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The proposed National Counterterrorism Center should offer one-stop shopping to agencies with counterterror-
ism and homeland security responsibilities.That is, it should be an authoritative reference base on the transnational
terrorist organizations: their people, goals, strategies, capabilities, networks of contacts and support, the context in
which they operate, and their characteristic habits across the life cycle of operations--recruitment, reconnaissance,
target selection, logistics, and travel. For example, this Center would offer an integrated depiction of groups like al
Qaeda or Hezbollah worldwide, overseas, and in the United States.

The NCTC will not eliminate the need for the executive departments to have their own analytic units. But

it would enable agency-based analytic units to become smaller and more efficient. In particular, it would make it
possible for these agency-based analytic units to concentrate on analysis that is tailored to their agency's specific
responsibilities.

A useful analogy is in military intelligence.There, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the service production

agencies (like the Army's National Ground Intelligence Center) are the institutional memory and reference source
for enemy order of battle, enemy organization, and enemy equipment.Yet the Joint Staff and all the theater com-
mands still have their own J-2s.They draw on the information they need, tailoring and applying it to their opera-
tional needs.As they learn more from their tactical operations, they pass intelligence of enduring value back up to
the Defense Intelligence Agency and the services so it can be evaluated, form part of the institutional memory, and
help guide future collection.

In our proposal, that reservoir of institutional memory about terrorist organizations would function for the

government as a whole, and would be in the NCTC.

5. The head of the NCTC would thus help coordinate the operational side of these agencies, like the FBI's

Counterterrorism Division.The intelligence side of these agencies, such as the FBI's Office of Intelligence, would
be overseen by the National Intelligence Director we recommend later in this chapter.

6.The quotation goes on:"It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too

precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the
alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who
knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that
occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward
procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of indi-
vidual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion--which is usually too late. . . .
Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and
some sheer bad luck." Thomas Schelling, foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor:Warning and Decision (Stan-
ford Univ. Press, 1962), p. viii.

7. For the Goldwater-Nichols Act, see Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986). For a general discussion of the

act, see Gordon Lederman, Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff:The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (Greenwood, 1999);
James Locher, Victory on the Potomac:The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2003).

8. For a history of the DCI's authority over the intelligence community, see CIA report, Michael Warner ed.,

Central Intelligence; Origin and Evolution (CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001). For the Director's view
of his community authorities, see DCI directive, "Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/1:The Authorities
and Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as Head of the U.S. Intelligence Community," Nov. 19,
1998.

9. As Norman Augustine, former chairman of Lockheed Martin Corporation, writes regarding power in the

government,"As in business, cash is king. If you are not in charge of your budget, you are not king." Norman Augus-
tine, Managing to Survive in Washington:A Beginner's Guide to High-Level Management in Government (Center for Strate-
gic and International Studies, 2000), p. 20.

10. For the DCI and the secretary of defense, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-6(a). If the director does not concur with

the secretary's choice, then the secretary is required to notify the president of the director's nonconcurrence. Ibid.
For the DCI and the attorney general, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-6(b)(3).

11.The new program would replace the existing National Foreign Intelligence Program.
12. Some smaller parts of the current intelligence community, such as the State Department's intelligence bureau

and the Energy Department's intelligence entity, should not be funded out of the national intelligence program
and should be the responsibility of their home departments.

13. The head of the NCTC should have the rank of a deputy national intelligence director, e.g., Executive

Level II, but would have a different title.

14. If the organization of defense intelligence remains as it is now, the appropriate official would be the under

secretary of defense for intelligence. If defense intelligence is reorganized to elevate the responsibilities of the direc-
tor of the DIA, then that person might be the appropriate official.

15. For the information technology architecture, see Ruth David interview (June 10, 2003). For the necessity

of moving from need-to-know to need-to-share, see James Steinberg testimony, Oct. 14, 2003. The Director still
has no strategy for removing information-sharing barriers and--more than two years since 9/11--has only
appointed a working group on the subject. George Tenet prepared statement, Mar. 24, 2004, p. 37.

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