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6 From Threat to Threat
1. President Clinton was a voracious reader of intelligence. He received the President's Daily Brief (PDB), Senior
Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB), and the State Department's intelligence updates daily, as well as other products
episodically. Berger, Clarke, and Chief of Staff John Podesta received daily Bin Ladin "Situation Reports" from the
CIA detailing Bin Ladin's reported location and movements. Berger told us he would tell President Clinton if there
was anything in these reports that he needed to know. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). Information on
distribution of Bin Ladin Situation Reports provided to the Commission by CIA.
2. President Clinton spoke of terrorism in numerous public statements. In his August 5, 1996, remarks at George
Washington University, he called terrorism "the enemy of our generation." He usually spoke of terrorism in two
related contexts: new technologies and the greater openness engendered by post­Cold War globalization; and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially--and increasingly over time--the threat from biological and chem-
ical weapons. President Clinton repeatedly linked terrorist groups and WMD as transnational threats for the new
global era. See, e.g., President Clinton remarks,"On Keeping America Secure for the 21st Century," Jan. 22, 1999
(at the National Academy of Sciences,Washington, D.C.), in which he spoke directly to these topics.
3. President Clinton spoke of the Y2K computer problem in his January 19, 1999, State of the Union address.
On Y2K concerns, see John Podesta interview (Jan. 15, 2004). On concerns about extremist groups exploiting mil-
lennial opportunities, see, e.g., CIA briefing materials, CTC for the DCI,"Millennium Threat," Dec. 16, 1999.
4. Judith Miller,"Holy Warriors: Dissecting a Terror Plot from Boston to Amman," New York Times, Jan. 15, 2001,
p.A1; CIA analytic report,"Bin Ladin's Terrorist Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable," CTC 00-400117, Nov. 2,
2000 (appendix B:"Bin Ladin's Role in the Anti-U.S.`Millennial' Plots").
5. Ibid. On Hoshar and Hijazi, see Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (I. B.Tauris, 2003), p. 188.
Khaldan and Derunta were terrorist training camps in Afghanistan controlled by Abu Zubaydah.While the camps
were not al Qaeda facilities,Abu Zubaydah had an agreement with Bin Ladin to conduct reciprocal recruiting efforts
whereby promising trainees at the camps could be invited to join al Qaeda. See Intelligence report, interrogation
of Abu Zubaydah, July 10, 2002.
6. Miller,"Holy Warriors," Jan. 15, 2001; CIA analytic report,"Bin Ladin's Terrorist Operations," Nov. 2, 2000
(appendix B).
7. CIA analytic report,"Bin Ladin's Terrorist Operations," Nov. 2, 2000 (appendix B).
8. FBI electronic communication,"Ahmed Ressam; Usama bin Ladin; Sbih Benyamin; Lucia Garofalo; Boua-
bide Chamchi," Dec. 29, 1999; Miller,"Holy Warriors," Jan. 15, 2001.The Encyclopedia is a multivolume instruction
manual containing lessons on weapons handling, tactics, covert operations, bomb making, and other topics. The
manual was originally created in the late 1980s by Afghanistan-based extremists, who considered it essential for
waging terrorist operations and guerrilla warfare in the jihad against the Soviets. For more on the origins of the
Encyclopedia, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, June 24, 2003. Although Deek's precise role
within the extremist community is unknown, his name appears variously as a staff member, instructor, and techni-
cal guru for the Khaldan and Derunta terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Intelligence has revealed no extant
links to the al Qaeda inner circle. For more on Deek, see FBI electronic communication,"Usama Bin Laden; Pentt-
bomb;Taliban," May 25, 2002.
9. Testimony of Dale Watson before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 9, 2000, p. 4; Miller,
"Holy Warriors," Jan. 15, 2001.
10.Testimony of Dale Watson before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 9, 2000, pp. 3­4; FBI
electronic communication,"Ahmed Ressam; Usama bin Ladin; Sbih Benyamin; Lucia Garofalo; Bouabide Gham-
chi," Dec. 29, 1999; Miller,"Holy Warriors," Jan. 15, 2001. On the fate of Hoshar and Hijazi's accomplices, see DOS
cable, Amman 05158,"Security Court Convicts UBL Suspects of Plotting," Sept. 18, 2000.
11. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 4, 1999; Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004). In the margin next to
Clarke's suggestion to attack al Qaeda facilities in the week before January 1, 2000, Berger wrote "no."
12. NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, Dec. 9, 1999.
13. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 14, 1999.The State Department, through the U.S. embassy in Riyadh,
also asked the Saudis to relay the same threat to the Taliban.The diplomat said the United States was delivering "a
strong and unmistakable message to the Taliban that should such attacks occur, they and Bin Ladin will be subject
to swift and serious response." See DOS cable, Riyadh 003900, "Saudis on USG Warning to Taliban Concerning
UBL Threats," Dec. 14, 1999. Berger wrote President Clinton that the State Department's warning seemed to barely
register with the Taliban. See NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, terrorist threat at the millennium, Dec. 18,
1999.
14. See NSC memo, talking points for Zinni, Dec. 20, 1999; Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 19, 2004); NSC
email, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 22, 1999 (in which Clarke writes that "the Milam mission has largely failed"); NSC
memo, Riedel re Milam call (attached to the Clarke email).
15. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004); George Tenet prepared statement, Mar. 24, 2004, p. 22.
16. Randy Moss interview (Feb. 6, 2004). In sending the draft MON to the CIA, the NSC's senior director
for intelligence programs, Mary McCarthy, cited only the August 1998 and July 1999 MONs as relevant prece-
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