KSM, July 11, 2001.As noted in chapter 7, KSM has said that it was generally well known by the summer of 2001
that he was planning an operation in the United States. Roger Cressey told us he did not recall seeing this report-
ing, although he would have had access to it. Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004).
For the summer threat reporting and actions taken in response, see NSC memo, Clarke/Cressey agenda for
June 22 CSG meeting, June 20, 2001; CIA, SEIB,"Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats," June 25,
2001; CIA, SEIB,"Bin Ladin Planning High-Profile Attacks," June 30, 2001; CIA cable,"Threat UBL Attack Against
US Interests Next 2448 Hours," June 22, 2001; FBI report, Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update,
ITOS Threat Update Webpage, June 22, 2001.
13. DOS cable, Riyadh 02326, "U.S.Visa Express Program Transforms NIV Scene in Saudi Arabia," Aug. 19,
2001; NSC memo, Current US Terrorism Alert, July 3, 2001.
14. See CIA cable, "Possible Threat of Imminent Attack from Sunni Extremists," June 23, 2001; CIA, SEIB,
"Bin Ladin Attacks May be Imminent," June 23, 2001; CIA, SEIB,"Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term
Threats," June 25, 2001.
15. See NSC memo, Clarke to CSG regarding that day's CSG meeting, June 22, 2001; NSC memo, Current
U.S.Terrorism Alert, July 3, 2001. For the readiness of FESTs, see NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley,Terror-
ism Threat Update, June 25, 2001.
16. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, Possibility of an al Qaeda Attack, June 25, 2001; CIA report,
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "MBC TV Carries Video Report on Bin Ladin, Followers in Training,"
June 24, 2001; CIA, SEIB,"Bin Ladin Threats Are Real," June 30, 2001; John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004);
CIA cable,"Continued Threat/Potential Attack by UBL," June 29, 2001.
17. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, Possibility of an al Qaeda Attack, June 28, 2001; NSC email,
Clarke for Rice and others,Terrorist Alert, June 30, 2001.
18. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and others,Terrorist Alert, June 30, 2001; CIA, SEIB,"Bin Ladin Planning
High-Profile Attacks," June 30, 2001; CIA, SEIB,"Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delays," July
2, 2001.
19. FBI report, National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) message, "National Threat
Warning System--Potential Anti-U.S.Terrorist Attacks," July 2, 2001.
20. By July 3, DCI Tenet had asked about 20 of his counterparts in friendly foreign intelligence services to
detain specific al Qaeda members and to generally harass al Qaedaaffiliated cells. NSC memo, Current U.S.Ter-
rorism Alert, July 3, 2001. For specific disruption activities and maintaining alert, see NSC email, Clarke to Rice
and Hadley,Threat Updates, July 6, 2001; Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
21. For the Cheney call see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For the Hadley
call see NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Edelman,Terrorism Alert, July 2, 2001. For the G-8 summit see Associated
Press Online,"Bush Faced Threat at G-8 Summit," Sept. 26, 2001.
22. Veronica C. interview (May 25, 2004); INS memo, Veronica C. to Cadman,"Briefing at the NSC," July 9,
2001; Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004). The Customs representative, Ricardo C., did send out a general
advisory that was based solely on historical facts, such as the Ressam case, to suggest there was a threat. Ricardo C.
interview (June 12, 2004).
23. See CIA memo,"CTC Briefing for the Attorney General on the Usama Bin Ladin Terrorist Threat," July
5, 2001, and the accompanying CIA briefing materials,"DCI Update Terrorist Threat Review," July 3, 2001.
24. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley,Threat Updates, July 6, 2001.
25. Ibid.; see also FBI memo, Kevin G. to Watson,"Protective Services Working Group (PSWG) Meeting Held
at FBIHQ 7/9/01," July 16, 2001, and accompanying attendance sheets.
26. FBI report, Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update, ITOS Threat Update Webpage, July 20,
2001.
27.Thomas Pickard interview (Apr. 8, 2004).
28. See CIA, SEIB,"Bin Ladin Plans Delayed but Not Abandoned," July 13, 2001; CIA, SEIB,"One Bin Ladin
Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing," July 25, 2001; NSC memo, Cressey to CSG,Threat SVTS, July 23, 2001.
29. FAA information circular, "Continued Middle Eastern Threats to Civil Aviation," IC-2001-04A, July 31,
2001.
30. George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004).
31. See CIA, SEIB,"Bin Ladin Threats Are Real," June 30, 2001. For Tenet's response to DOD's concerns about
possible deception, see CIA memo, weekly meeting between Rice and Tenet, July 17, 2001; John McLaughlin inter-
view (Jan. 21, 2004); Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003).
32. NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley,Threats Update, July 27, 2001.
33. FBI report, NLETS message, "Third Anniversary of the 1998 U.S. Embassy Bombings in East Africa
Approaches;Threats to U.S. Interests Continue," Aug. 1, 2001.
34. CIA cable,"Threat of Impending al Qaeda Attack to Continue Indefinitely," Aug. 3, 2001.
35. CIA letter,Tenet to the Commission, Mar. 26, 2004; Barbara S. interview (July 13, 2004); Dwayne D. inter-
view (July 13, 2004).
534
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 534