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worked as a computer programmer in Arizona before resuming flight training during the summer of 2001. FBI
report of investigation, interview of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 16, 2001, p. 5.
57. Intelligence report, interviews of Saudi hijackers' families, Dec. 22, 2001.
58. Al Qaeda figures at the university or in Tucson included Mubarak al Duri, reportedly Bin Ladin's princi-
pal procurement agent for weapons of mass destruction; Muhammad Bayazid, an al Qaeda arms procurer and trainer;
Wadi al Hage, an operative convicted for the East Africa bombings; and Wail Julaidan, a Saudi extremist with ties
to al Qaeda. CIA and FBI joint analytic report, "Arizona: Long Term Nexus for Islamic Extremists," May 15,
2002, p. 3.
59. Rayed Abdullah, who lived and trained with Hanjour, was a leader at the Islamic Cultural Center in Phoenix
and reportedly gave extremist speeches at the mosque. Ken Williams interview (Jan. 7, 2004); FBI electronic com-
munication, Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 22, 2003. Another Hanjour associate, Faisal al Salmi, took flight training with
Rayed Abdullah but wanted to keep his training secret. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Rayed Abdul-
lah, May 5, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Malek Seif, Oct. 25, 2001.When polygraphed on whether
he had taken flight training at the behest of an organization, al Salmi's negative response was deemed deceptive.
FBI electronic communication, investigation of Zakaria Soubra, June 5, 2002, p. 8.
60. For al Qaeda activity in Arizona, see Ken Williams interview (Jan. 7, 2004). On al Qaeda directing individ-
uals in the Phoenix area to enroll in flight training without telling them why, see FBI electronic communication,
investigation of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 22, 2003. Ghassan al Sharbi, who was captured in March 2002 in Pakistan
along with Abu Zubaydah, studied at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott,Arizona. Greg Krikorian,
"Detainee Facing Deportation Summoned to Probe," Los Angeles Times, Jan. 24, 2003; Ken Williams interview (Jan.
7, 2004). Although Sharbi has not been tied to the 9/11 attacks, he reportedly attended the training camps in
Afghanistan and swore bayat to Bin Ladin during the summer of 2001. FBI memorandum, investigation of Hamed
al Sulami, Aug. 1, 2002, p. 6.
After he left the camps, Sharbi looked for his friend Hamdan al Shalawi, another student in Arizona, for a secret
project. Shalawi reportedly trained in the camps in November 2000, learning how to conduct "Khobar
Towers"­type attacks that he and a colleague planned to execute in Saudi Arabia. FBI electronic communication,
investigation of Hamdan al Shalawi, Oct. 16, 2003, p. 2; Intelligence report, trace request on Shalawi, Nov. 27, 2000.
Shalawi, however, denies this, claiming to have been studying in Arizona at the time, which neither the FBI nor
we have been able to confirm. Shalawi was involved in a widely publicized incident in November 1999, when he
and his friend Muhammed al Qudhaieen were detained because the crew of a cross-country America West flight
reported that Qudhaieen had attempted to open the cockpit door on two occasions. FBI letterhead memorandum,
Hamed al Sulami, July 25, 2002, p. 7. After the 9/11 attacks, FBI agents in Phoenix considered whether the inci-
dent was a "dry run" for the attacks. See, e.g., FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Fahad al Wahedi, Nov.
8, 2002, p. 4. In our interviews of Shalawi and Qudhaieen, they both claimed that Qudhaieen was only looking for
the lavatory on the plane. Mohammad al Qudhaieen interview (Oct. 25, 2003); Hamdan al Shalawi interview (Oct.
22, 2003). Shalawi admits having gone to Afghanistan, but only once in the late 1980s after the war with the Soviet
Union. Shalawi interview (Oct. 22, 2003).
Finally, another admitted associate of Hani Hanjour in Arizona, Hamed al Sulami, has had telephone contact
with Sulayman al Alwan, a radical Saudi cleric from Qassim Province who was reported to be Abu Zubaydah's spir-
itual advisor and, as discussed later in this chapter, may have had a role in recruiting one or more of the muscle
hijackers. FBI memorandum, investigation of Hamed al Sulami,Aug. 1, 2002, p. 2; FBI memorandum, investigation
of Fahad al Wahedi, Nov. 8, 2002, p. 4; CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 27.
61. For Hanjour's meeting KSM, experience in the camp, and incorporation into the 9/11 operation, see Intel-
ligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. It is unknown how Hanjour got to the camps or who may
have directed him to go there. For new arrivals' procedures, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 15,
2003.
62. For Hanjour returning home and obtaining a visa, see DOS records, visa applications for Hanjour, Sept.
10, 2000; Sept. 25, 2000. For Hanjour's statement to his family, see Intelligence report, interviews of Saudi hijack-
ers' families, Dec. 22, 2001. For the meeting, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Jan. 7, 2004.
63.Ali initially gave Hanjour $3,000 to open the account and later deposited another $5,000 into the account.
See FBI report, financial timeline of 9/11 hijackers, Dec. 9, 2004, p. 36 (Dec. 5, 2000, and Jan. 28, 2001, entries).
Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 11, 2004. Hanjour also maintained another account, into which
more than $9,600 was deposited. While in the United States, he accessed both accounts via ATM. FBI Report,
"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 9, 11, 13, 17­18, 19. For Hanjour's travel and supposed
destination, see INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Dec. 8, 2000; DOS record, Hanjour visa application, Sept. 25,
2000. For his enrollment but failure to attend, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Nov. 6, 2000,
entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 11165; 265A-NY-280350-SF, serial 160).
64. For Hanjour's refresher training, see FBI report, "Hijackers Timeline," Dec. 5, 2003 (Dec. 13, 2000, entry
citing 265A-NY-280350-IN, serial 29652). For his desire to train on multi-engine planes, his language difficulties,
the instructor's advice, and his reaction, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Rodney McAlear, Apr. 10,
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
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