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istration working with Russia, see NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, update on Cole investigation, Nov. 25,
2000.
137. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004).
138. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
139. In the first ten days after the bombing, between October 13 and 23, at least three high-level briefing items
discussed responsibility for the attack.The next such briefing item we can find summarized the evidence for the
new Bush administration on January 25, 2001. On the guidance, and the presumed reasons for it, see Barbara Bod-
ine interview (Oct. 21, 2003); Pattie Kindsvater interview (Mar. 29, 2004); Ben Bonk statement during John
McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004); see also John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004); Richard interview (Dec.
11, 2003).
140. For Clarke's statement, see NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Nov. 7, 2000. For the November 10 briefing, see
CIA briefing materials, preliminary findings regarding the Cole attack for the Nov. 10, 2000, Small Group meet-
ing, undated (appears to be Nov. 10, 2000). For Berger and Clarke's communication with the President, see NSC
memo, Berger to President Clinton, USS Cole investigation update, Nov. 25, 2000.
141. See Gregory Newbold interview (Sept. 29, 2003);William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004). For Shelton
tasking Franks, see DOD memo, Joint Chiefs of Staff tasking, Mod 005 to Joint Planning Directive to U.S. Central
Command, Nov. 30, 2000. For Shelton briefing Berger, see NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, USS Cole
investigation update, Nov. 25, 2000. For the 13 options, see also DOD briefing materials, Operation Infinite Resolve
Contingency Plan Brief, undated. For the briefing to Kerrick, see DOD briefing materials, briefing to Lt. Gen.
Kerrick, Dec. 20, 2000. For the briefing of other DOD officials, see DOD briefing materials, "Evolution of Infi-
nite Resolve Planning, Summary of TLAM Availability (1998­2001), Evolution of the Armed Predator Program,"
Mar. 19, 2004, p. 5.
142. NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, USS Cole investigation update, Nov. 25, 2000.
143. Ibid. For Clarke's ideas, see NSC memo, Clarke to Sheehan and Hull,"Ultimatum Strategy with the Tal-
iban," Nov. 25, 2000.
144. CIA briefing materials,"Intelligence Assessment:The Attack on the USS Cole," Dec. 21, 2000.
145. Ibid.
146. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
147. For Albright's advisers, see DOS memo, Inderfuth to Albright, Dec. 19, 2000; DOS memo, Hull and East-
ham to Albright, preparation for Principals Committee meeting, Dec. 21, 2000. See also DOS briefing materials,
talking points for Principals Committee meeting, Dec. 21, 2000; William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004); Hugh
Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004).
148. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004)
149. Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (Free Press, 2004), p. 224. Sheehan has
not disavowed Clarke's quote.
150. George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004).
151. Pattie Kindsvater interview (Mar. 29, 2004). For Clarke's awareness, see NSC email, Clarke to Cressey,
"Considerations," Oct. 25, 2000.
152. For the lack of meaningful targets, see Scott Fry interview (Dec. 29, 2003); Walter Slocombe interview
(Dec. 19, 2003).
153. CIA memo, Black to Clarke,"NSC Requests on Approaches for Dealing with Problems in Afghanistan,"
Dec. 29, 2000.
154. See Samuel Berger letter to the Commission, "Comments on Staff Statements 5­8," May 13, 2004. For
the Blue Sky memorandum's proposals being rolled into proposals considered by the new administration, see George
Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004); John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004). On the internal CIA draft of the Blue
Sky memorandum, Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt added a handwritten note that he posed no objec-
tion if the memorandum was for transition discussion purposes, but "I do not believe a proposal of this magnitude
should be on the table for implementation" so late in the Clinton administration. He also questioned the proposal
for support to Massoud. CIA memo,"Options to Undermine Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida," Dec. 18, 2000.
155. NSC memo, "Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida: Status and
Prospects," undated (appears to be Dec. 29, 2001), attached to NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, Jan. 25, 2001.
156. Ben Bonk interview (Jan. 21, 2004); John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004).
157. Robert McNamara, Jr., interview (Apr. 19, 2004).
158. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7,
2004); James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). Pavitt also recalls telling the President-elect that killing Bin Ladin would
not end the threat.Vice President­elect Cheney, Rice, Hadley, and White House Chief of Staff­designate Andrew
Card also attended the briefing, which took place about a week before the inauguration.The President noted that
Tenet did not say he did not have authority to kill Bin Ladin.Tenet told us he recalled the meeting with Bush but
not what he said to the President-elect. George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004). He told us, however, that if cir-
cumstances changed and he needed more authority, he would have come back to either President Clinton or Pres-
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