background image
should be eliminated entirely. In an effort to preserve their mission, members
of the air defense community advocated the importance of air sovereignty
against emerging "asymmetric threats" to the United States: drug smuggling,
"non-state and state-sponsored terrorists," and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and ballistic missile technology.
97
NORAD perceived the dominant threat to be from cruise missiles. Other
threats were identified during the late 1990s, including terrorists' use of aircraft
as weapons. Exercises were conducted to counter this threat, but they were not
based on actual intelligence. In most instances, the main concern was the use
of such aircraft to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
Prior to 9/11, it was understood that an order to shoot down a commer-
cial aircraft would have to be issued by the National Command Authority (a
phrase used to describe the president and secretary of defense). Exercise plan-
ners also assumed that the aircraft would originate from outside the United
States, allowing time to identify the target and scramble interceptors.The threat
of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the United States--and using
them as guided missiles--was not recognized by NORAD before 9/11.
98
Notwithstanding the identification of these emerging threats, by 9/11 there
were only seven alert sites left in the United States, each with two fighter air-
craft on alert.This led some NORAD commanders to worry that NORAD
was not postured adequately to protect the United States.
99
In the United States, NORAD is divided into three sectors. On 9/11, all
the hijacked aircraft were in NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (also
known as NEADS), which is based in Rome, New York. That morning
NEADS could call on two alert sites, each with one pair of ready fighters: Otis
Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Langley Air Force
Base in Hampton,Virginia.
100
Other facilities, not on "alert," would need time
to arm the fighters and organize crews.
NEADS reported to the Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR)
headquarters, in Panama City, Florida, which in turn reported to NORAD
headquarters, in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
Interagency Collaboration.
The FAA and NORAD had developed proto-
cols for working together in the event of a hijacking.As they existed on 9/11,
the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD
required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of gov-
ernment.
101
FAA guidance to controllers on hijack procedures assumed that the aircraft
pilot would notify the controller via radio or by "squawking" a transponder code
of "7500"--the universal code for a hijack in progress. Controllers would notify
their supervisors, who in turn would inform management all the way up to FAA
headquarters in Washington.Headquarters had a hijack coordinator,who was the
director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security or his or her designate.
102
If a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the hijack coordinator on
"WE HAVE SOME PLANES"
17
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 17