believe this proposal to be consistent with it. Each agency would con-
centrate on its comparative advantages in building capabilities for joint
missions.The operation itself would be planned in common.
if these stereotypes match current reality; they may also be one more
symptom of the civil-military misunderstandings we described in
chapter 4. It is a problem to be resolved in policy guidance and agency
management, not in the creation of redundant, overlapping capabili-
ties and authorities in such sensitive work.The CIA's experts should
be integrated into the military's training, exercises, and planning. To
quote a CIA official now serving in the field:"One fight, one team."
have described, the overall amounts of money being appropriated for
national intelligence and to its component agencies should no longer
be kept secret. Congress should pass a separate appropriations act for
intelligence, defending the broad allocation of how these tens of bil-
lions of dollars have been assigned among the varieties of intelligence
work.
could learn about intelligence capabilities by tracking the top-line appropria-
tions figure.Yet the top-line figure by itself provides little insight into U.S. intel-
ligence sources and methods. The U.S. government readily provides copious
information about spending on its military forces, including military intelli-
gence.The intelligence community should not be subject to that much disclo-
sure. But when even aggregate categorical numbers remain hidden, it is hard
to judge priorities and foster accountability.
We have already stressed the importance of intelligence analysis that can draw
on all relevant sources of information. The biggest impediment to all-source
analysis--to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots--is the human or sys-
temic resistance to sharing information.