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makers and warfighters a decisive edge in any conflict where the interests of
the United States are vital. Not only does good intelligence win wars, but the
best intelligence enables us to prevent them from happening altogether.
Under the terms of existing rules and resolutions the House and Senate
intelligence committees lack the power, influence, and sustained capability to
meet this challenge.While few members of Congress have the broad knowl-
edge of intelligence activities or the know-how about the technologies
employed, all members need to feel assured that good oversight is happening.
When their unfamiliarity with the subject is combined with the need to pre-
serve security, a mandate emerges for substantial change.
Tinkering with the existing structure is not sufficient. Either Congress
should create a joint committee for intelligence, using the Joint Atomic Energy
Committee as its model, or it should create House and Senate committees with
combined authorizing and appropriations powers.
Whichever of these two forms are chosen, the goal should be a structure--
codified by resolution with powers expressly granted and carefully limited--
allowing a relatively small group of members of Congress, given time and
reason to master the subject and the agencies, to conduct oversight of the intel-
ligence establishment and be clearly accountable for their work. The staff of
this committee should be nonpartisan and work for the entire committee and
not for individual members.
The other reforms we have suggested--for a National Counterterrorism
Center and a National Intelligence Director--will not work if congressional
oversight does not change too. Unity of effort in executive management can
be lost if it is fractured by divided congressional oversight.
Recommendation: Congressional oversight for intelligence--and
counterterrorism--is now dysfunctional. Congress should address this
problem.We have considered various alternatives: A joint committee
on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is one.
A single committee in each house of Congress, combining authoriz-
ing and appropriating authorities, is another.
· The new committee or committees should conduct continuing stud-
ies of the activities of the intelligence agencies and report problems
relating to the development and use of intelligence to all members of
the House and Senate.
· We have already recommended that the total level of funding for intel-
ligence be made public, and that the national intelligence program be
appropriated to the National Intelligence Director, not to the secre-
tary of defense.
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