reports). On Bin Ladin's decision to approve 9/11 operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9,
2004. KSM has observed that the East Africa bombings and the subsequent bombing of the USS Cole yielded a
recruiting bonanza for al Qaeda, as increasing numbers of Arab youth became enamored of the idea of waging jihad
against the United States. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 5, 2003.
head of the media committee, he would take charge of producing the propaganda video al Qaeda issued follow-
ing the bombing of the USS Cole). On the oath, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 13, 2003 (in
which KSM also claims his reluctance stemmed from a concern that he would lose the ability to persevere with
the 9/11 operation should Bin Ladin subsequently decide to cancel it).
possible Israeli operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 30, 2003. On other possible targets
discussed with Atef, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 4, 2003 (Thailand); Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Apr. 4, 2004 (Singapore, Indonesia, Maldives).
of Nashiri, Feb. 10, 2003.
21. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Columbia Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 187, 199.
22. On the trip to Karachi, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 12, 2003. On Hambali's rela-
Al Qaeda began providing funds to JI for terrorist operations as early as 1999. Intelligence report, interrogation of
detainee, Mar. 3, 2004.
2003. In 1987, Sufaat received a bachelor's degree in biological sciences, with a minor in chemistry, from Califor-
nia State University, Sacramento. Sufaat did not start on the al Qaeda biological weapons program until after JI's
December 2000 church bombings in Indonesia, in which he was involved. Intelligence report, interrogation of
Hambali, Sept. 8, 2003. On Sufaat's schooling, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Dec. 14, 2001.
ligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 24, 2003.
their travel from Karachi to Los Angeles, where they would arrive on January 15, 2000. Intelligence report, inter-
rogation of KSM, July 31, 2003. On Hambali's assistance at KSM's request, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, July 31, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 8, 2003. On assistance to Moussaoui, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee,Apr. 9, 2002.
According to statements attributed to Hambali and Sufaat, in each of these instances the al Qaeda guests were lodged
at Sufaat's condominium, an apartment on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur. Intelligence report, interrogation of
detainee, Jan. 22, 2002; Intelligence reports, interrogations of Hambali, Sept. 8, 2003; Sept. 12, 2003.
orders from JI, but al Qaeda would lead any joint operation involving members of both organizations). On Ham-
bali's objections, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 8, 2003. On KSM's coordination with Ham-
bali, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Apr. 17, 2003. On KSM's recognition of Hambali's domain, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. According to KSM, his close relationship with Hambali
prompted criticism from Bashir, the JI leader, who thought Hambali should focus more directly on Indonesia and
Malaysia instead of involving himself in al Qaeda's broader terrorist program. Indeed, KSM describes Hambali as
an al Qaeda member working in Malaysia. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003. Nashiri observes
that al Qaeda's standard security practice dictated that no senior member could manage terrorist activities in a loca-
tion where another senior member was operating. Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Jan. 14, 2003.Yet
al Qaeda's deference to Hambali's turf apparently had limits. Khallad says he and Hambali never discussed the
intended Southeast Asia portion of the original 9/11 plan. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 27,
2004.