119. NSC note, Clarke to Berger,"Procedures for Protecting Predator," Sept. 30, 2000. Clarke pointed to a sil-
ver lining: "The fact that its existence has become at least partially known, may for a while change the al Qida
movement patterns," he wrote, but "it may also serve as a healthy reminder to al Qida and the Taliban that they are
not out of our thoughts or sight." Ibid.
120. Clarke wrote to Berger that "it might be a little gloomy sitting around the fire with the al Qida leader-
ship these days." NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 9, 2000.
121. For the number of dead and wounded, see Indictment, United States v. Jamal Ahmed Mohammed Ali al-
Badawi, No. S12 98 Cr. 1023 (KTD) (S.D. N.Y. filed May 15, 2003), p. 16.
122. See Intelligence report, interrogation of Abd al Rahim al Nashiri, Feb. 21, 2004. For Khallad, see Intelli-
gence report, interrogation of Khallad,Aug. 20, 2003. For Khamri and Nibras's full names, Quso's responsibility to
film the attack, and Nibras and Quso delivering money, see Indictment, United States v. al-Badawi, May 15, 2003,
pp. 1314. Badawi was supposed to film the attack but had to travel, so he instructed Quso to do it instead. FBI
notes, notes of Nov. 11 and 13 executive conference call, Nov. 13, 2000, p. 2. For Quso's admission of delivering
money, see Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003; Sept. 15, 2003).
123. For Bin Ladin's decision, Nashiri's trip to protest, and Nashiri's instructions, see Intelligence report, inter-
rogation of Nashiri, Feb. 21, 2004. For a report that Nashiri did not instruct the operatives to attack, see Intelli-
gence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Nov. 21, 2002.
124. For the attack, see Indictment, United States v. al-Badawi, May 15, 2003, p. 16. For Quso not filming the
attack, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Fahd Mohammed Ahmad al-Quso, Feb. 3, 2001, p. 8. Quso
apparently fell asleep and missed the attack. See FBI notes, notes of Nov. 11 and 13 executive conference call, Nov.
13, 2000, p. 2.
125. For Bin Ladin's order to evacuate and subsequent actions, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu
Zubaydah, Dec. 13, 2003. For Bin Ladin's, Atef 's, and Zawahiri's movements, see Intelligence report, interrogation
of Khallad, Sept. 27, 2003.
126. Intelligence report,Terrorism Activities, Oct. 1, 2001.
127. For the media committee, the video, and its effect, see Intelligence report, autobiography of KSM, July
12, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 4, 2003. On the bombing of the Cole sparking jihadist
recruitment, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 5, 2003.
128. See Barbara Bodine interview (Oct. 21, 2003); Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003; Sept. 15, 2003). On the
problems with having Americans bring firearms into the country, see also NSC email, Clarke to Berger, USS Cole--
situation report for PC meeting, Oct. 13, 2000. U.S. officials cannot travel to a country without the clearance of
the U.S. ambassador to that country.
129. For suspicion of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, see NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, update on Cole
attack, Oct. 12, 2000. For McLaughlin's statement, see John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004). In this vein, the
State Department advised the investigation not to rush to judgment that al Qaeda was responsible. Barbara Bod-
ine interview (Oct. 21, 2003).
130. For Yemen barring the FBI, see Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003; Sept. 15, 2003). For the CIA's character-
ization, see CIA report, threat to U.S. personnel in Yemen, Oct. 18, 2000. For the high-level interventions, see Samuel
Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); Kenneth Pollack interview (Sept. 24, 2003); CIA cable, CIA talking points for
Tenet's call to chief of Yemen intelligence, Oct. 26, 2000. On secondhand information, see John McLaughlin inter-
view (Jan. 21, 2004).
131. FBI notes, notes of Nov. 11 and 13 executive conference call, Nov. 13, 2000; FBI electronic communica-
tion,"Summary of information from Yemen intelligence," Jan. 10, 2001.
132. For the FBI agent's role, see Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003; Sept. 15, 2003). For Yemen providing the pho-
tograph, see FBI electronic communication,"Summary of information from Yemen intelligence," Jan. 10, 2001. For
the source identifying the photograph, see FBI electronic communication,"Source reporting on al Qaeda," Jan. 16,
2001.
133. For Khallad's involvement in the embassy bombings, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Moham-
mad Rashed Daoud al Owhali, Sept. 9, 1998. For Yemen identifying Nashiri, see FBI electronic communication,
"Information provided by Yemen intelligence," Dec. 17, 2000.
134. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004). Richard Miniter offers an account of the Clinton administra-
tion's deliberations about the Cole in Richard Miniter, Losing Bin Laden: How Bill Clinton's Failures Unleashed Global
Terror (Regnery, 2003), pp. 222227. Berger told us the account is "a crock." Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
Clarke was less critical. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004).
135. For the additional covert action authorities, see NSC memo, McCarthy to Berger, new covert action
authorities, Oct. 31, 2000. For Tenet developing options, see NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, update on
Cole investigation, Nov. 25, 2000.
136. For Berger's authorization, see NSC memo,TNT to Berger, responding to Taliban's September overture,
Oct. 20, 2000. For Berger's statement, see NSC memo, Berger to TNT, reply to Oct. 20, 2000, memo. For the admin-
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
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