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travel, entry, and immigration--was not seen as a national security matter. Pub-
lic figures voiced concern about the "war on drugs," the right level and kind
of immigration, problems along the southwest border, migration crises origi-
nating in the Caribbean and elsewhere, or the growing criminal traffic in
humans.The immigration system as a whole was widely viewed as increasingly
dysfunctional and badly in need of reform. In national security circles, how-
ever, only smuggling of weapons of mass destruction carried weight, not the
entry of terrorists who might use such weapons or the presence of associated
foreign-born terrorists.
For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons.Terrorists must
travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case targets, and gain access to attack.
To them, international travel presents great danger, because they must surface
to pass through regulated channels, present themselves to border security offi-
cials, or attempt to circumvent inspection points.
In their travels, terrorists use evasive methods, such as altered and counter-
feit passports and visas, specific travel methods and routes, liaisons with corrupt
government officials, human smuggling networks, supportive travel agencies,
and immigration and identity fraud.These can sometimes be detected.
Before 9/11, no agency of the U.S. government systematically analyzed ter-
rorists' travel strategies. Had they done so, they could have discovered the ways
in which the terrorist predecessors to al Qaeda had been systematically but
detectably exploiting weaknesses in our border security since the early 1990s.
We found that as many as 15 of the 19 hijackers were potentially vulnera-
ble to interception by border authorities. Analyzing their characteristic travel
documents and travel patterns could have allowed authorities to intercept 4 to
15 hijackers and more effective use of information available in U.S. govern-
ment databases could have identified up to 3 hijackers.
32
Looking back, we can also see that the routine operations of our immigra-
tion laws--that is, aspects of those laws not specifically aimed at protecting
against terrorism--inevitably shaped al Qaeda's planning and opportunities.
Because they were deemed not to be bona fide tourists or students as they
claimed, five conspirators that we know of tried to get visas and failed, and one
was denied entry by an inspector.We also found that had the immigration sys-
tem set a higher bar for determining whether individuals are who or what they
claim to be--and ensuring routine consequences for violations--it could poten-
tially have excluded, removed, or come into further contact with several hijack-
ers who did not appear to meet the terms for admitting short-term visitors.
33
Our investigation showed that two systemic weaknesses came together in
our border system's inability to contribute to an effective defense against the
9/11 attacks: a lack of well-developed counterterrorism measures as a part of
border security and an immigration system not able to deliver on its basic com-
mitments, much less support counterterrorism. These weaknesses have been
reduced but are far from being overcome.
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