background image
Sudan Becomes a Doubtful Haven
Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own,
in large part because Bin Ladin lost his base in Sudan. Ever since the Islamist
regime came to power in Khartoum, the United States and other Western gov-
ernments had pressed it to stop providing a haven for terrorist organizations.
Other governments in the region, such as those of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and
even Libya, which were targets of some of these groups, added their own pres-
sure. At the same time, the Sudanese regime began to change.Though Turabi
had been its inspirational leader, General Omar al Bashir, president since 1989,
had never been entirely under his thumb.Thus as outside pressures mounted,
Bashir's supporters began to displace those of Turabi.
The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. The would-be
killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in
Sudan and helped by Bin Ladin.
56
When the Sudanese refused to hand over
three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Secu-
rity Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanc-
tioned Khartoum in April 1996.
57
A clear signal to Bin Ladin that his days in Sudan were numbered came when
the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop
giving sanctuary to its enemies. Bin Ladin had to tell the Libyans who had been
part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had
to leave the country. Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the
Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him.
58
Bin Ladin also began to have serious money problems. International pres-
sure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan's cur-
rency. Some of Bin Ladin's companies ran short of funds. As Sudanese
authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased. Saudi
pressures on the Bin Ladin family also probably took some toll. In any case, Bin
Ladin found it necessary both to cut back his spending and to control his out-
lays more closely.He appointed a new financial manager,whom his followers saw
as miserly.
59
Money problems proved costly to Bin Ladin in other ways. Jamal Ahmed al
Fadl, a Sudanese-born Arab, had spent time in the United States and had been
recruited for the Afghan war through the Farouq mosque in Brooklyn. He had
joined al Qaeda and taken the oath of fealty to Bin Ladin, serving as one of his
business agents. Then Bin Ladin discovered that Fadl had skimmed about
$110,000, and he asked for restitution. Fadl resented receiving a salary of only
$500 a month while some of the Egyptians in al Qaeda were given $1,200 a
month. He defected and became a star informant for the United States. Also
testifying about al Qaeda in a U.S. court was L'Houssaine Kherchtou, who told
of breaking with Bin Ladin because of Bin Ladin's professed inability to pro-
vide him with money when his wife needed a caesarian section.
60
In February 1996, Sudanese officials began approaching officials from the
62
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 62