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Times, Jan. 20, 2002, p. A1. Enforcing the financial restrictions also proved a challenge--especially in the Middle
East. Anthony Wayne interview (Jan. 14, 2004); Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); DOS report,"Usama Bin Ladin
Intelligence Update," Nov. 19, 1999.
89. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Oct. 30, 1999.
90. Ibid.; NSC memo, Benjamin to CSG, Nov. 12, 1999. Earlier, Clarke had worried that the expulsion of Bin
Ladin might mean he would move to Somalia or Libya, where he might be even harder to target. NSC email, Clarke
to Berger, Oct. 8, 1998.
91. See Intelligence report, relations between al Qaeda and the Taliban, Feb. 20, 2002.
92. Intelligence report, March 2000.
93. UNSCR 1333, Dec. 19, 2000.
94. Edmund Hull interview (Oct. 18, 2003).
95.Ambassador Milam characterized UNSCR 1267 and UNSCR 1333 as "punchless." DOS cable, Islamabad
000656, "Options for dealing with Afghan terrorism problem," Feb. 6, 2001. But Ambassador Sheehan indicated
that even if UNSCR 1333 failed to stop the arms flow from Pakistan to the Taliban, it had enormous symbolic
importance. He also noted that UNSCR 1333 must have stigmatized the Taliban because they "went ballistic over
the sanctions." Sheehan added that UNSCR 1333 made Saudi Arabia and the UAE "very nervous" about their
relationships with the Taliban. Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003).
96.White House cable to U.S. Embassy, Islamabad, message to Prime Minister Sharif, June 16, 1999; Madeleine
Albright prepared statement, Mar. 24, 2004.
97.White House cable to U.S. Embassy, Islamabad, message to Prime Minister Sharif, June 16, 1999; Samuel
Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); NSC memo, Clarke and McCarthy to
Berger, Aug. 2, 1999.
98. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); DOS memo, Sheehan to Albright, "S/CT Update on Critical
Issues," July 9, 1999.
99. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004).
100.Thomas Pickering interview (Dec. 22, 2003).
101. See Executive Order 13099, Aug. 20, 1998.
102. CIA talking points, information on Bin Ladin for the DCI's Sept. 2, 1998, briefing to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Sept. 2, 1998.
103. For the Tirana raid and resulting operations, see Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 261, 264;
Clarke, Against All Enemies, p. 183; CIA talking points,"CIA Operation Results in Capture of Two Bin Ladin Oper-
atives," July 7, 1998; CIA memo, Jeff to Tenet, "Biweekly Developments in CT Policy," July 15, 1998. For other
operations, see NSC memo, Benjamin to Berger, Oct. 9, 1998. For the arrest of Abu Hajer, see CIA report,"Appre-
hension of Senior UBL Lieutenant in Germany," Sept. 22, 1998; NSC memo, Benjamin to Berger, Oct. 9, 1998;
NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 17, 1998. For an overview of the CIA's efforts to disrupt al Qaeda, see Joint
Inquiry testimony of George Tenet, Oct. 17, 2002. For Clarke's comment to Berger, see NSC email, Clarke to
Berger, Sept. 25, 1998.
104. For ambush attempts, see Joint Inquiry report (classified version), pp. 312­313; CIA memo,"Status of the
Bin Ladin Capture Operation," Sept. 30, 1998 (part of materials for Small Group meeting). For CIA officials' doubts,
see James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004); Jeff interview (Dec. 17, 2003). On the quality of the tribals' reporting, see
Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004).The tribals' extensive reporting on Bin Ladin's location is reflected in near
daily UBL Situation Reports prepared for the DCI from December 1998 to January 2001.
105. See Martin Sieff, "Terrorist Is Driven by Hatred for U.S., Israel," Washington Times, Aug. 21, 1998, p. 1.
Regarding the leak, see Mary C. interview (Oct. 25, 2003); Richard Taylor interview (Dec. 10, 2003); Don Kerr
interview (Sept. 9, 2003).
106. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, Nov. 3, 1998; NSC talking points, Nov. 3, 1998. The quoted
sentence is in boldface.
107. NSC memo, summary of conclusions of Oct. 26, 1998, CSG Meeting, Oct. 28, 1998; NSC notes, CSG
Agenda:"Bin Ladin Penetration of the United States," Oct. 26, 1998. For the threat against Washington, see NSC
memo, Clarke to Berger,Weekly Report, July 3, 1998; NSC email, Clarke to various NSC staff, Sept. 7, 1998; NSC
memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, Nov. 3, 1998.
108. NSC memo, summary of conclusions of Oct. 26, 1998, CSG meeting, Oct. 28, 1998.
109. Indictment, United States v. Usama Bin Laden, No. 98 Cr. (S.D. N.Y. unsealed Nov. 4, 1998), p. 3. For the
reports concerning Derunta, see NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, Nov. 3, 1998.
110. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Nov. 4, 1998. Evidence on Iraqi ties to al Qaeda is summarized in chapter 2.
111. Patrick Fitzgerald testimony, June 16, 2004.
112.The PDB was a summary of Intelligence report, planning by UBL to hijack U.S. airplane, Dec. 4, 1998.
For the immediate responses, see NSC memo, summary of conclusions of Dec. 4, 1998, CSG meeting; FAA secu-
rity directive, "Threat to Air Carriers," SD 108-98, Dec. 8, 1998.We requested declassification of this document;
the declassified document was delivered on July 13, 2004.
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