280350-302, serial 381; 265A-NY-280350-MM, serial 3817). For Shehhi's presence in Florida, see, e.g., ibid. (Apr.
13, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 17575).
81. For Shehhi's ticket purchase, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 13, 2001, entry cit-
ing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 17575;Apr. 18, 2001 entry citing 265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 1928; 265A-NY-
280350-302, serial 16379;Apr. 19, 2001, entry citing CIA report; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 17575). For Shehhi's
visit with Atta's father, see ibid. (Apr. 20, 2001, entry citing CIA report). For Atta having license during April 26,
2001, traffic stop and Shehhi spending two weeks abroad, see ibid. (citing 265A-NY-280350-MM, serial 2746; May
2, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 16379; 265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 1928); FBI Penttbom time-
line briefing (Dec. 10-11, 2003).
82. For Shehhi's return, see INS record, NIIS record of Shehhi, May 2, 2001. For Atta and Jarrah obtaining
driver's licenses, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (May 2, 2001, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-
MM, serial 59). Also on May 2, Atta and two unidentified companions appeared at the Miami District Immigra-
tion Office, where an inspector reduced Atta's authorized length of stay by two months, correcting the mistake
made back in January. Interview of inspector (Mar. 25, 2004).
83. For a description of the muscle hijackers, see CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003,
pp. 3452.
84. On Banihammad, see CIA analytic report,"Facilitating Disaster:An Overview of 11 September Finance,"
CTC 2002-40093H, Aug. 22, 2002, p. 4
85. Intelligence reports, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; July 17, 2002; Saudi Arabian
Mabahith briefing (Oct. 17, 2003) (disclosing that two of the muscle hijackers had married shortly before joining
the plot and only one,Wail al Shehri, was employed, as a physical education teacher).
86. CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 25.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., p. 26.
89. Ibid., p. 25. On Nawaf 's efforts on behalf of his brother, see CIA analytic report,"Afghanistan Camps Cen-
tral to 11 September Plot: Can al-Qa'ida Train on the Run?" CTC 2003-40071CH, June 20, 2003, p. 1; Intelli-
gence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 18, 2001.
90. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogations of KSM
and another detainee, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Feb. 19, 2004; Intelli-
gence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Feb. 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 18, 2004.
91. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan 7, 2004. Khallad agrees about the recruit pool, but also argues
that operatives' ethnicity was important for symbolic reasons, citing the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassy bomb-
ings and the planes operation as examples. In the planes operation, Khallad notes, Bin Ladin selected operatives
from Mecca (Mihdhar and the Hazmi brothers) and would have used more had they been available. Moreover, with
respect to the remaining Saudi muscle hijackers, Khallad claims Bin Ladin chose them because he wanted the 9/11
attacks to resound across Saudi Arabia, especially among the southern tribes and those of the hijackers themselves.
According to Khallad, Bin Ladin wanted operatives from strong tribal areas of Saudi Arabia and chose two Saudi
brothers from the al Shehri tribe, of which their father was a leader. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,
Feb. 18, 2004.
92. CIA analytic report, "The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, pp. 24, 26. According to Saudi authorities,
none of the hijackers had any record of extremist activity, but Satam al Suqami and Salem al Hazmi both had minor
criminal offense records. Saudi Arabian Mabahith briefing (Oct. 17, 2003).
93. CIA analytic report,"Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot," June 20, 2003, pp. 12.
94. For trainer's comments, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 8, 2002. For Omari's,
Ghamdi's, and Shehri's backgrounds, see CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 27; Intel-
ligence reports, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; July 17, 2002.
95. CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 26; Intelligence reports, interviews of Saudi
hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; July 17, 2002.According to Saudi authorities, a substantial number of the hijack-
ers isolated themselves and became religious only within a few months of leaving the Kingdom. All but Ahmad
al Haznawi, who called his aunt to inquire about his sick mother, ceased contact with their families about six months
before the attacks. Saudi Arabian Mabahith briefing (Oct. 17, 2003).
96. CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 26; Intelligence reports, interviews of Saudi
hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001; July, 17, 2002.
97. On Khattab, see CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 26, n. 2. For KSM's claim,
see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 15, 2003. For difficulties traveling to Chechnya, see also Saudi
Arabian Mabahith briefing (Oct. 17, 2003).
98. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Sept. 5, 2003; Mar. 26, 2004; Jan. 8, 2004; Jan. 7, 2004. Khal-
lad claims he also encouraged Salem al Hazmi to participate in a suicide operation. Intelligence report, interroga-
tion of Khallad, Apr. 13, 2004.
99. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 15, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Oct. 21, 2003. KSM does acknowl-
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