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· The National Intelligence Director would set personnel policies to
establish standards for education and training and facilitate assignments
at the national intelligence centers and across agency lines. The
National Intelligence Director also would set information sharing and
information technology policies to maximize data sharing, as well as
policies to protect the security of information.
· Too many agencies now have an opportunity to say no to change.The
National Intelligence Director should participate in an NSC execu-
tive committee that can resolve differences in priorities among the
agencies and bring the major disputes to the president for decision.
The National Intelligence Director should be located in the Executive Office
of the President. This official, who would be confirmed by the Senate and
would testify before Congress, would have a relatively small staff of several hun-
dred people, taking the place of the existing community management offices
housed at the CIA.
In managing the whole community, the National Intelligence Director is still
providing a service function.With the partial exception of his or her responsi-
bilities for overseeing the NCTC, the National Intelligence Director should
support the consumers of national intelligence--the president and policymak-
ing advisers such as the secretaries of state, defense, and homeland security and
the attorney general.
We are wary of too easily equating government management problems with
those of the private sector. But we have noticed that some very large private
firms rely on a powerful CEO who has significant control over how money is
spent and can hire or fire leaders of the major divisions, assisted by a relatively
modest staff, while leaving responsibility for execution in the operating divisions.
There are disadvantages to separating the position of National Intelligence
Director from the job of heading the CIA. For example, the National Intelli-
gence Director will not head a major agency of his or her own and may have
a weaker base of support. But we believe that these disadvantages are out-
weighed by several other considerations:
· The National Intelligence Director must be able to directly oversee intel-
ligence collection inside the United States.Yet law and custom has coun-
seled against giving such a plain domestic role to the head of the CIA.
· The CIA will be one among several claimants for funds in setting
national priorities.The National Intelligence Director should not be
both one of the advocates and the judge of them all.
· Covert operations tend to be highly tactical, requiring close attention.
The National Intelligence Director should rely on the relevant joint
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