background image
Bank meetings, see "Washington Is Seeking Support to Handle Protests at 2 Meetings," New York Times, Aug. 18,
2001, p. A8; Arlington County,"After-Action Report," pp. 12, A-4, C-26.
194. For a list of the response agencies, see James Schwartz and Christopher Combs,"Incident Command, Joint
Operations Center and Incident Communications," July 28, 2003 (presented at conference in Arlington,Va.,"Local
Response to Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9/11 Attack on the Pentagon").When the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms moved from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Justice after 9/11 in con-
nection with the creation of DHS, it was renamed the Bureau of Alcohol,Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (still
abbreviated ATF); see ATF press release,"ATF Moves to the Department of Justice," Jan. 24, 2003.
195. For the establishment of incident command on September 11, see Arlington County, "After-Action
Report," appendix 1, p. 1-1; Schwartz and Combs,"Incident Command."
196. Arlington County, "After-Action Report," appendix 1, p. 1-1. Other sources put the time of the partial
collapse as late as 10:14. See Edward P. Plaugher,"Fire & EMS," July 28, 2003 (presented at conference in Arling-
ton,Va.,"Local Response to Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9/11 Attack on the Pentagon").
197. Ibid., pp. A-30­A-31.
198. Edward A. Flynn,"Law Enforcement," July 28, 2003 (presented at conference in Arlington,Va., on "Local
Response to Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9/11 Attack on the Pentagon").
199. Arlington County,"After-Action Report," pp. 12­13.
200. For the estimate, see NIST report, "WTC Investigation Progress," June 22­23, 2004. For the updated
death certificate information, see New York City report, "WTC Victim List," June 21, 2004.The analysis in this
paragraph is based upon the following sources: CNN, "September 11: A Memorial," updated 2004 (online at
www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/memorial/index.html); company contacts, June 29, 2004 (online at
http://worldtradeaftermath.com/wta/contacts/companies_list.asp?letter=a); CNN, WTC tenants, 2001 (online
at www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/tenants1.html); September 11 personal tributes, June 19, 2004
(online at www.legacy.com/LegacyTribute/Sept11.asp); September 11 personal profiles, Oct. 11, 2003 (online at
www.september11victims.com/september11Victims); New York Times, Portraits: 9/11/01:The Collected "Portraits of
Grief" (Times Books, 2002). It is possible that a person who worked above the impact zone had not yet reached
his or her office and was killed below the impact zone, either by falling debris, by the fireballs that exploded into
the lobby, or by being trapped in an elevator. Individuals below the impact zone may have been killed for the
same reasons. Individuals may also have been killed while in the process of evacuating.
201. Ironically, had the towers remained up longer, scores more first responders would have died.Twenty-six
additional FDNY companies--more than 150 firefighters--were en route at the time of the South Tower's col-
lapse, and scores more PAPD officers on Church and Vesey were preparing to enter the towers.
202.The "advisory" announcement directed by protocol (without the expanded instruction for occupants to
return to their floors) would have given greater leeway to those who judged, based on a firsthand awareness of con-
ditions on their floors (e.g., some could feel heat from North Tower explosion), that evacuation was warranted. In
retrospect, occupants would only have had to reach a point below the 77th floor to be safe.
203.Appended to the directive was a list of different types of emergencies with designated Incident Comman-
ders.Terrorist incidents were subdivided according to the types of attack. Conventional weapons and bomb threats
were assigned to the NYPD, while chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks designated "NYPD or FDNY" as the
Incident Commander.The directive noted:"The handling of a threat of a chemical or biological release or the use
of conventional weapons falls to the NYPD. Dealing with the consequences of the explosion or release is the respon-
sibility of the FDNY.The investigation that follows, once the consequences of the event have been mitigated, is the
responsibility of the NYPD. Any conflicts regarding the issue of Command at these incidents will be resolved by
OEM." New York City memo, Office of the Mayor, "Direction and Control of Emergencies in the City of New
York," July 2001.
204. For the NYPD clearing lanes, see, e.g., FDNY interview 43, Chief (Mar. 3, 2004).
205. For the Mayor and Police Commissioner's consultation with the FDNY Chief of Department, see
Rudolph Giuliani interview (Apr. 20, 2004).
206.The FDNY's lack of command and control had some unintended positive consequences. One battalion
chief was dispatched to the South Tower but instead responded to the North Tower, where he was instrumental in
saving many lives after the South Tower collapsed. Some FDNY units dispatched to the South Tower--where they
would have perished--instead were mistakenly sent to the North Tower and in many cases survived.
207. For the FDNY addressing these issues, see generally FDNY report, McKinsey & Company, "FDNY
Report," Aug. 19, 2002; Peter Hayden interview (Jan. 14, 2004). For the PAPD not changing standard operating
procedures or training, see PAPD regulations,"Manual of Police Division Instructions," undated (in existence before
and after 9/11); Barry Pickard interview (Nov. 24, 2003).
208. One instance in which the FDNY/NYPD rivalry may have had an impact on the total fatalities was the
alleged failure of ESU officers descending past at least two firefighters after 9:59 in the North Tower to share their
evacuation instructions. It should be noted, however, that at least one firefighter has conceded that he, too, descended
past other stationary firefighters without telling them to evacuate. In addition, according to one of the ESU offi-
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9
553
FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 553