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When the travelers left Kuala Lumpur for Bangkok, local officials were able
to identify one of the travelers as Khalid al Mihdhar. After the flight left, they
learned that one of his companions had the name Alhazmi. But the officials did
not know what that name meant.
The information arrived at Bangkok too late to track these travelers as they
came in. Had the authorities there already been keeping an eye out for Khalid
al Mihdhar as part of a general regional or worldwide alert, they might have
tracked him coming in. Had they been alerted to look for a possible compan-
ion named Nawaf al Hazmi, they might have noticed him too. Instead, they
were notified only after Kuala Lumpur sounded the alarm. By that time, the
travelers had already disappeared into the streets of Bangkok.
On January 12, the head of the CIA's al Qaeda unit told his bosses that sur-
veillance in Kuala Lumpur was continuing. He may not have known that in
fact Mihdhar and his companions had dispersed and the tracking was falling
apart. U.S. officials in Bangkok regretfully reported the bad news on January
13. The names they had were put on a watchlist in Bangkok, so that Thai
authorities might notice if the men left the country. On January 14, the head
of the CIA's al Qaeda unit again updated his bosses, telling them that officials
were continuing to track the suspicious individuals who had now dispersed to
various countries.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence of any tracking efforts actually being
undertaken by anyone after the Arabs disappeared into Bangkok. No other
effort was made to create other opportunities to spot these Arab travelers in
case the screen in Bangkok failed. Just from the evidence in Mihdhar's pass-
port, one of the logical possible destinations and interdiction points would have
been the United States.Yet no one alerted the INS or the FBI to look for these
individuals.They arrived, unnoticed, in Los Angeles on January 15.
In early March 2000, Bangkok reported that Nawaf al Hazmi, now identi-
fied for the first time with his full name, had departed on January 15 on a
United Airlines flight to Los Angeles. Since the CIA did not appreciate the sig-
nificance of that name or notice the cable, we have found no evidence that this
information was sent to the FBI.
Even if watchlisting had prevented or at least alerted U.S. officials to the
entry of Hazmi and Mihdhar, we do not think it is likely that watchlisting, by
itself, have prevented the 9/11 attacks.Al Qaeda adapted to the failure of some
of its operatives to gain entry into the United States. None of these future
hijackers was a pilot. Alternatively, had they been permitted entry and sur-
veilled, some larger results might have been possible had the FBI been patient.
These are difficult what-ifs.The intelligence community might have judged
that the risks of conducting such a prolonged intelligence operation were too
high--potential terrorists might have been lost track of, for example.The pre-
9/11 FBI might not have been judged capable of conducting such an opera-
tion. But surely the intelligence community would have preferred to have the
chance to make these choices.
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