background image
around the White House complex. The officials who issued these orders did
not know that there were additional hijacked aircraft, or that one such aircraft
was en route to Washington. These measures were precautionary steps taken
because of the strikes in New York.
187
The FAA and White House Teleconferences.
The FAA, the White House,
and the Defense Department each initiated a multiagency teleconference
before 9:30. Because none of these teleconferences--at least before 10:00--
included the right officials from both the FAA and Defense Department, none
succeeded in meaningfully coordinating the military and FAA response to the
hijackings.
At about 9:20, security personnel at FAA headquarters set up a hijacking
teleconference with several agencies, including the Defense Department.The
NMCC officer who participated told us that the call was monitored only peri-
odically because the information was sporadic,it was of little value,and there were
other important tasks. The FAA manager of the teleconference also remem-
bered that the military participated only briefly before the Pentagon was hit.
Both individuals agreed that the teleconference played no role in coordinating
a response to the attacks of 9/11.Acting Deputy Administrator Belger was frus-
trated to learn later in the morning that the military had not been on the call.
188
At the White House, the video teleconference was conducted from the Sit-
uation Room by Richard Clarke, a special assistant to the president long
involved in counterterrorism. Logs indicate that it began at 9:25 and included
the CIA; the FBI; the departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the FAA; and
the White House shelter. The FAA and CIA joined at 9:40. The first topic
addressed in the White House video teleconference--at about 9:40--was the
physical security of the President, the White House, and federal agencies.
Immediately thereafter it was reported that a plane had hit the Pentagon.We
found no evidence that video teleconference participants had any prior infor-
mation that American 77 had been hijacked and was heading directly toward
Washington. Indeed, it is not clear to us that the video teleconference was fully
under way before 9:37, when the Pentagon was struck.
189
Garvey, Belger, and other senior officials from FAA headquarters partici-
pated in this video teleconference at various times.We do not know who from
Defense participated, but we know that in the first hour none of the person-
nel involved in managing the crisis did.And none of the information conveyed
in the White House video teleconference, at least in the first hour, was being
passed to the NMCC.As one witness recalled,"[It] was almost like there were
parallel decisionmaking processes going on; one was a voice conference
orchestrated by the NMCC . . . and then there was the [White House video
teleconference]. . . . [I]n my mind they were competing venues for command
and control and decisionmaking."
190
At 10:03, the conference received reports of more missing aircraft, "2 pos-
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THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
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