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ority should be placed on eliminating that threat. Wolfowitz contended that
the odds were "far more" than 1 in 10, citing Saddam's praise for the attack, his
long record of involvement in terrorism, and theories that Ramzi Yousef was
an Iraqi agent and Iraq was behind the 1993 attack on the World Trade Cen-
ter.
73
The next day, Wolfowitz renewed the argument, writing to Rumsfeld
about the interest of Yousef 's co-conspirator in the 1995 Manila air plot in
crashing an explosives-laden plane into CIA headquarters, and about informa-
tion from a foreign government regarding Iraqis' involvement in the attempted
hijacking of a Gulf Air flight. Given this background, he wondered why so lit-
tle thought had been devoted to the danger of suicide pilots, seeing a "failure
of imagination" and a mind-set that dismissed possibilities.
74
On September 19, Rumsfeld offered several thoughts for his commanders
as they worked on their contingency plans.Though he emphasized the world-
wide nature of the conflict, the references to specific enemies or regions named
only the Taliban, al Qaeda, and Afghanistan.
75
Shelton told us the administra-
tion reviewed all the Pentagon's war plans and challenged certain assumptions
underlying them, as any prudent organization or leader should do.
76
General Tommy Franks, the commanding general of Central Command,
recalled receiving Rumsfeld's guidance that each regional commander should
assess what these plans meant for his area of responsibility. He knew he would
soon be striking the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. But, he told us, he
now wondered how that action was connected to what might need to be done
in Somalia,Yemen, or Iraq.
77
On September 20, President Bush met with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, and the two leaders discussed the global conflict ahead.When Blair asked
about Iraq, the President replied that Iraq was not the immediate problem.
Some members of his administration, he commented, had expressed a differ-
ent view, but he was the one responsible for making the decisions.
78
Franks told us that he was pushing independently to do more robust plan-
ning on military responses in Iraq during the summer before 9/11--a request
President Bush denied, arguing that the time was not right. (CENTCOM also
began dusting off plans for a full invasion of Iraq during this period, Franks
said.) The CENTCOM commander told us he renewed his appeal for further
military planning to respond to Iraqi moves shortly after 9/11, both because
he personally felt that Iraq and al Qaeda might be engaged in some form of
collusion and because he worried that Saddam might take advantage of the
attacks to move against his internal enemies in the northern or southern parts
of Iraq, where the United States was flying regular missions to enforce Iraqi
no-fly zones. Franks said that President Bush again turned down the request.
79
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.
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H av i ng i s sue d d i re c t ive s to guide his administration's preparations for
war, on Thursday, September 20, President Bush addressed the nation before a
joint session of Congress. "Tonight," he said, "we are a country awakened to
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