the Cold War and its immediate aftermath.These capabilities were insufficient,
but little was done to expand or reform them.
cers, particularly in the Bin Ladin unit, were eager for the mission, most were
not.The higher management of the directorate was unenthusiastic.The CIA's
capacity to conduct paramilitary operations with its own personnel was not
large, and the Agency did not seek a large-scale general expansion of these capa-
bilities before 9/11. James Pavitt, the head of this directorate, remembered that
covert action, promoted by the White House, had gotten the Clandestine Ser-
vice into trouble in the past. He had no desire to see this happen again. He
thought, not unreasonably, that a truly serious counterterrorism campaign
against an enemy of this magnitude would be business primarily for the mili-
tary, not the Clandestine Service.
worked on plans for using Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan and that
they hoped for action orders. JCS Chairman General Shelton and General
Anthony Zinni at Central Command had a different view. Shelton felt that the
August 1998 attacks had proved a waste of good ordnance and thereafter con-
sistently opposed firing expensive Tomahawk missiles merely at "jungle gym"
terrorist training infrastructure.
but he was also prepared to make perfectly clear his own strong doubts about
the wisdom of any military action that risked U.S. lives unless the intelligence
was "actionable."
was nowhere more apparent than in the military establishment.After the August
1998 missile strike, other members of the JCS let the press know their unhap-
piness that, in conformity with the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, Shelton had
been the only member of the JCS to be consulted. Although follow-on mili-
tary options were briefed more widely, the vice director of operations on the
Joint Staff commented to us that intelligence and planning documents relating
to al Qaeda arrived in a ziplock red package and that many flag and general
officers never had the clearances to see its contents.
ous foreign enemy then threatening the United States.The Clinton adminis-
tration effectively relied on the CIA to take the lead in preparing long-term
offensive plans against an enemy sanctuary. The Bush administration adopted
this approach, although its emerging new strategy envisioned some yet unde-