4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); PANYNJ interview 13 (Nov. 20, 2003). For lack
of concern about a second plane, see FDNY interview 63, Chief (May 16, 2004).
56. FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004).
57. For their situational awareness, see FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 15, Chief
(Jan. 14, 2004) (quotation).
58. Peter Hayden testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped).
59. On the lack of information, see FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan.
14, 2004).
60. On the staging areas, see FDNY interview 47, Chief (Mar. 11, 2004); FDNY interview 44, Chief (Mar. 8,
2004); FDNY interview 33, EMS (Feb. 9, 2004). For EMS's response, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video
footage, Sept. 11, 2001. For private ambulances responding, see FDNY interview 35, EMS (Feb. 10, 2004).
61. NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special Operations Division, and Divisions 1, 2, and 3 radio channels, Sept.
11, 2001.
62. For the Chief of Department's actions, see NYPD interview 8, HQ (Feb. 24, 2004). For the number of offi-
cers, see NYPD regulations,"Patrol Guide: Rapid Mobilization," Jan. 1, 2000; NYPD recordings, City Wide 1 and
Divisions 1, 2, and 3 radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001.
63. For shifting the mobilization point, see NYPD interview 17, 1st Precinct (Apr. 1, 2004). For stationing offi-
cers around the perimeter, see NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special Operations Division, and Divisions 1, 2, and
3 radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001. For officers being diverted, see, e.g., NYPD interview 21, 6th Precinct (May 4,
2004).
64. For the helicopters' dispatch, see NYPD records, "Aviation Unit Flight Data Sheets," Sept. 11, 2001. For
communications with air traffic controllers and their situational awareness, see NYPD interview 12,Aviation (Mar.
10, 2004); NYPD interview 14, Aviation (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 13, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD
interview 16, Aviation (Apr. 1, 2004).
65. NYPD recording, Special Operations Division radio channel, Sept. 11, 2001.
66. For the third helicopter, see NYPD records,"Aviation Unit Flight Data Sheets," Sept. 11, 2001. For the hel-
icopters' subsequent actions and protocol, see NYPD interview 12,Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD interview 14,
Aviation (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 13, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD interview 16, Aviation (Apr. 1,
2004); NYPD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004).
67. Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls; NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special Operations, and Division
1, 2, and 3 radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001.
68. NYPD memo, requests for departmental recognition 4 and 6, Jun. 26, 2002. For those on the 22nd floor
apparently not being located, see PANYNJ recognition 1, undated.
69. NYPD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004).
70. For other officers' positioning, see NYPD interview 20, Manhattan South Task Force (May 4, 2004); NYPD
interview 21, 6th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 19, 13th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 4,
Housing (Feb. 17, 2004); PAPD interview 4, Port Authority Bus Terminal Command (Nov. 20, 2003). For officers
assisting in the North Tower evacuation, see NYPD memo, request for departmental recognition 1 and 2, June 26,
2002.
71. NYPD recording,Transit Division 1 radio channel, Sept. 11, 2001.
72. NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special Operations Division, and Divisions 1, 2, and 3 radio channels, Sept.
11, 2001.
73. For the on-site commanding officer's actions, see PAPD interview 1,WTC command (Oct. 14, 2003). For
the on-duty sergeant's initial instructions, see PAPD statement 3,WTC Command (Nov. 12, 2001). For his instruc-
tions to meet at the desk, see PAPD statement 3, WTC Command (Nov. 12, 2001); PAPD statement 12, WTC
Command (Mar. 28, 2002). On the scarcity of radios, see PAPD statement 9, PATH Command (Jan. 28, 2002);
PAPD statement 8,WTC Command (Jan. 12, 2002).
74. PAPD interview 7,WTC Command (Nov. 25, 2003).
75. For the response, see PAPD statement 2,WTC Command (Nov. 10, 2001). For the lack of such written
standard operating procedures, see PAPD interview 3, LaGuardia Airport Command (Nov. 20, 2003); PAPD reg-
ulations,"Manual of Police Division Instructions," undated (in existence before 9/11). Instead, the PAPD relied on
tradition to dictate its response procedures. On the lack of interoperable frequencies, see PANYNJ interview 4 (May
10, 2004); PAPD statement 9, PATH Command (Jan. 28, 2002).
76. For the evacuation order, see PAPD statement 3, WTC Command (Nov. 12, 2001); PAPD interview 1,
WTC Command (Oct. 14, 2003). For its transmission, see Port Authority transcripts of recorded Port Authority
calls and radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001, vol. II, channel W, p. 7.
77. PAPD statement 1,Administrative Command, Nov. 2, 2001; PAPD statement 4,Administrative Command,
Nov. 24, 2001.
78. For the Emergency Operations Center's activation, see OEM interview 3 (Mar. 16, 2004); OEM interview
2 (Mar. 4, 2004). For the request for search teams, see OEM interview 5 (Mar. 19, 2004). For the senior OEM offi-
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9
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