238. CIA memo, Black to Clarke, Jan. 25, 2001. For a Joint Staff view, see, e.g., Scott Gration interview (Mar.
3, 2004).The mission commander for the Predator flights, Air Force Major Mark A. Cooter, had registered his oppo-
sition to redeploying the aircraft back in December 2000: "given the cost/benefit from these continued missions
it seems senseless." DOD letter, Cooter to Alec B.,"Continued Flight Operations," Nov. 14, 2000 (attached to CIA
memo, Black to DCI and others, Predator Operation, Nov. 17, 2000).
239. See NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee meeting, Apr. 30, 2001.This docu-
ment noted a consensus in favor of reconnaissance missions commencing in July. But DDCI McLaughlin told us
that he and Black believed that no such decision had been made at the meeting. Hadley told us he believed that a
decision had been made at the meeting to fly such missions. See John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 2, 2004). See also
CIA briefing materials,"Summary of April 30, 2001 Deputies Committee meeting," May 3, 2001; Stephen Hadley
meeting (Jan. 31, 2004). For Rice's perspective, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
240.Allen described the "quibbling" over financing the Predator program as "ridiculous." Charles Allen inter-
view (Jan. 27, 2004). For a CIA senior management perspective, see, e.g., John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004).
The Defense Department's view is suggested in CIA briefing materials,"Summary of April 30, 2001 Deputies Com-
mittee meeting," May 3, 2001.
241. George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004); Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004).
242. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004); John Jumper interview
(Mar. 3, 2004).
243. On Hadley's efforts and directions, see NSC memo, Hadley to McLaughlin,Wolfowitz, and Myers,"Re:
Predator," July 11, 2001. On Rice's intervention, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
244. On the Deputies Committee meeting, see NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, July 31, 2001;
CIA memo, Campbell to McLaughlin, Pavitt, and others,Aug. 2, 2001.The White House told us that it cannot find
a formal Summary of Conclusions for this meeting.
245. NSC memo, Hadley to Armitage,Wolfowitz, Myers, and McLaughlin, resolving Predator issues, Aug. 3,
2001 (including McLaughlin's handwritten comment); NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, "Need to place a
call to Tenet," Aug. 8, 2001.
246. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004); John Jumper interview (Mar. 3, 2004); see also Scott Gration
interview (Mar. 3, 2004).
247. NSC memo, Clarke to Rice,"Observations at the Principals Meeting on Al Qida," Sept. 4, 2001 (text ital-
icized here is underlined in the original).
248. Ibid.
249. Ibid.
250. Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004.
251. CIA memo, Black to Tenet, Sept. 4, 2001.
252.Various interviews with participants, as well as the Maher memo (see note 255 below), make it clear that
the meeting focused on Predator, not the presidential directive.
253. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
254. Ibid.; NSC memo, Cressey to Rice, September 4 PC on counterterrorism, Sept. 3, 2001.
255. CIA memo, Maher to limited group, "Principals Committee meeting, Sept. 4, 2001," Sept. 4, 2001. We
have not found a formal summary of conclusions, which would usually be prepared after a Principals Committee
meeting.
256. Ibid.
257. Ibid.
258. Ibid.
259. NSC memo, Clarke to CSG members, Sept. 7, 2001.
260. On Massoud's assassination, see Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 574575. On the Sept. 10 meeting, see NSC memo,
Biegun to executive secretaries, "Summary of Conclusions for Sept. 10, 2001 Deputies Committee meeting on
Afghanistan, India and Pakistan," Sept. 26, 2001. Note that the agenda for this meeting, distributed on September
7, 2001, listed its topics as "Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan"; the Summary of Conclusions, written after 9/11, flipped
the order of the topics.
261. NSC memo, Hadley to Tenet, Sept. 10, 2001.
7 The Attack Looms
1. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 16.
2. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003.Although KSM's stated reasons for sending Hazmi
and Mihdhar to California do not seem especially compelling, we have uncovered no evidence tending to estab-
lish any more plausible explanation for the California destination.The possibility that the two hijackers were pur-
suing another al Qaeda mission on the West Coast, while certainly conceivable--see, e.g., CIA analytic report,
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
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