ing with Two of UBL's Brothers, May 19, 2000;Youssef M. Ibrahim,"Saudis Strip Citizenship from Backers of Mil-
itants," New York Times, Apr. 10, 1994, p. 15;"Saudi Family Disassociates Itself from `Terrorist' Member," Associated
Press, Feb. 19, 1994.
114. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); Intelligence report, inter-
rogation of KSM, July 30, 2003; Robert Block,"In War on Terrorism, Sudan Struck a Blow by Fleecing Bin Laden,"
Wall Street Journal, Dec. 3, 2001, p. A1. Despite substantial evidence to the contrary and his own assertion that Bin
Ladin arrived in Afghanistan with no money, KSM has told his interrogators that he believes the bulk of the money
(8595 percent) for the planes operation came from Bin Ladin's personal fortune. Intelligence reports, interroga-
tions of KSM, July 30, 2003; Apr. 5, 2004; June 15, 2004.
115. Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); CIA analytic report, Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations, CTC
2002-40117CH, Nov. 14, 2002.The United States was not a primary source of al Qaeda funding, although some
funds raised in the United States may have made their way to al Qaeda or its affiliated groups. Frank G. and Mary
S. briefing (July 15, 2003).
116. Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); CIA analytic report,"Identifying al-Qa'ida's Donors and Fundraisers:
A Status Report," CTC 2002-40029CH, Feb. 27, 2002.
117. CIA analytic report,"Identifying al-Qa'ida's Donors and Fundraisers:A Status Report," Feb. 27, 2002; CIA
analytic report, spectrum of al Qaeda donors, CTC 2003-30199HC, Oct. 30, 2003; Frank G. interview (Mar. 2,
2004).
118. CIA analytic report,"How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network," CTC 99-40003, Jan. 27,
1999; CIA analytic report, "Gauging the War against al-Qa'ida's Finances," CTC 2002-30078CH, Aug. 8, 2002;
CIA analytic report, paper on Al-Haramain, CTC 2002-30014C, Mar. 22, 2002.
119. CIA analytic report,"Al Qa'ida's Financial Ties to Islamic Youth Programs," CTC 2002-40132HCX, Jan.
17, 2003; CIA analytic report, Al Qaeda Financial Network, CTC 2002-40094H, Aug. 7, 2002.
120. Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); CIA analytic report, Financial Links of Al Qaeda Operative, CTC 2002-
30060CH, June 27, 2002.
121. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003).The Taliban's support was limited to the period immedi-
ately following Bin Ladin's arrival in Afghanistan, before he reinvigorated fund-raising efforts. By 9/11, al Qaeda
was returning the favor, providing substantial financial support to the Taliban.
122. David Aufhauser interview (Feb. 12, 2004).We have found no evidence that Saudi Princess Haifa al Faisal
provided any funds to the conspiracy, either directly or indirectly. See Adam Drucker interview (May 19, 2004).
123. On limited Saudi oversight, see Bob Jordan interview (Jan. 14, 2004). In Saudi Arabia, zakat is broader and
more pervasive than Western ideas of charity, in that it functions not only as charity but also as social welfare, edu-
cational assistance, foreign aid, a form of income tax, and a source of political influence.
124. A hawala, at least in the "pure" form, transfers value without the use of a negotiable instrument or other
commonly recognized method for the exchange of money. For example, a U.S. resident who wanted to send money
to a person in another country, such as Pakistan, would give her money, in dollars, to a U.S.-based hawaladar.The
U.S. hawaladar would then contact his counterpart in Pakistan, giving the Pakistani hawaladar the particulars of the
transaction, such as the amount of money, the code, and perhaps the identity of the recipient.The ultimate recipi-
ent in Pakistan would then go to the Pakistani hawaladar and receive his money, in rupees, from whatever money
the Pakistani hawaladar has on hand. As far as the sender and ultimate recipient are concerned, the transaction is
then complete.The two hawaladars would have a variety of mechanisms to settle their debt, either through offset-
ting transactions (e.g., someone in Pakistan sending money to the United States using the same two hawaladars), a
periodic settling wire transfer from the U.S. hawaladar's bank to the Pakistani hawaladar's bank, or a commercial
transaction, such as the U.S. hawaladar paying a debt or an invoice, in dollars, that the Pakistani hawaladar owes in
the United States. Hawalas typically do not have a large central control office for settling transactions, maintaining
instead a loose association with other hawaladars to transfer value, generally without any formal or legally binding
agreements. See Treasury report,"A Report to Congress in Accordance with Section 359 of the [USA PATRIOT
Act]" Nov. 2002;Treasury report,"Hawala:The Hawala Alternate Remittance System and its Role in Money Laun-
dering," undated (prepared by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network in cooperation with INTERPOL, prob-
ably in 1996).
125. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); CIA analytic report Al-Qa'ida Financiers, CTC 2002-
30138H, Jan. 3, 2003. Moreover, because al Qaeda initially was living hand to mouth, there was no need to store
funds.
126. CIA analytic report,"Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target," CTC 01-40003HCS,Apr. 12, 2001; CIA
analytic report,"Couriers, Hawaladars Key to Moving Al-Qa'ida Money," CTC 2003-40063CH, May 16, 2003.
127. For al Qaeda spending, see Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003).The 1998 U.S. embassy bomb-
ings in East Africa cost approximately $10,000. CIA analytic report,"Gauging the War on Terrorism: Most 11 Sep-
tember Practices Still Viable," Jan. 30, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 3, 2003.Although there
is evidence that al Qaeda experienced funding shortfalls as part of the cyclical fund-raising process (with more
money coming during the holy month of Ramadan), we are not aware of any intelligence indicating that terror-
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