via Essabar. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Apr. 8, 2004. On Binalshibh's communication to Ess-
abar, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 17, 2002; Nov. 6, 2003; Apr. 8, 2004.
Sept. 24, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003. On Atta's call to his father, see Intel-
ligence report, re Atta, Sept. 13, 2001. On Jarrah's letter, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah,
July 18, 2002, p. 67.
FBI interview,Abdullah asked whether the FBI had taped the call. FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar
Abdullah, July 23, 2002. Also on possibility of Hazmi-Abdullah contact shortly before 9/11, see Danny G. inter-
views (Nov. 18, 2003; May 24, 2004). On the change in Abdullah's mood, see FBI report of investigation, interview
of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2001. On the sudden interest of Abdullah and Salmi in proceeding with marriage
plans, see FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Samir
Abdoun, Oct. 21, 2001. On anticipated law enforcement interest in gas station employees and September 10, 2001,
meeting, see FBI report of investigation, interview, May 21, 2002.
177. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 14, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004.
178. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 3, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004; Apr. 3, 2004.
179. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Nov. 27, 2001; Feb. 5, 2002. Intelligence report, interroga-
cerned about this lack of discretion that they urged Bin Ladin not to make any additional remarks about the plot.
According to KSM, only Bin Ladin,Atef,Abu Turab al Jordani, Binalshibh, and a few of the senior hijackers knew
the specific targets, timing, operatives, and methods of attack. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Oct. 27,
2003; Feb. 23, 2004. Indeed, it was not until midsummer that Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Ayman al Zawahiri
learned of the operation, and only after his group had cemented its alliance with al Qaeda and Zawahiri had become
Bin Ladin's deputy. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004.
182. On Omar's opposition, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, May 30, 2002, in which the
Omar's unwillingness to allow an attack against the United States to originate from Afghanistan. See also Intelli-
gence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 27, 2003. There is some discrepancy about the position of Zawahiri.
According to KSM, Zawahiri believed in following the injunction of Mullah Omar not to attack the United States;
other detainees, however, have said that Zawahiri was squarely behind Bin Ladin. Intelligence report, interrogation
of detainee, June 20, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, June 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interro-
gation of KSM, Sept. 26, 2003.
he would have disobeyed even had the council ordered Bin Ladin to cancel the operation. Intelligence report, inter-
rogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004.
186. Abdul Faheem Khan interview (Oct. 23, 2003); see also Arif Sarwari interview (Oct. 23, 2003).
187. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 8, 2003; July 24, 2003.
188. FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serial 3112; Western Union
the debit card for Mihdhar's bank account, which still contained approximately $10,000.The package containing
the card was intercepted after the FBI found the Express Mail receipt for it in Hazmi's car at Dulles Airport on
9/11. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 61.
line," Dec. 5, 2003.The conversation was brief and, according to Senguen, not unusual. FBI electronic communi-
cation, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 18, 2001, pp. 56.