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produced a common problem throughout the Muslim world: a large, steadily
increasing population of young men without any reasonable expectation of
suitable or steady employment--a sure prescription for social turbulence. Many
of these young men, such as the enormous number trained only in religious
schools, lacked the skills needed by their societies. Far more acquired valuable
skills but lived in stagnant economies that could not generate satisfying jobs.
Millions, pursuing secular as well as religious studies, were products of edu-
cational systems that generally devoted little if any attention to the rest of the
world's thought, history, and culture.The secular education reflected a strong
cultural preference for technical fields over the humanities and social sciences.
Many of these young men, even if able to study abroad, lacked the perspective
and skills needed to understand a different culture.
Frustrated in their search for a decent living, unable to benefit from an edu-
cation often obtained at the cost of great family sacrifice, and blocked from
starting families of their own, some of these young men were easy targets for
radicalization.
Bin Ladin's Historical Opportunity
Most Muslims prefer a peaceful and inclusive vision of their faith, not the
violent sectarianism of Bin Ladin.Among Arabs, Bin Ladin's followers are com-
monly nicknamed takfiri, or "those who define other Muslims as unbelievers,"
because of their readiness to demonize and murder those with whom they dis-
agree. Beyond the theology lies the simple human fact that most Muslims, like
most other human beings, are repelled by mass murder and barbarism what-
ever their justification.
"All Americans must recognize that the face of terror is not the true face of
Islam," President Bush observed. "Islam is a faith that brings comfort to a bil-
lion people around the world. It's a faith that has made brothers and sisters of
every race. It's a faith based upon love, not hate."
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Yet as political, social, and
economic problems created flammable societies, Bin Ladin used Islam's most
extreme, fundamentalist traditions as his match.All these elements--including
religion--combined in an explosive compound.
Other extremists had, and have, followings of their own. But in appealing
to societies full of discontent, Bin Ladin remained credible as other leaders and
symbols faded. He could stand as a symbol of resistance--above all, resistance
to the West and to America. He could present himself and his allies as victori-
ous warriors in the one great successful experience for Islamic militancy in the
1980s: the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation.
By 1998, Bin Ladin had a distinctive appeal, as he focused on attacking
America. He argued that other extremists, who aimed at local rulers or Israel,
did not go far enough.They had not taken on what he called "the head of the
snake."
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