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10.2 PLANNING FOR WAR
By late in the evening of September 11, the President had addressed the nation
on the terrible events of the day.Vice President Cheney described the Presi-
dent's mood as somber.
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The long day was not yet over.When the larger meet-
ing that included his domestic department heads broke up, President Bush
chaired a smaller meeting of top advisers, a group he would later call his "war
council."
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This group usually included Vice President Cheney,Secretary of State
Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, General Hugh Shelton, Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (later to become chairman) General Myers, DCI
Tenet, Attorney General Ashcroft, and FBI Director Robert Mueller. From the
White House staff, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Chief of
Staff Card were part of the core group, often joined by their deputies, Stephen
Hadley and Joshua Bolten.
In this restricted National Security Council meeting, the President said it
was a time for self-defense.The United States would punish not just the per-
petrators of the attacks, but also those who harbored them. Secretary Powell
said the United States had to make it clear to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the
Arab states that the time to act was now. He said we would need to build a
coalition.The President noted that the attacks provided a great opportunity to
engage Russia and China. Secretary Rumsfeld urged the President and the
principals to think broadly about who might have harbored the attackers,
including Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan, and Iran. He wondered aloud how
much evidence the United States would need in order to deal with these coun-
tries, pointing out that major strikes could take up to 60 days to assemble.
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President Bush chaired two more meetings of the NSC on September 12.
In the first meeting, he stressed that the United States was at war with a new
and different kind of enemy.The President tasked principals to go beyond their
pre-9/11 work and develop a strategy to eliminate terrorists and punish those
who support them.As they worked on defining the goals and objectives of the
upcoming campaign, they considered a paper that went beyond al Qaeda to
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THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
FBI was aware of the flights of Saudi nationals and was able to screen
the passengers before they were allowed to depart.
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The FBI interviewed all persons of interest on these flights prior to
their departures.They concluded that none of the passengers was con-
nected to the 9/11 attacks and have since found no evidence to change
that conclusion. Our own independent review of the Saudi nationals
involved confirms that no one with known links to terrorism departed
on these flights.
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