that of analyst in chief.
tive departments, and they are guarded for understandable reasons: the DCI
commands the CIA's personnel overseas; the secretary of defense will not yield
to others in conveying commands to military forces; the Justice Department
will not give up the responsibility of deciding whether to seek arrest warrants.
But the result is that each agency or department needs its own intelligence
apparatus to support the performance of its duties. It is hard to "break down
stovepipes" when there are so many stoves that are legally and politically enti-
tled to have cast-iron pipes of their own.
had to "give up some of their turf and authorities and prerogatives."Today, he
said, the executive branch is "stove-piped much like the four services were
nearly 20 years ago." He wondered if it might be appropriate to ask agencies
to "give up some of their existing turf and authority in exchange for a stronger,
faster, more efficient government wide joint effort."
operational planning.
J-3, and overall policy by J-5. Our concept combines the J-2 and J-3 functions
(intelligence and operational planning) in one agency, keeping overall policy
coordination where it belongs, in the National Security Council.
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), built on the foundation of the
existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Breaking the
older mold of national government organization, this NCTC should
be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed
by personnel from the various agencies. The head of the NCTC
should have authority to evaluate the performance of the people
assigned to the Center.
earlier national agencies like the National Reconnaissance Office,
which was formed to organize the work of the CIA and several
defense agencies in space.