sand nine hundred feet in a rapid rate of descent, the radar target terminated at the World Trade Center.'" FAA
report,"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001. Former NORAD official Alan
Scott testified that the time of impact of United 175 was 9:02. William Scott testimony, May 23, 2003. We have
determined that the impact time was 9:03:11 based on our analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control soft-
ware logic.
132. Ibid., 9:03; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, Cleveland/Boston position, line 5115, 9:05;
134. Joseph McCain interview (Oct. 28, 2003); Robert Marr (Jan. 23, 2004); James Fox interview (Oct. 29,
136. Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14, 2003);Timothy Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 2004).
137. Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to military airspace and then to
tankers in the vicinity of New York, the mission crew commander considered scrambling the Langley fighters to
New York to provide backup for the Otis fighters until the NEADS Battle Cab (the command area that overlooks
the operations floor) ordered "battle stations only at Langley." The alert fighters at Langley Air Force Base were
ordered to battle stations at 9:09. Colonel Marr, the battle commander at NEADS, and General Arnold, the CONR
commander, both recall that the planes were held on battle stations, as opposed to scrambling, because they might
be called on to relieve the Otis fighters over New York City if a refueling tanker was not located, and also because
of the general uncertainty of the situation in the sky.According to William Scott at the Commission's May 23, 2003,
hearing,"At 9:09, Langley F-16s are directed to battle stations, just based on the general situation and the breaking
news, and the general developing feeling about what's going on." See NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Comman-
der, channel 2, 9:08:36; Robert Marr interview (Oct. 27, 2003); Larry Arnold interview (Feb. 3, 2004). See also
Colonel Marr's statement that "[t]he plan was to protect New York City." Filson, Air War Over America, p. 60.
139.The Indianapolis Center controller advised other Indianapolis Center personnel of the developing situa-
be affected. John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004).
the simultaneous loss of radio communications and radar identification." FAA report,"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack
Events September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001.
Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position;
September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, p. 13.
allow the display of primary radar data from the "tertiary" and "quadrary" radars.
headquarters issued a directive to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. Review of the same mate-
rials also indicates that no one within FAA located American 77 until the aircraft was identified by Dulles con-
trollers at 9:32. For much of that time, American 77 was traveling through Washington Center's airspace. The
Washington Center's controllers were looking for the flight, but they were not told to look for primary radar returns.
Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp.
14, 27.
147. FAA memo, "Partial Transcript; Aircraft Accident; AAL77; Washington, DC; September 11, 2001," Sept.