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38. Ibid.; Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004).
39. NTSB report,"Flight Path Study--American Airlines Flight 11," Feb. 19, 2002.
40.The 56 passengers represented a load factor of 33.33 percent of the airplane's seating capacity of 168, below
the 49.22 percent for Flight 175 on Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11, 2001. See UAL
report, Flight 175 BOS-LAX Load Factors, undated (from June 1, 2001, to Sept. 11, 2001). Nine passengers hold-
ing reservations for Flight 175 did not show for the flight.They were interviewed and cleared by the FBI. FAA report,
"Executive Summary," Sept. 12, 2001; FAA report,"Executive Summary, Chronology of a Multiple Hijacking Cri-
sis, September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; UAL record, Flight 175 ACARS report, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight
175 Flight Data Recap, Sept. 11, 2001.
41. FAA report,"Executive Summary," Sept. 12, 2001; FAA report,"Executive Summary, Chronology of a Mul-
tiple Hijacking Crisis, September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; NTSB report,"Flight Path Study--United Airlines 175,"
Feb. 19, 2002; NTSB report,Air Traffic Control Recording--United Airlines Flight 175, Dec. 21, 2001. At or around
this time, flight attendants Kathryn Laborie and Alfred Marchand would have begun cabin service in first class; with
Amy King and Robert Fangman in business class; and with Michael Tarrou, Amy Jarret, and Alicia Titus in econ-
omy class. See UAL report, "Flight 175 Flight Attendant Positions/Jumpseats," undated. United flight attendants,
unlike those at American, did not carry cockpit keys. Instead, such keys were stowed in the cabin--on Flight 175,
in the overhead bin above seats 1A and 1B in first class. See Don Dillman briefing (Nov. 18, 2003); Bob Jordan
briefing (Nov. 20, 2003).
42.Asked by air traffic controllers at 8:37 to look for an American Airlines 767 (Flight 11), United 175 reported
spotting the aircraft at 8:38. At 8:41, the flight crew reported having "heard a suspicious transmission" from another
aircraft shortly after takeoff,"like someone keyed the mike and said everyone stay in your seats." See NTSB report,
Air Traffic Control Recording--United Airlines Flight 175, Dec. 21, 2001.
43. See Marc Policastro interview (Nov. 21, 2003); FBI reports of investigation, interview of Lee Hanson, Sept.
11, 2001; interview of Marc Policastro, Sept. 11, 2001; interview of Louise Sweeney, Sept. 28, 2001; interview of
Ronald May, Sept. 11, 2001. On both American 11 and United 175, Boeing 767 double-aisled aircraft, the hijack-
ers arrayed themselves similarly: two seated in first class close to the cockpit door, the pilot hijacker seated close
behind them, and at least one other hijacker seated close behind the pilot hijacker. Hijackers were seated next to
both the left and right aisles. On American 77 and United 93, Boeing 757 single-aisle aircraft, the pilot hijacker sat
in the first row, closest to the cockpit door. See FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004,
pp. 67-69; AAL schematics for Flight 11 and Flight 77; UAL schematics for Flight 175 and Flight 93.
44. NTSB report,"Flight Path Study--United Airlines 175," Feb. 19, 2002; NTSB report, Air Traffic Control
Recording--United Airlines Flight 175, Dec. 21, 2001.
45. See FBI report of investigation, interview of Lee Hanson, Sept. 11, 2001.
46. Flight crew on board UAL aircraft could contact the United office in San Francisco (SAMC) simply by
dialing *349 on an airphone. See FBI report of investigation, interview of David Price, Jan. 24, 2002.At some point
before 9:00, SAMC notified United's headquarters of the emergency call from the flight attendant. See Marc Poli-
castro interview (Nov. 21, 2003); FBI report of investigation, interview of Marc Policastro, Sept.11, 2001; Rich Miles
interiew (Nov. 21, 2003).
47. NTSB report,"Flight Path Study--United Airlines 175," Feb. 19, 2002.
48. See FBI reports of investigation, interview of Julie Sweeney, Oct. 2, 2001; interview of Louise Sweeney,
Sept. 28, 2001.
49. See FBI report of investigation, interview of Lee Hanson, Sept. 11, 2001.
50. See ibid.; interview of Louise Sweeney, Sept. 28, 2001.
51. NTSB report,"Flight Path Study--United Airlines 175," Feb. 19, 2002.
52. AAL report, "Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin
Positions During Start of Cabin Service," undated;AAL email,Young to Clark,"Flight Crews," Sept. 12, 2001;AAL
record, Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001.
53.AAL record, System Operations Command Center (SOCC) log, Sept. 11, 2001, p. 2; NTSB report,"Flight
Path Study--American Airlines Flight 77," Feb. 19, 2002. Flight attendant Renee May would likely have started
working in the first-class galley; Michele Heidenberger would have been in the aft galley; Jennifer Lewis would
have been in first class; and Kenneth Lewis would have been in the main cabin. On cabin service, see AAL report,
"Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start
of Cabin Service," undated. For cruising altitude, see NTSB report,"Flight Path Study--American Airlines Flight
77," Feb. 19, 2002. On events in the cabin, see FAA recording, Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center, position
HNN R, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Theodore Olson, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report of
investigation, interview of Ronald and Nancy May, Sept. 12, 2001; AAL record, Dispatch Environmental
Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001.
54.Air traffic control notified American's headquarters of the problem, and the airline began attempts to con-
tact the flight by 8:59 via ACARS. See NTSB report, "Flight Path Study--American Airlines Flight 77," Feb. 19,
2002. On American 11, the transponder signal was turned off at 8:21; on United 175, the code was changed at 8:47;
on American 77, the signal was turned off at 8:56; and on United 93, the signal was turned off at 9:41. See FAA
report,"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; Richard Byard interview (Sept.
454
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
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