10. See TSA report,"Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers," undated; see also UAL letter,"Flight 175--
11 Sep01 Passenger ACI Check-in History," July 11, 2002.
11.The Hazmis checked in at 7:29; the airline has not yet been able to confirm the time of Hanjour's check-
in. However, it had to have taken place by 7:35, when he appears on the checkpoint videotape. See AAL record,
SABRE information for Flight 77, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL response to the Commission's February 3, 2004, requests,
Mar. 15, 2004; Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal checkpoints, Sept. 11,
2001.
12. See TSA report,"Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers," undated; see also FAA report,"Selectee List
AALA #77," undated; FBI report of investigation, interview of Vaughn Allex, Sept. 12, 2001;Vaughn Allex inter-
view (July 13, 2004).
13.The FAA conducted many screener evaluations at Dulles between September 11, 1999, and September 11,
2001.While the test results for physical search exceeded the national average, both the metal detector and X-ray
results were below average. See FAA briefing materials, "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD,"
Oct. 24, 2001.
14. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal checkpoints, Sept. 11, 2001;
see also Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004).
15. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal checkpoints, Sept. 11, 2001;
see also Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004).
16. For investigation findings, see FAA report, "American Airlines Flight #77: Hijacking and Crash into the
Pentagon, Sept. 11, 2001," undated. For screener evaluations, see Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004).
17. See AAL record, SABRE information for Flight 77, Sept. 11, 2001;AAL response to the Commission's Feb-
ruary 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004.
18. UAL record, Flight 93 EWR bag loading status, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight 93 EWR ACI passen-
ger history, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight 93 EWR full bag history, Sept. 11, 2001;TSA report,"Selectee Sta-
tus of September 11th Hijackers," undated; FBI report,"The Final 24 Hours," Dec. 8, 2003.
19.The FAA conducted many screener evaluations at Newark between September 11, 1999, and September
11, 2001. Detection rates for metal detection, physical searches, and X-rays all met or exceeded the national aver-
ages. See FAA briefing materials,"Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD," Oct. 24, 2001; see also
FAA report,"United Airlines Flight 93, September 11, 2001, Executive Report," Jan. 30, 2002.
20. UAL record, Flight 93 EWR ACI passenger history, Sept. 11, 2001; see also FBI report, "The Final 24
Hours," Dec. 8, 2003.
21.While Flights 11 and 77 were at or slightly above the average number of passengers for the respective flights
that summer, Flights 175 and 93 were well below their averages.We found no evidence to indicate that the hijack-
ers manipulated the passenger loads on the aircraft they hijacked. Financial records did not reveal the purchase of
any tickets beyond those the hijackers used for themselves. See FBI response to Commission briefing request no.
6, undated (topic 8);AAL report,"Average Load Factor by Day-of-Week," undated (for Flights 11 and 77 from June
11, 2001, to Sept. 9, 2001);AAL response to the Commission's supplemental document requests, Jan. 20, 2004; UAL
report, Flight 175 BOS-LAX Load Factors, undated (from June 1, 2001, to Sept. 11, 2001); UAL report,"Explana-
tion of Load Factors," undated.
22. See AAL response to the Commission's February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004; AAL record, Dispatch
Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001;AAL report,"Flight Attendant Jump
Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service,"
undated; AAL report,"Passenger Name List, Flight 11/September 11," undated.
23. Commission analysis of NTSB and FAA air traffic control and radar data. See AAL record, Dispatch Envi-
ronmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001; NTSB report,"Flight Path Study--Amer-
ican Airlines Flight 11," Feb. 19, 2002; Bill Halleck and Peggy Houck interview (Jan. 8, 2004).The initial service
assignments for flight attendants on American 11 would have placed Karen Martin and Bobbi Arestegui in first
class; Sara Low and Jean Roger in business class; Dianne Snyder in the midcabin galley; Betty Ong and Amy Sweeney
in coach; and Karen Nicosia in the aft galley. Jeffrey Collman would have been assigned to work in coach, but to
assist in first class if needed. See AAL report, "Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight
Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service," undated; Bob Jordan briefing (Nov. 20, 2003).
24. NTSB report, Air Traffic Control Recording--American Airlines Flight 11, Dec. 21, 2001; NTSB report,
Air Traffic Control Recording--United Airlines Flight 175, Dec. 21, 2001. Given that the cockpit crew of Ameri-
can 11 had been acknowledging all previous instructions from air traffic control that morning within a matter of
seconds, and that when the first reporting of the hijacking was received a short time later (the 8:19 call from Betty
Ong) a number of actions had already been taken by the hijackers, it is most likely that the hijacking occurred at
8:14
A
.
M
.
25.An early draft of an executive summary prepared by FAA security staff for the agency's leadership referred
to an alleged report of a shooting aboard Flight 11.We believe this report was erroneous for a number of reasons--
there is no evidence that the hijackers purchased firearms, use of a gun would be inconsistent with the otherwise
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
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