BS, serials 349, 19106, 16624; 315N-NY-280350-CD, serial 373; 315N-NY-280350, serials 7441, 21340; 315N-
NY-280350-AT, serial 135). There have been many speculations about why Atta scheduled the Portland flight.
Although he may have believed that security was more relaxed at the smaller airport, he and Omari had to pass
through security again at Logan. Ibid. (citing 315N-NY-280350-BS, serial 2909). Interrogation of detainees has
produced no solid explanation for the trip. See, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Mar. 3, 2004.
tive briefings.
ited to six people. The Commission received access to about four years of articles from the PDB related to Bin
Ladin, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and key countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, including all the
Commission requested. The White House declined to permit all commissioners to review these sensitive docu-
ments.The Commission selected four representatives--the Chair, the Vice Chair, Commissioner Gorelick, and the
Executive Director--as its review team.All four reviewed all of the more than 300 relevant articles. Commissioner
Gorelick and the Executive Director prepared a detailed summary, reviewed by the White House for constitutional
and especially sensitive classification concerns, that was then made available to all Commissioners and designated
staff. Except for the August 6, 2001, PDB article, the summary could not include verbatim quotations, for exam-
ple the titles of the articles, but could paraphrase the substance.Two of the articles--the December 4, 1998, hijack-
ing article (in chapter 4) and the August 6, 2001, article discussing Bin Ladin's plans to attack in the United States
(in this chapter)--were eventually declassified.
6. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley,Terrorism Update, Mar. 30, 2001; NSC email, Clarke to Rice,
8. See NSC email, Cressey to Rice and Hadley,Threat Update,Apr. 19, 2001; CIA, SEIB,"Bin Ladin Planning
(appears to be from April 2001).
ITOS Threat Update Webpage, May 7, 2001 (the walk-in's claim was later discredited). For Attorney General brief-
ing, see CIA briefing materials, "Briefing for the Attorney General, 15 May 2001, Al-Qa'ida," undated. For more
threats and CSG discussion, see Intelligence report,Threat Report, May 16, 2001; NSC memo, CSG agenda, May
17, 2001.
August 22, 2001); CIA, SEIB,"Bin Ladin Network's Plans Advancing," May 26, 2001; NSC email, Clarke to Rice
and Hadley,"A day in the life of Terrorism intelligence," May 24, 2001.
to the Commission by President Bush on Apr. 29, 2004).
that KSM himself was regularly traveling to the United States. See Intelligence report, June 12, 2001. This was
doubted by the CIA's Renditions Branch, which had been looking for KSM since 1997. It noted, however, that if
the source was talking about the "real" KSM, the CIA had both "a significant threat and opportunity to pick him
up." See CIA cable, request additional information on KSM, June 26, 2001.A month later, a report from the source
indicated that the information regarding KSM's travel to the United States was current as of the summer of 1998.
It noted further, however, that KSM continued his old activities but not specifically the travel to the United States.
Significantly, it confirmed that the source was talking about the "real" KSM. See CIA cable, follow-up source on