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· opportunity and space to recruit, train, and select operatives with the
needed skills and dedication, providing the time and structure
required to socialize them into the terrorist cause, judge their trust-
worthiness, and hone their skills;
· a logistics network able to securely manage the travel of operatives,
move money, and transport resources (like explosives) where they
need to go;
· access, in the case of certain weapons, to the special materials needed
for a nuclear, chemical, radiological, or biological attack;
· reliable communications between coordinators and operatives; and
· opportunity to test the workability of the plan.
Many details in chapters 2, 5, and 7 illustrate the direct and indirect value of
the Afghan sanctuary to al Qaeda in preparing the 9/11 attack and other oper-
ations.The organization cemented personal ties among veteran jihadists work-
ing together there for years. It had the operational space to gather and sift
recruits, indoctrinating them in isolated, desert camps. It built up logistical net-
works, running through Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates.
Al Qaeda also exploited relatively lax internal security environments in West-
ern countries, especially Germany. It considered the environment in the United
States so hospitable that the 9/11 operatives used America as their staging area
for further training and exercises--traveling into, out of, and around the coun-
try and complacently using their real names with little fear of capture.
To find sanctuary, terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least gov-
erned, most lawless places in the world.The intelligence community has pre-
pared a world map that highlights possible terrorist havens, using no secret
intelligence--just indicating areas that combine rugged terrain, weak gover-
nance, room to hide or receive supplies, and low population density with a town
or city near enough to allow necessary interaction with the outside world. Large
areas scattered around the world meet these criteria.
5
In talking with American and foreign government officials and military offi-
cers on the front lines fighting terrorists today, we asked them: If you were a
terrorist leader today, where would you locate your base? Some of the same
places come up again and again on their lists:
· western Pakistan and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region
· southern or western Afghanistan
· the Arabian Peninsula, especially Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and the
nearby Horn of Africa, including Somalia and extending southwest
into Kenya
· Southeast Asia, from Thailand to the southern Philippines to Indonesia
· West Africa, including Nigeria and Mali
· European cities with expatriate Muslim communities, especially cities
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