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We found no evidence that, at this critical time, NORAD's top command-
ers, in Florida or Cheyenne Mountain, coordinated with their counterparts at
FAA headquarters to improve awareness and organize a common response.
Lower-level officials improvised--for example, the FAA's Boston Center
bypassed the chain of command and directly contacted NEADS after the first
hijacking. But the highest-level Defense Department officials relied on the
NMCC's air threat conference, in which the FAA did not participate for the
first 48 minutes.
197
At 9:39, the NMCC's deputy director for operations, a military officer,
opened the call from the Pentagon, which had just been hit. He began:"An air
attack against North America may be in progress. NORAD, what's the situa-
tion?" NORAD said it had conflicting reports. Its latest information was "of a
possible hijacked aircraft taking off out of JFK en route to Washington D.C."
The NMCC reported a crash into the mall side of the Pentagon and requested
that the Secretary of Defense be added to the conference.
198
At 9:44, NORAD briefed the conference on the possible hijacking of Delta
1989.Two minutes later, staff reported that they were still trying to locate Sec-
retary Rumsfeld and Vice Chairman Myers. The Vice Chairman joined the
conference shortly before 10:00; the Secretary, shortly before 10:30.The Chair-
man was out of the country.
199
At 9:48, a representative from the White House shelter asked if there were
any indications of another hijacked aircraft.The deputy director for operations
mentioned the Delta flight and concluded that "that would be the fourth pos-
sible hijack." At 9:49, the commander of NORAD directed all air sovereignty
aircraft to battle stations, fully armed.
200
At 9:59, an Air Force lieutenant colonel working in the White House Mil-
itary Office joined the conference and stated he had just talked to Deputy
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley.The White House requested (1) the
implementation of continuity of government measures, (2) fighter escorts for
Air Force One, and (3) a fighter combat air patrol over Washington, D.C.
201
By 10:03, when United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania, there had been no
mention of its hijacking and the FAA had not yet been added to the tele-
conference.
202
The President and the Vice President
The President was seated in a classroom when, at 9:05,Andrew Card whispered
to him: "A second plane hit the second tower. America is under attack." The
President told us his instinct was to project calm, not to have the country see
an excited reaction at a moment of crisis. The press was standing behind the
children; he saw their phones and pagers start to ring. The President felt he
should project strength and calm until he could better understand what was
happening.
203
The President remained in the classroom for another five to seven minutes,
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