ers that he had been on jihad in Chechnya. Fearing that they might ask for his passport, he removed the
U.S. visa--as later confirmed by forensic analysis performed by Saudi authorities. Hamlan returned to col-
lege and resumed living with his parents, who confiscated his passport.
KSM to convince Hamlan to return to Afghanistan. Hamlan never did. Intelligence report, interrogation
of detainee, Mar. 16, 2003.
and Binalshibh.A letter recovered from a safehouse in Pakistan, apparently written by Sayf al Adl, also sug-
gests that Jdey was initially part of the 9/11 operation at the same time as the Hamburg group. A video-
tape of Jdey's martyrdom statement was found in the rubble of Atef 's house near Kabul following a
November 2001 airstrike, together with a martyrdom video of Binalshibh. While both Binalshibh and
Khallad confirm Jdey's status as an al Qaeda recruit, KSM says Jdey was slated for a "second wave" of attacks
but had dropped out by the summer of 2001 while in Canada. FBI briefing (June 24, 2004); Intelligence
report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, May 21,
2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 1, 2003.
of Zubaydah, Feb. 18, 2004. KSM also taught the muscle hijackers English and provided lessons about airplanes.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004. Binalshibh also has discussed this training in post-capture
statements, describing it as hand-to-hand combat training. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Jan. 8,
2004. According to Binalshibh, after returning to Afghanistan, muscle hijacker recruits fought on the front lines
alongside the Taliban and participated in the March 2001 destruction of the giant Buddha statues in Bamian
Province, Afghanistan. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Mar. 31, 2004.
rogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004.
KSM's funding of the hijackers, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 15, 2004; July 25, 2003.
else they needed. Ali referred them to places where they could obtain travelers checks. He also helped Ahmed al
Ghamdi, one of the earliest operatives to transit Dubai, acquire a mobile phone account so that the operatives could
use that number as a travel agency point of contact. Ibid.
to by the nickname "Losh") appears to have contacted Atta and expressed the desire to join the operation.Ali actu-
ally applied for a U.S. visa on August 27, 2001, listing his intended arrival date as September 4 for a one-week stay.
His application was denied because he appeared to be an economic immigrant. DOS record, visa application of Ali
Abdul Aziz Ali,Aug. 27, 2001. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Nov. 17, 2003; Intelligence report, doc-
uments captured with KSM, Sept. 24, 2003; CIA notes,"DRG Research Notes," Jan. 17, 2004; FBI report,"Sum-
mary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 72.
hijacker Banihammad opened bank accounts at the same UAE bank while Banihammad was his way to the United
States. Banihammad, who was from the UAE, was familiar with the country's procedures and helped Hawsawi com-
plete his account application. Banihammad gave Hawsawi roughly $3,000 and granted him power of attorney over
his account so that Hawsawi could forward the bank card to him in the United States. After Banihammad arrived
in the United States, Hawsawi deposited $4,900 into the account. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investiga-
tion," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 29.
(Flight 11) and Satam al Suqami (Flight 11), who flew from the UAE to London and arrived in Orlando on April
23, 2001, where Atta most likely met them. Suqami was admitted as a business visitor, allowing him only a one-
month stay and thus making him an illegal overstay by May 21, 2001. INS records, NIIS records of Waleed al Shehri
and Satam al Suqami, Apr. 23, 2001. Suqami was the only hijacker not to obtain a U.S. identification document.