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The DCI did not develop a management strategy for a war against Islamist
terrorism before 9/11. Such a management strategy would define the capabil-
ities the intelligence community must acquire for such a war--from language
training to collection systems to analysts. Such a management strategy would
necessarily extend beyond the CTC to the components that feed its expertise
and support its operations, linked transparently to counterterrorism objectives.
It would then detail the proposed expenditures and organizational changes
required to acquire and implement these capabilities.
DCI Tenet and his deputy director for operations told us they did have a
management strategy for a war on terrorism. It was to rebuild the CIA.They
said the CIA as a whole had been badly damaged by prior budget constraints
and that capabilities needed to be restored across the board. Indeed, the CTC
budget had not been cut while the budgets had been slashed in many other
parts of the Agency. By restoring funding across the CIA, a rising tide would
lift all boats.They also stressed the synergy between improvements of every part
of the Agency and the capabilities that the CTC or stations overseas could draw
on in the war on terror.
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As some officials pointed out to us, there is a tradeoff in this management
approach. In an attempt to rebuild everything at once, the highest priority
efforts might not get the maximum support that they need. Furthermore, this
approach attempted to channel relatively strong outside support for combat-
ing terrorism into backing for across-the-board funding increases. Proponents
of the counterterrorism agenda might respond by being less inclined to loosen
the purse strings than they would have been if offered a convincing countert-
errorism budget strategy. The DCI's management strategy was also focused
mainly on the CIA.
Lacking a management strategy for the war on terrorism or ways to see how
funds were being spent across the community, DCI Tenet and his aides found
it difficult to develop an overall intelligence community budget for a war on
terrorism.
Responsibility for domestic intelligence gathering on terrorism was vested
solely in the FBI, yet during almost all of the Clinton administration the rela-
tionship between the FBI Director and the President was nearly nonexistent.
The FBI Director would not communicate directly with the President. His key
personnel shared very little information with the National Security Council
and the rest of the national security community. As a consequence, one of the
critical working relationships in the counterterrorism effort was broken.
The Millennium Exception
Before concluding our narrative, we offer a reminder, and an explanation, of
the one period in which the government as a whole seemed to be acting in
concert to deal with terrorism--the last weeks of December 1999 preceding
the millennium.
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