38. For KSM's joining al Qaeda, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 13, 2003. KSM has pro-
attacks in late 1998 or in early 1999. Compare Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003; Jan. 9,
2004; Feb. 19, 2004; Apr. 3, 2004. For KSM's antipathy to the United States, see Intelligence report, interrogation
of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004. For Atef 's role, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. For Atef 's death,
see DOS report,"Comprehensive List of Terrorists and Groups Identified Under Executive Order 13224," Dec. 31,
2001.
40. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004; Apr. 30, 2004. An earlier KSM
ligence report, interrogation of KSM,Apr. 17, 2003. KSM has admitted that his statement in a post-9/11 interview
with Al Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda--that an al Qaeda "reconnaissance committee" had identified 30 potential tar-
gets in the United States during the late 1990s--was a lie designed to inflate the perceived scale of the 9/11 oper-
ation. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 23, 2004. For the specific targets, see Intelligence report,
selection of 9/11 targets, Aug. 13, 2003 (citing KSM interrogation).
not learn of the selection of Hazmi and Mihdhar for the planes operation until November 1999. Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004. For Mihdhar's and Hazmi's eagerness, see Intelligence reports, interrogations
of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 20, 2004 . For Bin Ladin's instruction, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb.
20, 2004. Hazmi obtained a B-1/B-2 multiple-entry visa issued at Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, on April 3, 1999; Mihdhar
obtained the same type of visa at the same location on April 7, 1999. DOS records, NIV applicant details for Hazmi
and Mihdhar, Nov. 8, 2001. Hazmi and Mihdhar both obtained new passports shortly before they applied for visas.
FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Jan. 31, 2003, p. 9.
Saudi al Qaeda member, Oct. 3, 2001. For their visits to Afghanistan, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of
detainee, Feb. 5, 2002; Feb. 11, 2002; Intelligence reports, interrogations of Saudi al Qaeda member, Oct. 2, 2001;
Oct. 18, 2001.
44. For Khallad's visa application under a false name and its rejection, see DOS record, visa application of Salah
20, 2003. Khallad's visa denial was based not on terrorism concerns but apparently on his failure to submit suffi-
cient documentation in support of his application. See DOS record, NIV applicant detail, Mar. 31, 2004. For Khal-
lad's 1999 mission to Yemen, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 20, 2003. For the U.S. point of
contact, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 22, 2003. Khallad claims he cannot remember his
U.S. contact's full name but says it sounded like "Barzan." According to the CIA, "Barzan" is possibly identifiable
with Sarbarz Mohammed, the person who resided at the address in Bothell,Washington, that Khallad listed on his
visa application as his final destination. Ibid. For his contacts with "Barzan" and his arrest, see ibid.; Intelligence
report, interrogation of Khallad,Aug. 20, 2003. Nashiri has confirmed that Khallad had been assigned to help pro-
cure explosives for the ship-bombing plot, and that his arrest caused work on the operation to stop temporarily.
Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Feb. 21, 2004.
6, 2004 (August 1999). Khallad's brother reportedly has confirmed that Khallad was released from custody only
after negotiations with the Yemeni director for political security in which a deal was struck prohibiting Khallad and
his associates from conducting operations in Yemen. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 1, 2002. For
his giving up on a visa and his return to Afghanistan, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, July 31,
2003; Aug. 22, 2003.
KSM, Feb. 20, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004. KSM has noted that Ramzi Binal-
shibh, another Yemeni slated early on to participate in the 9/11 attacks, likewise would prove unable to acquire a
U.S. visa the following year. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 7, 2004. For KSM's desire to keep Khal-
lad and Abu Bara involved, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For Saudis being chosen
for the planes operation, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Jan. 7, 2004; Jan. 23, 2004. For KSM's split-
ting the operation into two parts, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003; Intelligence report,
interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 27, 2004.