ties in accordance with regional and field office concerns, and most were not
fully staffed. Many state and local entities believed they had little to gain from
having a full-time representative on a JTTF.
tect the president and other high officials, its agents did become involved with
those of the FBI whenever terrorist assassination plots were rumored.
sometimes cooperated. In the winter of 19992000, as will be detailed in
chapter 6, questioning by an especially alert Customs inspector led to the
arrest of an al Qaeda terrorist whose apparent mission was to bomb Los
Angeles International Airport.
tigation of the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the April
1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.
rorism. Moreover, law enforcement could be effective only after specific indi-
viduals were identified, a plot had formed, or an attack had already occurred.
Responsible individuals had to be located, apprehended, and transported back
to a U.S. court for prosecution. As FBI agents emphasized to us, the FBI and
the Justice Department do not have cruise missiles.They declare war by indict-
ing someone.They took on the lead role in addressing terrorism because they
were asked to do so.
portation had been vested by Congress with the sometimes conflicting man-
date of regulating the safety and security of U.S. civil aviation while also
promoting the civil aviation industry.The FAA had a security mission to pro-
tect the users of commercial air transportation against terrorism and other
criminal acts. In the years before 9/11, the FAA perceived sabotage as a greater
threat to aviation than hijacking. First, no domestic hijacking had occurred in
a decade. Second, the commercial aviation system was perceived as more vul-
nerable to explosives than to weapons such as firearms. Finally, explosives were