back, wait to see if they got the message, and hit them hard if they did not. He
made clear that the military should focus on targets that would influence the
Taliban's behavior.
Military Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan." The paper took it as a given
that Bin Ladin would continue to act against the United States even while
under Taliban control. It therefore detailed specific U.S. demands for the Tal-
iban: surrender Bin Ladin and his chief lieutenants, including Ayman al
Zawahiri; tell the United States what the Taliban knew about al Qaeda and its
operations; close all terrorist camps; free all imprisoned foreigners; and comply
with all UN Security Council resolutions.
to 48 hours, or the United States will use all necessary means to destroy the
terrorist infrastructure. The State Department did not expect the Taliban to
comply. Therefore, State and Defense would plan to build an international
coalition to go into Afghanistan. Both departments would consult with NATO
and other allies and request intelligence, basing, and other support from coun-
tries, according to their capabilities and resources. Finally, the plan detailed a
public U.S. stance: America would use all its resources to eliminate terrorism
as a threat, punish those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, hold states and other
actors responsible for providing sanctuary to terrorists, work with a coalition
to eliminate terrorist groups and networks, and avoid malice toward any peo-
ple, religion, or culture.
pointing.
Franks said, did not have an off-the-shelf plan to eliminate the al Qaeda threat
in Afghanistan. The existing Infinite Resolve options did not, in his view,
amount to such a plan.
David.
fowitz, and Cofer Black, chief of the DCI's Counterterrorist Center.
warlords who would join the fight against al Qaeda.
praised this proposal, saying it had been a turning point in his thinking.