The need to restructure the intelligence community grows out of six prob-
lems that have become apparent before and after 9/11:
· Structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work. National intelli-
gence is still organized around the collection disciplines of the home
agencies, not the joint mission. The importance of integrated, all-
source analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to
"connect the dots." No one component holds all the relevant infor-
mation.
By contrast, in organizing national defense, the Goldwater-
Nichols legislation of 1986 created joint commands for operations in
the field, the Unified Command Plan.The services--the Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Marine Corps--organize, train, and equip their peo-
ple and units to perform their missions. Then they assign personnel
and units to the joint combatant commander, like the commanding
general of the Central Command (CENTCOM). The Goldwater-
Nichols Act required officers to serve tours outside their service in
order to win promotion.The culture of the Defense Department was
408
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
· National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which develops,
acquires,and launches space systems for intelligence collection
· Other national reconnaissance programs
Departmental intelligence agencies:
· Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the Department of
Defense
· Intelligence entities of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marines
· Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the Depart-
ment of State
· Office of Terrorism and Finance Intelligence of the Depart-
ment of Treasury
· Office of Intelligence and the Counterterrorism and Coun-
terintelligence Divisions of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion of the Department of Justice
· Office of Intelligence of the Department of Energy
· Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Pro-
tection (IAIP) and Directorate of Coast Guard Intelligence
of the Department of Homeland Security
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