More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts of those events
made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the
hijackings, raising questions about the adequacy of the response.Those accounts
had the effect of deflecting questions about the military's capacity to obtain
timely and accurate information from its own sources. In addition, they over-
stated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful informa-
tion that morning.
In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD offi-
cials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from
the FAA.
175
This statement was incorrect.There was no hijack to report at 9:16.
United 93 was proceeding normally at that time.
In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that at 9:24,
NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American 77.
176
This state-
ment was also incorrect.The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that Amer-
ican 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington,
D.C.
177
In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also
stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications
about American 77,
178
United 93, or both.These statements were incorrect as
well.The fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was
heading south, as is clear not just from taped conversations at NEADS but also
from taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at
NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records.
Yet this response to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single public
timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense.The inac-
curate accounts created the impression that the Langley scramble was a logical
response to an actual hijacked aircraft.
In fact, not only was the scramble prompted by the mistaken information
about American 11, but NEADS never received notice that American 77 was
hijacked. It was notified at 9:34 that American 77 was lost.Then, minutes later,
NEADS was told that an unknown plane was 6 miles southwest of the White
House. Only then did the already scrambled airplanes start moving directly
toward Washington, D.C.
Thus the military did not have 14 minutes to respond to American 77, as
testimony to the Commission in May 2003 suggested. It had at most one or
two minutes to react to the unidentified plane approaching Washington, and
the fighters were in the wrong place to be able to help.They had been respond-
ing to a report about an aircraft that did not exist.
Nor did the military have 47 minutes to respond to United 93, as would be
implied by the account that it received notice of the flight's hijacking at 9:16.
By the time the military learned about the flight, it had crashed.
We now turn to the role of national leadership in the events that morning.
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