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· We also recommend that the intelligence committee should have a

subcommittee specifically dedicated to oversight, freed from the con-
suming responsibility of working on the budget.

· The resolution creating the new intelligence committee structure

should grant subpoena authority to the committee or committees.
The majority party's representation on this committee should never
exceed the minority's representation by more than one.

· Four of the members appointed to this committee or committees

should be a member who also serves on each of the following addi-
tional committees:Armed Services, Judiciary, Foreign Affairs, and the
Defense Appropriations subcommittee. In this way the other major
congressional interests can be brought together in the new commit-
tee's work.

· Members should serve indefinitely on the intelligence committees,

without set terms, thereby letting them accumulate expertise.

· The committees should be smaller--perhaps seven or nine members

in each house--so that each member feels a greater sense of respon-
sibility, and accountability, for the quality of the committee's work.

The leaders of the Department of Homeland Security now appear before 88
committees and subcommittees of Congress. One expert witness (not a mem-
ber of the administration) told us that this is perhaps the single largest obstacle
impeding the department's successful development.The one attempt to con-
solidate such committee authority, the House Select Committee on Home-
land Security, may be eliminated.The Senate does not have even this.

Congress needs to establish for the Department of Homeland Security the

kind of clear authority and responsibility that exist to enable the Justice Depart-
ment to deal with crime and the Defense Department to deal with threats to
national security.Through not more than one authorizing committee and one
appropriating subcommittee in each house, Congress should be able to ask the
secretary of homeland security whether he or she has the resources to provide
reasonable security against major terrorist acts within the United States and to
hold the secretary accountable for the department's performance.

Recommendation: Congress should create a single, principal point of
oversight and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are
best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this
department and its duties. But we believe that Congress does have
the obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and
that this committee should be a permanent standing committee with
a nonpartisan staff.

HOW TO DO IT?

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