(Mektab al Khidmat, or MAK), which channeled recruits into Afghanistan.
to rebel groups in Afghanistan fighting the Soviet occupation. This assistance
was funneled through Pakistan:the Pakistani military intelligence service (Inter-
Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISID), helped train the rebels and dis-
tribute the arms. But Bin Ladin and his comrades had their own sources of
support and training, and they received little or no assistance from the
United States.
Soviets began their withdrawal, the jihad's leaders debated what to do next.
a base or foundation (al Qaeda) as a potential general headquarters for future
jihad.
zation's structure included as its operating arms an intelligence component, a
military committee, a financial committee, a political committee, and a com-
mittee in charge of media affairs and propaganda. It also had an Advisory Coun-
cil (Shura) made up of Bin Ladin's inner circle.
lenged control and for preparing the mujahideen to fight anywhere in the
world. Azzam, by contrast, favored continuing to fight in Afghanistan until it
had a true Islamist government. And, as a Palestinian, he saw Israel as the top
priority for the next stage.
Azzam and both of his sons. The killers were assumed to be rival Egyptians.
The outcome left Bin Ladin indisputably in charge of what remained of the
MAK and al Qaeda.
ence on Bin Ladin and his al Qaeda colleagues. By the late 1980s, the Egypt-
ian Islamist movement--badly battered in the government crackdown
following President Sadat's assassination--was centered in two major organiza-
tions: the Islamic Group and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. A spiritual guide for
both, but especially the Islamic Group, was the so-called Blind Sheikh, Omar
Abdel Rahman. His preaching had inspired the assassination of Sadat. After
being in and out of Egyptian prisons during the 1980s, Abdel Rahman found