group loaded a Learjet with explosives and took off for a suicide mission to Washington. Military officials said they
could scramble fighter jets from Langley Air Force Base to chase the aircraft, but they would need "executive" orders
to shoot it down. Chuck Green interview (Apr. 21, 2004). For no recognition of this threat, see Ralph Eberhart
interview (Mar. 1, 2004).
99. Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004).
100. Donald Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004); Langley Air Force Base 119th Fighter Wing briefing (Oct.
67, 2003).
101. Collin Scoggins interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004); FAA report,"Crisis Management Handbook for
Significant Events," Feb. 15, 2000; DOD memo, CJCS instruction,"Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of
Derelict Airborne Objects," June 1, 2001.
102. See FAA regulations, Hijacked Aircraft, Order 7110.65M, para.10-2-6 (2001); David Bottiglia interview
(Oct. 1, 2003); FAA report,"Crisis Management Handbook for Significant Events," Feb. 15, 2000. From interviews
of controllers at various FAA centers, we learned that an air traffic controller's first response to an aircraft incident
is to notify a supervisor, who then notifies the traffic management unit and the operations manager in charge.The
FAA center next notifies the appropriate regional operations center (ROC), which in turn contacts FAA head-
quarters. Biggio stated that for American 11, the combination of three factors--loss of radio contact, loss of
transponder signal, and course deviation--was serious enough for him to contact the ROC in Burlington, Mass.
However, without hearing the threatening communication from the cockpit, he doubts Boston Center would have
recognized or labeled American 11 "a hijack." Terry Biggio interview (Sept. 22, 2003); see also Shirley Miller inter-
view (Mar. 30, 2004); Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004).
103. FAA regulations, Special Military Operations, Requests for Service, Order 7610.4J, paras. 7-1-1, 7-1-2
(2001); DOD memo, CJCS instruction, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne
Objects," June 1, 2001.
104. Ralph Eberhart interview (Mar. 1, 2004);Alan Scott interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Robert Marr interview (Jan.
23, 2004); FAA regulations, Position Reports within NORAD Radar Coverage, Order 7610.4J, para. 7-4-2 (2001);
DOD memo, CJCS instruction,"Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," June
1, 2001.
105. FAA regulations,Air/Ground Communications Security, Order 7610.4J, para. 7-1-6 (2001); FAA regula-
tions,Vectors, Order 7610.4J, para. 7-2-3 (2001).
106. Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 22, 2003);Terry Biggio interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004); Collin
Scoggins interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Daniel Bueno interview (Sept. 22, 2003). For evidence of the numerous
attempts by air traffic control to raise American 11, see FAA memo,"Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident;AAL11; New
York, NY; September 11, 2001," Feb. 15, 2002, p. 7.
107. DOD radar files, 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, "9/11 Autoplay," undated; Peter Zalewski interview
(Sept. 22, 2003); John Schippani interview (Sept. 22, 2003).
108. Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 22, 2003); John Schippani interview (Sept. 22, 2003).
109. FAA memo,"Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident;AAL11; New York, NY; September 11, 2001," Feb. 15, 2002,
p. 11; Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 23, 2003).
110. Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 23, 2003); John Schippani interview (Sept. 22, 2003);Terry Biggio inter-
views (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004); Robert Jones interview (Sept. 22, 2003).
111. FAA memo,"Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident;AAL11; New York, NY; September 11, 2001,"Apr. 19, 2002,
p. 2; FAA record, Boston Center daily record of facility operation, Sept. 11, 2001;Terry Biggio interviews (Sept.
22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004); Daniel Bueno interview (Sept. 22, 2004). See also FAA memo,"Transcription of 9/11 Tapes,"
Oct. 2, 2003, p. 2; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, line 4525, 8:328:33.
112. See FAA memo,"Transcription of 9/11 Tapes," Oct. 2, 2003, pp. 23; FAA record, New England Region
Daily Log, Sept. 11, 2001; Daniel Bueno interview (Sept. 22, 2003);Terry Biggio interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8,
2004).
113. FAA memo,"Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident;AAL11; New York, NY; September 11, 2001," Feb. 15, 2002,
p. 12.
114. FAA memo,"Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident;AAL11; New York, NY; September 11, 2001," Jan. 28, 2002,
p. 5.
115. FAA memo,"Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident;AAL11; New York, NY; September 11, 2001,"Apr. 19, 2002,
p. 5;Terry Biggio interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Collin Scoggins interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004); Daniel Bueno
interview (Sept. 22, 2003).
116. On 9/11, NORAD was scheduled to conduct a military exercise,Vigilant Guardian, which postulated a
bomber attack from the former Soviet Union. We investigated whether military preparations for the large-scale
exercise compromised the military's response to the real-world terrorist attack on 9/11. According to General Eber-
hart,"it took about 30 seconds" to make the adjustment to the real-world situation. Ralph Eberhart testimony, June
17, 2004.We found that the response was, if anything, expedited by the increased number of staff at the sectors and
at NORAD because of the scheduled exercise. See Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004).
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
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