, 1993

LIQ-9-01-CO:R:C:E 224047 PH

CATEGORY: LIQUIDATION

District Director of Customs
St. Louis, Missouri 63105

RE: Application for Further Review of Protest No. 4503-92- 100008; 68 Cust. Ct. 17, C.D. 4327, 61 CCPA 90, C.A.D. 1129; Emergency War Material; Untimely Certificates; Subheading 9808.00.30, HTSUSA; 19 U.S.C. 1514; 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1)

Dear Sir:

The above-referenced protest was forwarded to this office for further review. We have considered the points raised by your office and the protestant. Our decision follows.

The representative of the protestant (Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Esq.) met on October 27, 1992, with representatives of this Office to discuss this case. After that meeting, Mr. Ehrenhaft forwarded additional remarks on the subject protest. A copy of those remarks (made in a November 3, 1992, letter) is enclosed for your records.

FACTS:

According to the file, between November 6, 1989, and August 31, 1990, the protestant entered certain components for incorporation into systems which the protestant had contracted to provide to another company under that company's "prime contract" with the United States Army. The components were entered under subheading 9808.00.30, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated (HTSUSA), which provides for duty-free treatment of articles for United States military departments which are certified to the Commissioner of Customs by the authorized procuring agencies to be emergency war material purchased abroad. According to the protestant, "[a]t all relevant times, all of the parties concerned knew -- indeed, specified -- that no Customs duties should be due or paid on these imports, since [the protestant] imported these components to be used solely for U.S. military procurement purposes." The protestant also states that it "knew what was required under the law to obtain such duty- free treatment, including the submission of duty-free certificates."

According to the protestant (the FACTS described in this and the following paragraphs through the paragraph beginning on page 2 and ending on page 3 of this ruling are based on the allega- tions and/or submissions of the protestant), the responsible employee of the protestant corresponded in late 1988 and early 1989 with the primary contractor to provide certain information related to the obtaining of the duty-free certificates. That employee understood that the primary contractor would provide this information to the Army which would authorize the duty-free treatment. The employee also directed (by memorandum of December 16, 1988) another employee of the protestant (the sub-contract manager for the involved project) to provide instructions to foreign vendors to include a statement in all shipping documents that their goods were eligible for duty-free treatment and to request the District Director of Customs to notify the protestant's broker for execution of any required duty-free certificates. The employee understood that the broker, upon such notification, would obtain and submit to Customs on behalf of the protestant any necessary duty-free certificates. Two other employees of the protestant also understood that the broker was primarily responsible for obtaining and submitting to Customs all necessary documents and certificates, including the duty-free certificates.

One of these other employees, described as an international traffic agent primarily responsible for supervising international shipments on a day-to-day basis, became aware in May of 1990 that there were problems relating to the duty-free entry of the merchandise. This employee learned that the protestant must obtain duty-free treatment of the goods through the primary contractor. The employee immediately communicated with an employee of the primary contractor who instructed her to send him any requests for duty-free treatment and any other necessary information. Thereafter, the protestant's employee called the employee of the primary contractor "periodically" to see that the primary contractor was doing everything possible in regard to the obtaining of duty-free treatment. In October of 1990, the employee of the primary contractor provided the protestant's employee with copies of memorandums from the primary contractor to the Defense Contract Management Area Office (DCMAO), dated October 5, 1990.

"Soon thereafter" the protestant's employee became aware that there were still problems relating to the duty-free entry of the merchandise. She called a DCMAO employee who advised her that the protestant should identify, through the primary contractor, the entry numbers for the merchandise and that DCMAO would then issue and send to Customs any necessary duty-free certificates. At this point, the protestant's employee first became aware that the protestant's broker was not "performing ... all functions necessary for duty-free entry ...."

The protestant's employee "immediately" contacted an employee of the primary contractor and "fax-ed" a list of the pertinent entry numbers which the employee of the primary contractor stated would be sent to the DCMAO employee. "Two or three weeks later" the protestant's employee called the DCMAO employee to ask about the progress of the duty-free certificates and was advised that issuance of the certificates took time and that the request was being processed. After subsequent conversations between the protestant's employee and the employee of the primary contractor about progress in obtaining the duty- free certificates, the employee of the primary contractor called the DCMAO employee who claimed that she had never received the list of entry numbers which the protestant's employee had "fax- ed" to the employee of the primary contractor. The employee of the primary contractor "fax-ed" a copy of the same list to the DCMAO employee. (Note: although the file contains a copy of a list of entry numbers for which duty-free certificates are requested, "fax-ed" from the employee of the primary contractor to the DCMAO contractor, the "fax" is undated and the entries listed on the "fax" are not included in this protest. According to the District Director of Customs where the protest was filed, all of the entries listed in this "fax" were given duty-free treatment.) "Through repeated contacts with DCMAO and with the help of [the protestant's broker]" the protestant obtained the duty-free certificates in October and November of 1991.

In the meantime, the entries under consideration were being processed. Notices of Advance (Customs Form 29) were sent to the protestant for each of the entries when the required duty-free certificate was not provided within 6 months and the absence of a duty-free certificate was explicitly given as the reason for the rate advance. When the protestant failed to respond to the Notices of Advance and no duty-free certificates were provided, the entries were liquidated without benefit of the duty-free provisions of subheading 9808.00.30, HTSUSA. The dates of these liquidations were October 26, 1990, November 2, 1990, March 15, 1991, and April 26, 1991 (although two of the liquidations were more than one year after the dates of entry, there is no "deemed liquidation" issue because, according to Customs records, proper notices of extension were given).

The protestant did not protest the liquidations under 19 U.S.C. 1514 or otherwise contest the liquidations until October 22, 1991, when it sent a letter to the District Director requesting reliquidation under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) of the entries under consideration, along with a number of other entries. The protestant also sent letters to the District Director pertaining to the request for reliquidation on November 1, 12, and 15, 1991 (in response to questions and/or requests for more specificity by Customs). The bases given in these letters for the request for reliquidation were changes to personnel and responsibilities due to furloughs of employees, the belief by the protestant that the primary contractor was filing the documents required by Customs (the protestant stated it had usually been a primary contractor instead of a sub-contractor), the inadvertent mislaying of certain entries, that the protestant had believed that letters from DCMAO's regional office to its New York office with regard to duty-free entries were the required certificates and had surrendered them to Customs, and that the protestant had believed that it was necessary to file the duty-free certificates through the primary contractor and that these certificates were being sent directly to Customs.

Included in the file are supporting documents including affidavits by concerned employees of the protestant (each affidavit is dated March 9, 1992). Also in the file are copies of duty-free certificates for each of the entries protested. The dates of these certificates are October 29, 1991, November 13, 1991, and November 25, 1991.

On December 10, 1991, the District Director denied the request for reliquidation. On March 9, 1992, the protestant filed a protest of this denial of the request for reliquidation with regard to the 30 entries listed in Attachment A to the protest. The protestant argues that the request for reliquidation should have been granted because the duty-free certificates were not obtained until after the entries were liquidated and this delay was caused by mistakes of fact as to the respective roles of the protestant, the protestant's broker, and the primary contractor (specifically, the protestant contends that it made a mistake of fact in assuming that its broker was submitting to Customs all necessary documentation) and by DCMAO's inadvertence in processing the certificates. The protest was forwarded for further review on June 11, 1992.

ISSUE:

In this case, as described in the FACTS portion of this ruling, was the failure of the protestant to timely file duty- free certificates as required under subheading 9808.00.30, HTSUSA, a clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence for which relief may be granted under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1)?

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

Initially, we note that both the request for reliquidation under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) and the protest of the denial of that request, under 19 U.S.C. 1514(a), were timely filed (with regard to the fact that the duty-free certificates for some of the entries could not have been received by Customs until after the request for reliquidation under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) was filed or until more than one year after liquidation, see C.J. Tower & Sons of Buffalo, Inc. v. United States, 68 Cust. Ct. 17, C.D. 4327, 336 F. Supp 1395 (1972), aff'd, 61 CCPA 90, C.A.D. 1129, 499 F. 2d 1277 (1974)).

Under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1), Customs may reliquidate an entry to correct a clerical error (see PPG Industries, Inc., v. United States, 7 CIT 118, 124 (1984), and cases cited therein), mistake of fact (Hambro Automotive Corporation v. United States, 66 CCPA 113, 118, C.A.D. 1231, 603 F. 2d 850 (1979)), or other inadvertence (see Occidental Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 13 CIT 244, 246 (1989)), not amounting to an error in the construction of a law (see Mattel, Inc. v. United States, 72 Cust. Ct. 257, 262-263, C.D. 4547 (1974), and cases cited therein) when certain conditions are met.

The conditions required to be met under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) are that the clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadver- tence must be adverse to the importer, manifest from the record or established by documentary evidence, and brought to the attention of Customs within one year after the date of liquida- tion of the entry. The relief provided for in 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) is not an alternative to the relief provided for in the form of protests under 19 U.S.C. 1514; section 1520(c)(1) only affords "limited relief in the situations defined therein" (Phillips Petroleum Company v. United States, 54 CCPA 7, 11, C.A.D. 893 (1966), quoted in Godchaux-Henderson Sugar Co., Inc., v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 68, 69, C.D. 4874, 496 F. Supp. 1326 (1980); see also, Computime, Inc. v. United States, 9 CIT 553, 555, 622 F. Supp. 1083 (1985), and Concentric Pumps, Ltd. v. United States, 10 CIT 505, 508, 643 F. Supp. 623 (1986)).

Customs has ruled that "negligent inaction" (see Customs Service Decision (C.S.D.) 80-250; see also, Occidental Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, supra), is not within the scope of 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1). Cases involving the submission of incorrect or incomplete documentation and the failure to submit, or late submission, of correct documentation have been held to constitute negligent inaction (see, e.g., rulings 222049, dated June 17, 1991, 221590, dated October 30, 1989, and 221680, dated October 16, 1989).

Basically, the protestant claims that the entries should have been reliquidated because it made a mistake of fact in believing that the primary contractor was responsible for filing the duty-free certificates. In addition, the protestant claims that it made a mistake of fact in assuming that its broker was filing the duty-free certificates with Customs. Also, the protestant claims inadvertence in DCMAO's delay in processing the duty-free certificates. The protestant cites the case of C.J. Tower & Sons of Buffalo, Inc. v. United States, supra, in support of its protest.

In the C.J. Tower case, it was held that relief should have been granted under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) when merchandise was entered under a dutiable provision, the entry was liquidated dutiable, and after the liquidation became final but within the 1-year period provided for in section 1520(c)(1) a request for reliquidation was filed. The basis for the decision was that neither the importer nor Customs knew until after the liquidation became final that the merchandise was emergency war material which could have been entered duty-free under the predecessor to subheading 9808.00.30, HTSUSA. Subsequent Court decisions have emphasized this basis for the C.J. Tower case (i.e., that neither the importer nor Customs knew until after the liquidation became final that the merchandise was emergency war material) (see Concentric Pumps, Ltd., v. United States, supra, at 508; and NEC Electronics U.S.A. Inc. v. United States, 13 CIT 214, 217, 709 F. Supp. 1171 (1989)).

In the case under consideration it is conceded that "[a]t all relevant times, all of the parties knew ... that no Customs duties should be due or paid on these imports, since [the protestant] imported these components to be used solely for U.S. military procurement purposes." Therefore, this case is distinguished from the C.J. Tower case.

The protestant cites ruling 720958, December 29, 1982, for the proposition that the protestant's assumption that its broker was filing all necessary documentation in connection with the duty-free entry of the merchandise was a remediable mistake of fact. The protestant also cites ruling 729292, July 9, 1986, in support of its position. In ruling 729292, relief was granted under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) when Generalized System of Preference (GSP) Forms "A" were not timely filed because a letter sending certificates of origin from the foreign supplier to the importer was "clearly misdelivered, and if promptly delivered would have resulted in the submission of the missing documents before the end of the 90-day period following liquidation." It is indicated in ruling 729292 that there was some apprehension that the Customs field office processing the request under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) was taking the position that the regulatory provision requiring Form "A" for GSP entries (19 CFR 10.112) precluded the filing of a section 1520(c)(1) claim.

In the case of ruling 720958, explicit written directions were given by the protestant to the broker and the broker failed to follow those directions. In the case under consideration, no such written directions were given to the broker (although employees of the protestant stated that they "understood" that the broker was responsible for obtaining the duty-free certificates). Further, we understand that the broker has acted as broker for the protestant's DCMAO (formerly DCASR) entries since 1972 and that the importer has always taken the responsibility for obtaining the duty-free certificates in those cases. Ruling 720958 is distinguished from the case under consideration.

In the case of ruling 729292, a specific mistake or inadvertence remediable under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) was clearly established by documentary evidence. The ruling reached the conclusion that, but for this mistake or inadvertence, the required documents would have been timely delivered. The protestant attempts to analogize this case to the case under consideration, arguing that "[b]ut for [protestant's] mistake of fact in assuming initially that [the broker] was submitting all necessary documents, and then the delays resulting from DCMAO's inadvertence in issuing the necessary duty-free certificates, [the protestant] would have submitted the certificates in a timely fashion." We do not accept this attempted analogy. As shown above, the protestant has not clearly established that its alleged assumption that its broker was responsible for obtaining the duty-free certificates was a mistake of fact remediable under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1). Further, as is shown below, there was "negligent inaction" on the part of the protestant in this case. It is specifically recognized in ruling 729292 that negligent inaction would have been a bar to relief in that case. Also as shown below, it is not established that DCMAO's alleged delay in processing the duty-free certificates was inadvertence remediable under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1). Ruling 729292 is distinguished from the case under consideration.

A review of the pertinent times in this protest shows that this case is a classic case of negligent inaction in which the protestant is seeking to use 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) as an alternative to 19 U.S.C. 1514. For simplicity, these pertinent times (based either on the undisputed record or protestant's own submissions and contentions) are set forth in tabular form:

EVENT DATE

Entries. 11/6/89 - 8/31/90.

Protestant first becomes aware of May 1990. problems with certificates.

Protestant is advised that it must obtain May 31, 1990, and certificates through primary contractor "immediately" and begins action to do so. thereafter.

Notices of Advance sent by Customs to More than 6 months protestant advising that entries will after entries. be liquidated dutiable in the absence of certificates.

Protestant becomes aware there are still "Soon thereafter" problems with obtaining certificates and October 5, 1990. first becomes aware that broker is not performing all functions necessary to obtain duty-free entry.

Protestant "fax-es" a copy of entry "Immediately numbers to primary contractor who thereafter" above. "fax-es" same to DCMAO.

Primary contractor "fax-es" another Indefinite date, but copy of entry numbers to DCMAO which "2 or 3 weeks" and says it did not receive first "fax". several telephone conversations after above.

Liquidations 10/20/90 (8 entries)
11/02/90 (1 entry)
03/15/91 (5 entries)
04/26/91 (16 entries)

Duty-free certificates issued 10/29/91, 11/13/91, and 11/25/91.

Thus, before any of the entries were liquidated, the protestant became aware that there were problems with the obtaining of duty-free certificates, it was advised how it should obtain the duty-free certificates (and it eventually did obtain them in the advised manner), and it became aware that its broker was not performing all of the functions necessary to obtain the duty-free certificates. Also before liquidation, in the case of each entry, Customs, by Notices of Advance, gave the protestant notice that the entries would not be given duty-free treatment in the absence of duty-free certificates. After (or before, in some cases) these Notices of Advance were sent, and before, or at approximately the same time as, liquidation of the entries, the protestant became fully aware that there was a problem in the obtaining of duty-free certificates (i.e., the protestant "fax- ed" to the primary contractor a list of the entries for which certificates were needed and the primary contractor "fax-ed" the list to DCMAO and later (but still clearly before the liquidations became final) the primary contractor "fax-ed" a second list to DCMAO).

In C.S.D. 80-250 (cited and discussed in Occidental Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, supra), Customs published its position on negligent inaction. This position is, basically, that when an importer fails to respond to inquiries by Customs for further information, or fails to provide documents requested by Customs, Customs must liquidate the entry on the basis of the best information available to it and the failure of the importer to provide the information or documents is not a clerical error, mistake of fact, or inadvertence remediable under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) (see the rulings cited above (222049, 221590, and 221680) for examples of rulings in which this rule has been applied). In the case under consideration, Customs advised the importer of the documents necessary for duty-free entry of the merchandise and, when the documents were not provided and Customs received no response from the importer within the time given, Customs had no choice but to liquidate the entries on the basis of the best information available (see St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. (Insurer for Carreon, Inc.) v. United States, Slip Op. 92-125, Vol. 26, Cust. Bull. & Dec., No. 35, p. 36, August 26, 1992, for an illustration of the hazards to Customs of extending the liquidations of entries when information or documents have been requested and the importer has not responded).

The protestant had at least two alternatives available to it when it became aware of the problems it was having in obtaining duty-free certificates (which it concedes it recognized as a condition precedent to obtaining duty-free treatment for the merchandise). When it initially became aware of these problems, it could have requested that the time for liquidation be extended (see 19 U.S.C. 1504; 19 CFR 159.12(a)(1)(ii)). The protestant could have followed this course of action after receipt of the Notices of Advance or at any other time up to liquidation of the entries. After liquidation of the entries, the protestant could have filed a protest under 19 U.S.C. 1514, if it had done so timely (i.e., within 90 days of liquidation).

In regard to protestant's choice to seek relief under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) instead of 19 U.S.C. 1514, see the Court decisions cited above for the rule that the relief provided in the former is not an alternative to the relief provided for in the latter. Also in this regard, see Occidental Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, supra, in which the Court stated about a similar fact pattern:

The record shows that the Customs Service liquidated the entry, and, given the information it had at the time, classified the merchandise properly. Plaintiff did not protest the classification, but rather petitioned for reliquidation under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1). Clearly, plaintiff's proper course of action would have been to challenge the classification of the merchandise through a section 514 protest. [13 CIT at 248-249. Emphasis added.]

In the case under consideration, the protestant did not respond to the Notices of Advance, in which the absence of the required duty-free certificates was explicitly given as a reason for advancing the duty on the merchandise, until at least six months after issuance of the Notices (in the case of the entry for which a copy of the Notice of Advance was forwarded for our review, this time period was more than 1 year and four months). This failure to communicate with Customs about this matter, when the protestant concededly was aware of the problems concerning the obtaining of the duty-free certificates and the necessity of obtaining such certificates to obtain duty-free treatment, was negligent inaction on the part of the protestant. The mistake made by the protestant in this case was in its choice of action to correct the problem (i.e., before liquidation of the entries, it could have requested extension of the time for liquidations, and after liquidation of the entries, it could have timely protested the entries under 19 U.S.C. 1514). See, in this regard, Universal Cooperatives, Inc., v. United States, 13 CIT 516, 518, 715 F. Supp. 1113 (1989), in which the Court distinguished between "decisional mistakes" in which a party may make the wrong choice between two known alternative sets of facts and which "must be challenged under Section 514" and "ignorant mistakes" which are remediable under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1). The mistake made in this case was in the nature of a "decisional mistake" for which relief under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) may not be granted.

With regard to the protestant's claim that DCMAO's delay in processing the duty-free certificates was remediable inadvertence under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1), there is no evidence as to the claim- ed inadvertence. As explicitly stated in section 1520(c)(1), in order to qualify for relief under that provision, the clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence must be manifest from the record or established by documentary evidence (see, in this regard, PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States, 4 CIT 143, 147-148 (1982), and United States v. Lineiro, 37 CCPA 5, 10, C.A.D. 410 (1949)). Therefore, in the absence of any evidence as to the claimed inadvertence, no relief may be granted on this basis.

In its November 3, 1992, letter, the protestant discusses the St. Paul File & Marine Insurance Co. (Insurer for Carreon, Inc.) v. United States, supra, and Occidental Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, supra, cases. With regard to the former, we are not citing this case as precedent for the decision in the protest under consideration; rather, we are citing it to illustrate that Customs does not have carte blanche to extend liquidations when information necessary for liquidation which is requested by Customs is not provided. Under the Carreon case, when requested information is not provided, liquidation may be extended for a reasonable period of time relative to the situation, but if liquidation is extended unreasonably, the entries will be deemed to have been liquidated, as entered, by operation of law.

The protestant attempts to distinguish the protest under consideration from the Occidental Oil & Gas Co. case on the basis that the Notices of Action sent to the protestant by Customs were not received because of the reorganization of the protestant (the forms were addressed to "Emerson E&S Division" but in early 1989, according to the protestant, the protestant became a separate company and Emerson Electric Corporation (of which Emerson E&S had been a division) continued other operations. The protestant concludes that "[i]t is surely only because no [Notice of Action] was actually received by E&S that it did not respond", adding that "it is unlikely [that the responsible employee, who provided one of the affidavits described above] would have ignored the notice had it been properly delivered."

The protestant appears to be asking us to determine, on the basis of supposition, that the Notices of Action were not received by the protestant (i.e., see language quoted above, "it is surely because ..." and "it is unlikely ..."), but provides no evidence in this regard. In fact, all documents in the file having addresses for the protestant (including the protest itself) have the same mailing address (although the protest lists the name of the protestant as "Electronics & Space Corp."), and entries and invoices from 1990 (i.e., after the 1989 reorganization) list the consignee or importer as a division of Emerson Electric Corp., just as was done on the Notices of Action. As to this issue, see Tropicana Products, Inc. v. United States, 13 CIT 390, 393, 713 F. Supp. 413 (1989); aff'd, 909 F. 2d 504 (Fed. Cir. 1990), noting the "presumption that 'public officials have discharged their duties ....'" See also, PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States, supra, and United States v. Lineiro, supra, as to the requirement that a clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence must be manifest from the record or established by documentary evidence to qualify for relief under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) (as discussed above) (in particular, note the statement of the Court in the Lineiro case that "[d]etermination of issues in customs litigation may not be based on supposition" (37 CCPA at 10)).

As to the other arguments made by the protestant in its November 3, 1992, letter, we do not accept as a "crucial distinction," as claimed by the protestant, the fact that in the protest under consideration the documents establishing the entitlement to duty-free treatment were submitted at the time of the application for reliquidation under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1), whereas that was not the case in the Occidental Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, supra, case. (In fact, we note that the duty- free certificates were not filed within the 1-year period for filing an application for reliquidation under section 1520(c)(1) in the case of all but one of the entries listed on the first page of the attachment to the protest and the first entry listed on page two of that attachment.) The fact that in the case of some of the entries duty-free certificates were submitted at the time of the filing of the application for reliquidation under section 1520(c)(1) does not change the fact that it was negligent inaction of the protestant to fail to respond to the Notices of Action, as discussed above. Nor do we agree, as contended by the protestant in its November 3, 1992, letter that the reasoning in the Occidental Oil & Gas Co. case is contrary to that in the C.J. Tower & Sons of Buffalo, Inc. v. United States, supra, case and, in any case, is not applicable to the protest under consideration because the protest involves "defense articles" and the Occidental Oil & Gas Co. case involved a claim for duty-free treatment under the provision for "American goods returned" (see the discussion of the applicability of the C.J. Tower case to the protest under consideration, above).

HOLDING:

The failure of the protestant to timely file duty-free certificates as required under subheading 9808.00.30, HTSUSA, as described in the FACTS portion of this ruling, was not a clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence for which relief may be granted under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1).

The protest is DENIED. A copy of this decision should be attached to the Form 19 and provided to the protestant as part of the notice of action on the protest.

Sincerely,

John Durant, Director

Previous Ruling Next Ruling

See also: