able targets and had been on the list since the spring of 1999. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2,
2004. On Binalshibh's receipt of money, Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 23, 2002; Dec. 11,
2002. In one report, Binalshibh says that Atef provided him with $3,000; in another he claims it was $5,000.
143. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Dec. 11, 2002.
144. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Apr. 8, 2004.
145. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 48. Intelligence reports, interrogations
Army knives and withdrew 1,700 Swiss francs from his SunTrust bank account. He may have intended to use the
knives during the attacks. It is unknown why he withdrew the money. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Inves-
tigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 47.
ing and were connected to the 9/11 attacks. In an indictment of the Spanish cell members dated September 17,
2003, the Spanish government relies on three main points. First is a 1997 trip to the United States by Ghasoub al
Abrash Ghalyoun, a Syrian living in Spain. During the trip, Ghalyoun videotaped a number of U.S. landmarks,
including the World Trade Center.The Spanish indictment alleges that an al Qaeda courier was in Ghalyoun's town
in Spain shortly after the trip and that the courier probably delivered the tape to al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan.
Second, the Spanish government contends that during the relevant time period, an individual named Muhammed
Belfatmi was near the town where the Atta-Binalshibh meeting took place. and that Belfatmi traveled to Karachi
shortly before September 11 on the same flight as Said Bahaji, one of Atta's Hamburg associates, and even stayed at
the same hotel. Finally, Spanish authorities rely on an intercepted telephone conversation between cell leader Imad
Eddin Barakat Yarkas and an individual named "Shakur" in August 2001, in which "Shakur" describes himself as
entering "the field of aviation" and "slitting the throat of the bird.""Shakur" has been identified by Spanish author-
ities as Farid Hilali. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that other facts will come to light as the Spanish
case progresses to trial, we have not found evidence that individuals in Spain participated in the July meeting or in
the 9/11 plot. See Baltasar Garzon interview (Feb. 13, 2004); Indictment, Central Investigating Court No. 5, Madrid,
Sept. 17, 2003, pp. 151200, 315366; Superseding Indictment, Central Investigating Court No. 5, Madrid, April
28, 2004.
147. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Sept. 11, 2003; Oct. 11, 2003;
experienced pilot. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
ligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003. KSM has admitted that he considered targeting a nuclear
power plant as part of his initial proposal for the planes operation. See chapter 5.2. He has also stated that Atta
included a nuclear plant in his preliminary target list, but that Bin Ladin decided to drop that idea. Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 12, 2002.
150. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003;Apr. 17, 2003.
151. On Binalshibh's new phones, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 21, 2002. On Binal-
Sept. 10, 2003; CIA report, Director's Review Group, Oct. 2003.
about the 9/11 operation. He says the file included letters and email communications among those involved with
the attacks, but was lost in Afghanistan when he fled after September 11. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
Oct. 15, 2003.
157. According to Binalshibh, Jarrah was not aware of Moussaoui or the wire transfers. Intelligence reports,