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30. Jack S. interview (June 14, 2004).
31.The FBI checked a variety of databases for information on the Bin Ladin flight passengers and searched the

aircraft. Because it was not clear to us whether the TIPOFF terrorist watchlist was checked by the FBI, the Terror-
ist Screening Center checked the names of individuals on the flight manifests of six Saudi flights against the cur-
rent TIPOFF watchlist at our request prior to our hearing in April 2004.There were no matches. At our request,
based on additional information, the Terrorist Screening Center in June and July 2004 rechecked the names of indi-
viduals believed to be on these six flights, the names of individuals on three more charter flights, the names of indi-
viduals on the flight containing the Saudi Deputy Defense Minister, and the names of Saudi nationals on commercial
flights that journalists have alleged are suspect.There were no matches.Tim D. interviews (Apr. 12, 2004; June 30,
2004; July 9, 2004); FBI memo, Terrorist Screening Center to Director's Office, "Request by 9/11 Commission
Task Force to screen the airline passenger lists through the TDSB and TIPOFF databases," Mar. 30, 2004.

32.White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Charlie Gibson of ABC, Sept. 4, 2002, p. 11.
33."The only . . . true advice I receive is from our war council." White House transcript, President Bush inter-

view with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz of the Washington Post, Dec. 20, 2001.

34. On Secretary Rumsfeld's remarks, see White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Wood-

ward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.The President's adviser, Karen Hughes, who was in the interview, listed the points
Rumsfeld made at the smaller NSC meeting. Ibid.

35. On the President's tasking in the earlier meeting held that day, see NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions

for NSC Meeting Held on September 12, 2001, Dec. 17, 2001. On the paper that went beyond al Qaeda, see NSC
memo, Deputies Draft Paper (attached to Agenda for NSC Meeting Scheduled for Sept. 12, 2001).The Summary
of Conclusions for the afternoon meeting indicates that the paper was discussed.

On giving priority to preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, see White House tran-

script, Hadley interview with Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, Jan. 11, 2002, p. 535.

36. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee Meeting Held on September 13, 2001.

In addition to the usual members of President Bush's war cabinet, Secretary of Transportation Mineta and FAA
security chief Canavan also attended.

37. DOS cable, State 158711,"Deputy Secretary Armitage's Meeting with General Mahmud:Actions and Sup-

port Expected of Pakistan in Fight Against Terrorism," Sept. 14, 2001. On September 14, 2001, the U.S. Embassy
in Islamabad sent Musharraf 's answer to the State Department by cable.

38. DOS cable, Islamabad 5123,"Musharraf Accepts the Seven Points," Sept. 14, 2001.
39. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of NSC Meeting Held on September 13, 2001. According to the

Summary of Conclusions, this meeting of the President and his advisers took place in the White House Situation
Room; however, the agenda alerting agencies to the meeting specified that it would be conducted via the secure
video teleconference system (SVTS).Thus, it is unclear whether the attendees met face-to-face at the White House
or held their meeting remotely via SVTS.

40. State Department memo, "Gameplan for Polmil Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan," Sept. 14, 2001

(tasked by President Bush).The paper was sent to the White House on September 14, 2001.The demand to free
all imprisoned foreigners reflected the U.S. government's concern about the welfare of several foreign aid workers
in Afghanistan who had been imprisoned by the Taliban in August 2001.Two young American women, Heather
Mercer and Dayna Curry of the organization "Shelter Now International," were among those arrested and charged
with promoting Christianity.The Taliban and other Islamists found their activities an affront to Islam and in viola-
tion of Afghanistan's laws and the regime's tenets.Wendy Chamberlin interview (Oct. 28, 2003). Powell stated that
the President wanted to get the hostages out but that desire would not restrain American action.White House tran-
script, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.

41. State Department memo, "Gameplan for Polmil Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan," Sept. 14, 2001.
42.White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.
43. Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004). Hadley told us that the White House was not satisfied with the

Defense Department's plans to use force in Afghanistan after 9/11. Ibid.; see also White House transcript, Rice inter-
view with John King of CNN, Aug. 2, 2002, p. 421.

44.Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004).
45. NSC memo, Hadley to recipients,"Discussion Paper for NSC meeting at Camp David on 14 September,"

Sept. 14, 2001.

46. CIA memo,"Going to War," Sept. 15, 2001.
47.White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.
48. DOD briefing materials, "Evolution of Infinite Resolve Planning (AQ, UBL)," undated (provided to the

Commission on Mar. 19, 2004). According to Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, the President
responded to Shelton by saying that the boots-on-the-ground option was an interesting idea. He wanted to know
what the CIA would do when ground forces were in Afghanistan.White House transcript, Hadley interview with
Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, Jan. 11, 2002, p. 545.

49. NSC memo,"Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting," Sept. 17, 2001;White House transcript,

President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 10

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