103. CIA briefing materials, DCI Update, "Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly," Aug. 23, 2001. Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin testified that he was told about Moussaoui several days before Tenet was
briefed, although he did not recall the specific date of the briefing. John McLaughlin testimony, Apr. 14, 2004.
104. George Tenet interviews (Jan. 28, 2004; July 2, 2004).
105. For the renewed request, see FBI letterhead memorandum, Zacarias Moussaoui, Sept. 11, 2001. For the
initial British response, see British Security Service memo, re: Zacarias Moussaoui, Sept. 12, 2001; information pro-
vided to the Commission by the British government; British liaison telex,"Zacarias Moussaoui--Background Infor-
mation," Sept. 13, 2001. See also Joseph H. interview (May 4, 2004).
106. Joint Inquiry report (classified version), pp. 340341. Notably, the FBI analyst "Mary" who was looking
at the Mihdhar information suggested that the U.S. government talk to Ressam to see if he knew anything about
Mihdhar. See CIA email, Mary to John, seeking identification by Ressam,Aug. 21, 2001.There is no evidence that
Ressam was asked about Moussaoui or Mihdhar prior to 9/11.
107.According to Ramzi Binalshibh, had KSM known that Moussaoui had been arrested, he would have can-
celled the 9/11 attacks. Intelligence report, interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh, Feb. 14, 2003.
108. Joint Inquiry report (classified version), pp. 329331; Joint Inquiry interview of Mike, Alice, Larry, John,
Terry, Aug. 12, 2002.
109. CIA cable, Key UBL personalities, Sept. 25, 2000.
110. CIA cable, Mukhtar information, May 23, 2002.
111. CIA cable, Biographical Information on Key UBL Associates in Afghanistan, June 11, 2001; Intelligence
report, biographical information on Bin Ladin associates in Afghanistan, June 12, 2001. For the subsequent identi-
fication, see CIA cable, follow-up source on KSM, July 11, 2001.
112. For the reporting identifying Mukhtar as KSM, see CIA cable, source information re: KSM,Aug. 28, 2001.
113. John interview (Apr. 2, 2004).
9 Heroism and Horror
1. For the WTC's layout, see Port Authority diagrams, "World Trade Center Concourse Level," "Concourse
Level," and "Plaza Level," undated. For the number of square feet of office space, see Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) report, "World Trade Center Building Performance Study," undated. For the number of
workers and passersby, see Port Authority briefing (May 13, 2004).
For the dimensions, see FEMA report, "World Trade Center Building Performance Study," undated. In addi-
tion, the outside of each tower was covered by a frame of 14-inch-wide steel columns; the centers of the steel
columns were 40 inches apart.These exterior walls bore most of the weight of the building.The interior core of
the buildings was a hollow steel shaft, in which elevators and stairwells were grouped. Ibid. For stairwells and ele-
vators, see Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004.
2. See Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004.
3. Ibid.These deviations were necessary because of the placement of heavy elevators and machine rooms, and
were located between the 42nd and 48th floors and the 76th and 82nd floors in both towers. For the doors being
closed but unlocked, see Port Authority briefing (May 13, 2004).
4. For rooftop access and evacuations, see Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004.
For the helipad not conforming, see PANYNJ interview 14 (July 8, 2004). In the interests of promoting candor
and protecting privacy, we agreed not to identify most individuals we interviewed. Individuals are identified by a
code, and individuals' ranks or units are disclosed only in a broad manner.
5. For the 1993 attack's effect, see Alan Reiss testimony, May 18, 2004. For the attack's testing the city's response
capability, see FDNY report,"Report from the Chief of Department,Anthony L. Fusco," in William Manning, ed.,
The World Trade Center Bombing: Report and Analysis (FEMA, undated), p. 11.
6. For the towers' loss of power and the other effects, see New York City report, "Report of the World Trade
Center Review Committee," 1995, p. 4. For generators' shutting down, see Port Authority briefing (May 13, 2004).
For the rescue efforts, see FDNY report,"Report from the Chief of Department,Anthony L. Fusco," in Manning,
ed., The World Trade Center Bombing, p. 11. For the evacuation time, see PANYNJ interview 5 (May 15, 2004).
7. For information on rooftop evacuations, see Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May
2004; NYPD interview 25, Aviation (June 21, 2004). For the rappel rescue, see Port Authority response to Com-
mission interrogatory, May 2004. For figure of 15 hours, see "World Trade Center Bombing," NY Cop Online Mag-
azine, Dec. 12, 2000 (online at www.nycop.com). For the general false impression, see Civilian interview 3 (May
4, 2004); Commission analysis of letters written to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
concerning the September 11 attacks. For the WTC fire safety plan, see Port Authority response to Commission
interrogatory, May 2004.
8. For the upgrades, see Port Authority memorandum to the Commission for Nov. 3, 2003, meeting; Port
Authority briefing (May 13, 2004).
9. For the upgrades, see Port Authority memorandum to the Commission for Nov. 3, 2003, meeting; Port
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
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